There is some evidence that children of divorced parents do not perform as well as comparable children in intact families but that this gap declines with the aggregate divorce rate. We develop a model in which the higher expectations for remarriage associated with higher divorce rates can trigger an equilibrium in which divorced fathers make more generous transfers that benefit their children and the mother in the aftermath of divorce. As a result, the welfare loss of children from the separation of their parents can be lower when divorce and remarriage rates rise.

"This article investigates the role of surprises in marital dissolution [in the United States]. Surprises consists of changes in the predicted earning capacity of either spouse. Data from the National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 is used. We find that an unexpected increase in the husband's earning capacity reduces the divorce hazard, while an unexpected increase in the wife's earning capacity raises the divorce hazard. Couples sort into marriage according to characteristics that are likely to enhance the stability of the marriage. The divorce hazard is initially increasing with the duration of marriage, and the presence of children and high levels of property stabilizes the marriage."

An analysis of the economic impact of divorce settlements in the United States is presented using data for a white cohort taken from the National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972. "The effects of spouses' incomes on the divorce transfer are estimated and used to simulate the welfare effects of divorce on husbands, wives, and children under alternative assumptions about marriage contracts and the ability of a couple to continue coordinating resources in the aftermath of divorce. We find a positive (negative) relationship between divorce transfers and the growth of husband's (wife's) earnings during marriage. The estimated expenditure on children in the divorce state is only half the accustomed level during marriage."

The failure of many divorced fathers to comply with court-mandated child support awards has been identified as a major reason why a growing number of children live in poverty in female-headed households. This paper presents a model that seeks to explain why so many divorced fathers allow their children's welfare to suffer as a consequence of divorce. The point of departure is the recognition that children are collective consumption goods from the point of view of the father and mother. Within marriage, proximity and altruism serve to overcome the "free-rider" problem associated with the provision of public goods. However, on divorce the noncustodial parent suffers a loss of control over the allocative decisions of the custodial parent and it is not feasible for the couple to achieve a Pareto-optimal allocation of their joint resources. A model of optimal marriage contracts is constructed in which a couple decides on the allocation of resources within marriage and on the terms of a settlement in the event of divorce. The settlement consists of the determination of custody and transfer of income to the custodial parent. Divorce is endogenous in our model and its occurrence depends on a random variable introduced into the family budget constraint that measures the quality of the marriage match. The analysis yields several useful insights. In addition to explaining the apparently insufficient support by custodians we explain why custody rights and alimony transfers often go in the same direction, most commonly to the wife, and why uneven distribution of income between the spouses increases the probability of divorce.

This paper analyses the optimum pricing policies of a multiproduct monopoly in the presence of inflation and fixed costs of nominal price changes. We examine the conditions which lead to staggered or synchronized pricing policies when the timing of price changes is endogenous. Two aspects of the decision problem are emphasized: the interactions in the joint profit function between the prices of the various goods and the interactions in the costs of price adjustment. We show that with positive interactions in the profit function and costs of price adjustments that are independent across products, staggering is unlikely. Depending on initial conditions, a firm may follow a staggered steady state or a synchronized steady state path. But the former is locally unstable while the latter is attained from a broad set of initial conditions. For a small rate of interest the staggered policy is optimal if! the interaction in profits is negative.

We describe aggregate inflation as a stochastic process in which the rate of change of the price level can be positive or zero, where the times spent in each state are of random duration. This class of processes includes Two-State Markov Chains and Renewal Processes as special cases. It is shown that the optimal pricing policy of a monopolistic firm with non-convex costs of price adjustment is (S, s) in its real-price, i.e. its nominal price relative to the price level. A basic certainty-equivalence result is proved: i.e. the firm behaves as if it faces a certain and fixed rate of inflation, higher than the actual expected rate, the difference between the two rates being a risk premium which depends on the real interest rate and the parameters of the stochastic process. One can thus apply previous results from the case of certainty (Sheshinski and Weiss, The Review of Economic Studies, 1977) to obtain comparative static results. In particular, one finds that an increase in the variance of expected inflation leads firms to choose a pricing policy with larger amplitude in real price. The paper also addresses the question of consistency in firms' expectations when the price level is determined by the firms' actions.

Journal Article Expected Interruptions in Labour Force Participation and Sex-Related Differences in Earnings Growth Get access Yoram Weiss, Yoram Weiss Tel Aviv University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Reuben Gronau Reuben Gronau Hebrew University and the National Bureau of Economic Research Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 48, Issue 4, October 1981, Pages 607–619, https://doi.org/10.2307/2297200 Published: 01 October 1981 Article history Received: 01 October 1980 Accepted: 01 March 1981 Published: 01 October 1981

Eytan Sheshinski, Yoram Weiss; Demand for Fixed Factors, Inflation and Adjustment Costs, The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 46, Issue 1, 1 January 1979