This paper examines the effect of board gender diversity on firm performance in China's listed firms from 1999 to 2011. We document a positive and significant relation between board gender diversity and firm performance. Female executive directors have a stronger positive effect on firm performance than female independent directors, indicating that the executive effect outweighs the monitoring effect. Moreover, boards with three or more female directors have a stronger impact on firm performance than boards with two or fewer female directors, consistent with the critical mass theory. Finally, we find that the impact of female directors on firm performance is significant in legal person-controlled firms but insignificant in state-controlled firms. This paper sheds new light on China's boardroom dynamics. As governments increasingly contemplate board gender diversity policies, our study offers useful empirical guidance to Chinese regulators on the issue.

The Real-Time Transaction Reporting System (RTRS) reduced the delay in reporting municipal bond trades from one-day to 15 min. We find a significant reduction in secondary market trading costs after the introduction of the RTRS. Our estimates imply that retail investors benefited primarily from reduced dealer intermediation costs, while large trades benefited from reductions in bargaining costs. Bonds experienced increases in trading volume across the liquidity spectrum. We find higher dealer capital commitment, longer intermediation chains, and fewer pre-arranged trades, all suggesting increased market-making incentives for dealers. These results are largely consistent with predictions from search-based models.

This paper investigates how variations in stock-level leverage lead to dynamic intraday trading behavior and illiquidity transmission across different stocks by utilizing a unique, precise, stock-level margin trading dataset. We document that leveraged investors’ need to meet margin call requirements and liquidity demands due to prior market drops results in subsequent selloffs in otherwise stable stocks, particularly in trading sessions in which there is little new information. This effect exists both within and across different industries and is stronger for stocks with less information asymmetry, better liquidity, higher past stock performance, and even during trading suspension. We also find strong evidence on the volatility spillover induced by leverage. Taken together, such findings suggest that our results are driven by illiquidity contagion instead of information spillover. Our study contributes to the research on asset fire sales, margin trading, and funding liquidity during the intraday deleveraging process in financial market turmoil.

It is common practice worldwide for corporate insiders to put up stock as collateral for personal loans. We highlight a potential problem in such pledging. When controlling shareholders face a margin call threat if stock prices fall below the required level for a loan, they have an incentive to use corporate resources for their private benefit. We develop and test a margin call hypothesis that controlling shareholders may initiate share repurchases to fend off potential margin calls associated with pledged stocks in order to maintain their control rights. Investors seem to recognize such behavior and discount the potential benefits of repurchase programs. However, share pledges are not reliably related to repurchases when control rights are not a concern. We further show that regulatory restrictions of control rights on pledging effectively reduce the likelihood of firms' repurchasing. Overall, our results shed light on the impact of share pledges on corporate decisions.

Abstract Data from the Taiwan Stock Exchange identify the originator of each submitted order, and there are no designated dealers or specialists. We study marketable order imbalances, i.e., the net order flow resulting from trades that demand immediacy. We distinguish imbalances by trader type (individuals, domestic institutions, foreign institutions) and by the usual size of each trader's order. Day-to-day persistence in order imbalance is strongest for small foreign institutions and weakest for large individual traders. Such persistence emanates both from splitting orders over time and from herding, and there is little evidence that aggregate price pressures from such persistence last beyond a trading day, indicating that de facto market making is quite effective. We attempt to discern which types of traders are de facto liquidity providers, which are likely to be informed, and which trade for liquidity reasons. The evidence indicates that all trader classes are successful market makers, large domestic institutions conduct the most informed trades, and large individuals are noise or liquidity traders.

We provide the first comprehensive and robust evidence on the relationship between board independence and firm performance in China. We find that independent directors have an overall positive effect on firm operating performance in China. Our findings are robust to a battery of tests, including endogeneity checks using instrumental variables, the dynamic generalized method of moments estimator, and the difference-in-differences method. The positive relationship between board independence and firm performance is stronger in government-controlled firms and in firms with lower information acquisition costs. We also document that Chinese independent directors play an important role in constraining insider self-dealing and improving investment efficiency.

IPO auctions, which provide an impartial way of determining IPO pricing and share allocations, offer a natural setting for examining whether institutional investors possess private information, and for measuring how valuable their information is. Analyzing detailed bidding data from Taiwan’s discriminatory (pay-as-bid) auctions, we find that, relative to retail investors, institutional investors tend to bid higher in auctions when IPO shares are more valuable, and that underpricing is larger in auctions with relatively higher institutional bids. These results imply that institutional investors are better informed about IPO value, and that they obtain higher information rents when they bid higher relative to retail investors. We estimate the value of institutional investors’ private information to be worth about 8.68% of return, which is the extra rate of return they command on their informational advantages over retail investors.

Individual investor trading results in systematic and economically large losses. Using a complete trading history of all investors in Taiwan, we document that the aggregate portfolio of individuals suffers an annual performance penalty of 3.8 percentage points. Individual investor losses are equivalent to 2.2% of Taiwan's gross domestic product or 2.8% of the total personal income. Virtually all individual trading losses can be traced to their aggressive orders. In contrast, institutions enjoy an annual performance boost of 1.5 percentage points, and both the aggressive and passive trades of institutions are profitable. Foreign institutions garner nearly half of institutional profits.

Although dividend clientele have been studied over several decades, their existence remains controversial. We study the interaction of dividends and taxes by exploiting a unique dataset from Taiwan, where the capital gains tax is zero. We find strong evidence of a clientele effect. Agents subject to high rates of taxation on dividends tend to hold stocks with lower dividends and sell (buy) stocks that raise (lower) dividends. Agents in lower tax brackets behave in the opposite manner. After legalization of repurchases in 2000, firms with higher concentrations of more heavily taxed shareholders were more apt to begin repurchase programs.