This paper investigates whether being a local leader affects a firm's stock price crash risk. We find that local leadership, in terms of being a relatively large firm in a surrounding locality, decreases a firm's stock price crash risk. The results are robust to both an instrumental variable and a difference-in-differences regression approach. We also document that the impact on crash risk depends on the extent to which local communities are likely to be monitoring local firms through their stock market participation rates, the information environment surrounding these firms, and the level of industry competition. Overall, our results highlight a novel benefit of being a local leader, as it is associated with a higher level of local monitoring which renders the firm less prone to crash risk.

Compared to the past literature on prediction markets that uses small-scale observational field data or experiments, this present research examines the efficiency of such markets by studying catastrophe (CAT) bonds. We collect actual catastrophe loss data, match them with the defined trigger events of each CAT bond contract, and then employ an empirical pricing framework to obtain the excess CAT premiums in order to represent the market-based forecasts. Our results indeed show that market-based forecasts have more significant predictive content for future CAT losses than professional forecasts that use natural catastrophe risk models. Although the predictive information for CAT events is specialized and complex, our evidence supports that CAT bond markets are successful prediction markets that efficiently aggregate information about future CAT losses. Our resultsalso highlight that actual CAT losses in future periods can explain the excess CAT bond spreads in the primary market and provide support for market efficiency when pricing CAT risk.

This study proposes chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence to be an alternative explanation to corporate cash holdings. We find positive effects of CEO overconfidence on the level of cash holdings and the value of cash, which are mainly due to the investment environments faced by firms. The positive effects of CEO overconfidence on cash holdings level and cash value are barely affected by the traditional motives of cash holdings based on trade-off and agency theories. The analysis of cash sources further explains why firms with overconfident CEOs can aggressively pursue risky investments and maintain large cash holdings at the same time. Although the prior literature indicates that overconfident CEOs tend to avoid equity issues for their capital investments, the contribution to cash savings from equity is higher than that from debt. Additional robustness tests also support our empirical findings.

Investor preferences for holding speculative assets are likely to be more pronounced ahead of firms’ earnings announcements, probably because of lower inventory costs and immediate payoffs or because of enhanced investor attention. We show that the demand for lottery-like stocks is stronger ahead of earnings announcements, leading to a price run-up for these stocks. In sharp contrast to the standard underperformance of lottery-like stocks, lottery-like stocks outperform non-lottery stocks by about 52 basis points in the 5-day window ahead of earnings announcements. However, this return spread is reversed by 80 basis points in the 5-day window after the announcements. Moreover, this inverted-V-shaped pattern on cumulative return spreads is more pronounced among firms with a greater retail order imbalance, among firms with low institutional ownership, and in regions with a stronger gambling propensity, and it is also robust after controlling for past 12-month returns and various proxies for investor attention.

We study the behavior of the U.S. labor share over the past 90 years. We find that the observed decline of the labor share is entirely explained by the capitalization of intellectual property products in the national income and product accounts.

We examine the causal effect of managerial litigation risk on managers’ disclosure of earnings warnings in the face of large earnings shortfalls. Exploring the staggered adoption of universal demand (UD) laws as an exogenous decrease in litigation risk, we find that the adoption leads to a decrease in managers’ issuance of earnings warnings, especially among firms facing a higher litigation risk prior to the adoption. In contrast, we find no change in managers’ tendency to alert investors of impending large positive earnings surprises. Collectively, our results provide causal evidence that higher litigation risk incentivizes managers to issue more earnings warnings. Our results differ from Bourveau et al.’s finding of an increase in the frequency of management earnings forecasts after the adoption of UD laws. We reconcile our findings with theirs by demonstrating that the effect of adopting UD laws on management earnings forecasts depends critically on forecast horizon: The adoption increases long‐horizon forecasts, but decreases short‐horizon forecasts.

We examine the relation between CEO delta, firm locality, and firm value for a sample of 7749 firm-year observations. We find that CEO delta is more value-enhancing for rural firms, those associated with exacerbated agency conflicts resulting from decreased observability of managerial investment decisions and higher levels of information asymmetry. Further, the positive relation between CEO delta and firm value is stronger for rural firms with higher levels of information asymmetry or in less religious areas. Our findings imply that managerial ownership is more effective in mitigating agency conflicts in rural areas with higher levels of information asymmetry and lower degrees of local trustworthy constituents. Our results are robust to alternative definitions of urban/rural firms, the inclusion of additional control variables, and various tests controlling the endogeneity between firm location and value. Finally, the results do not appear to be driven by reverse causality.

Recent research finds that investors' assessments of a stock's fundamental value are influenced by corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance through the affect‐as‐information heuristic. We extend prior research by examining two boundary conditions for the use of this heuristic: (i) whether the CSR performance relates to activities that are integrated in a firm's core business practices (material CSR issues) or not (immaterial CSR issues), and (ii) whether the CSR performance is positive or negative. Employing an experimental method, we find that the affect‐as‐information heuristic applies only to immaterial CSR issues but not to material CSR issues, and only to positive but not negative CSR performance. Our findings suggest that investors likely use a heuristic approach to process immaterial and positive CSR issues, and a more deliberate and systematic approach to process material or negative CSR issues. Our study has both practical and theoretical implications.

In this study, we examine the joint effect of vertical pay dispersion and peer observability on subordinates' misreporting choices. We adopt a participative budgeting setting in which two subordinates report to one superior, and we manipulate vertical pay dispersion (low/high) and peer observability (absent/present). Subordinates have private information about actual project costs and can over‐report project costs to the superior without detection and thus create budgetary slack. When a peer's reporting choices are observable, we predict and find that peer reporting choices have an asymmetric influence on the focal subordinates' reporting choices, and this asymmetric influence depends on the level of vertical pay dispersion. Specifically, we find that when vertical pay dispersion is low, subordinates who observe peer reports containing low slack misreport less , whereas observing peer reports that contain high slack has no significant effect. However, when vertical pay dispersion is high , subordinates who observe peer reports containing high slack misreport more , whereas observing peer reports that contain low slack has no significant effect. Driven by these asymmetric effects, subordinates misreport less in the presence of peer observability than in its absence when vertical pay dispersion is low and misreport more in the presence of peer observability than in its absence when vertical pay dispersion is high. Overall, our findings suggest that when a firm has a more egalitarian pay structure (i.e., low vertical pay dispersion), an open information policy is conducive to a more honest reporting environment, whereas under a more hierarchical pay structure (i.e., high vertical pay dispersion), open information policies can compromise the honesty of subordinates' reports.