This study examines the impact of regulatory capital and several of its determinants (i.e., earnings, loan loss provisions, charge‐offs and growth) on bank managers' financing decisions and investors' interpretations of those decisions. The analysis is related to two streams of research. We add to the corporate finance literature that seeks to explain the market's reaction to security issuances by developing and testing a refined set of predictions of the demand for debt and equity capital using a sample of capital‐regulated firms (banks). We extend the accounting literature that links regulatory capital‐management decisions with bank performance by examining whether investors infer that performance. We find that bank managers' financing choices reflect their private information regarding the levels of regulatory capital, earnings, and charge‐offs in the issuance year. We document a negative market reaction to capital‐increasing issuances and a positive reaction to capital‐decreasing issuances. A cross‐sectional analysis of that market reaction indicates that investors infer managers' expectations of earnings in the issuance year

The following text is Standard & Poor's official response to the Basel Committee's proposal, which was presented to the regulators in December 1999. Standard & Poor’s welcomes the opportunity to respond to the committee’s proposal. The risk adjustment of capital, introduced in a simplified format in the 1988 Basel accord, was adopted by most of the world’s bank regulatory regimes. The current proposal could meaningfully advance this process, a development that Standard & Poor’s strongly supports

This paper investigates the use of undisclosed limit orders on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). Our findings suggest that undisclosed limit orders are used to reduce the option value of limit orders. We find no evidence that undisclosed limit orders are more frequently used by informed traders than disclosed limit orders. The effects of recent changes in undisclosed order regulation are also examined. We find that the enhancement in pre-trade transparency, through tightening the undisclosed order regulation in October 1994, resulted in a significant decline in trading volume. The impact of the second regulation change in October 1996, which further tightened undisclosed order regulation, resulted in a less significant trading volume reduction