We modify the 1983 Diamond and Dybvig model so that banks offer liquidity services to depositors, raise equity funding, make risky loans, and invest in safe, liquid assets. Banks monitor borrowers to ensure that they repay loans and they are susceptible to depositor runs. We model the run decision by solving a novel global game. Relative to a social planner, banks opt for a more deposit-intensive capital structure, their assets may be more or less lending intensive, and the level of lending may be higher or lower. Correcting these three distortions requires a package of three regulations

Stress tests convey information about the strictness of future tests, creating incentives for banks to alter their future lending behavior. Regulators recognize and use this influence: they may conduct softer stress tests to encourage lending or tougher stress tests to reduce risk-taking. This information management can lead to inefficiencies when (a) the test loses credibility or (b) the test becomes self-fulfilling. In addition, banks may distort their lending behavior in anticipation of the stress test design, leading to further surplus losses. The analysis applies to banking supervision and regulation more broadly

We investigate the impact of dividend policy on earnings quality and opportunistic earnings management for individual banks across 45 developed and developing countries between 1996 and 2019. Our estimates show that high dividend payments reduce earnings management, hence mitigate agency problems. This mitigation is especially prevalent among well-capitalised and non-listed banks. Greater investor protection and government regulation appear to strengthen the negative association between dividend policy and earnings management. Our results hold robustly across many different specifications

Credit rating-based capital regulation induces financial institutions to take on additional systematic risk. In this paper, we uncover interconnected channels through which this systematic risk hoarding affects financial stability using a proprietary ECB bond holdings dataset. First, banks and insurance corporations effectively reduce their capital buffers by hoarding bonds with high systematic credit risk. Second, this hoarding increases the portfolio concentration of credit rating-constrained and unconstrained financial institutions. Third, in addition to the general tendency of regulated financial institutions to fire sale bonds after rating downgrades, we reveal even larger fire sales precisely when their regulatory advantages of reaching for systematic yield disappear. Using a shock in capital regulation, we establish this causal relationship between the severity of fire sales and the tendencies of regulatory-constrained financial institutions to seek bonds with high systematic credit risk. Such systematic risk hoarding reduces capital buffer by an additional 16% in economic downturns

This paper examines the impact of bank opacity on European financial stability. Based on a panel dataset of listed European banks covering the period 2002–2018, I find that bank opacity has a significant influence on the institution-specific contribution to the ∆Conditional Value at Risk and Marginal Expected Shortfall. The enforcement mechanism and the policies introduced by accounting standard setters and regulators for the risk disclosure of banks have a positive impact on the reduction of systemic risk. Both the risk reporting in accordance with IFRS 7 and the measures introduced by the Basel Committee in the form of the Basel Pillar 3 regulation led to an increase in transparency and thus an improvement in financial market stability. As an independent enforcement mechanism, the country-specific strength of the external auditing profession plays a significant role in fostering stability. The results are robust, by using both alternative opacity measures and instrumental-variable estimations (2SLS) to control for potential endogeneity

We study the international coordination of bank capital requirements under a host-country rule: the requirement depends on where the borrower, not the bank, is located. In such a regime, countries compete for scarce bank equity capital. Raising a country’s requirement may generate bank capital outflows as well as inflows. We pin down the condition for the sign of the capital flow and the associated externality, and highlight the policy implications. Absent collaboration, overshooting is likely: individual countries have an incentive to increase Basel III’s Counter-Cyclical Capital Buffer too much in good times and cut it too much in bad times

This study explores the relationship between sovereign credit risk, banking fragility, and global financial factors in a large panel database of emerging market economies. To measure banking fragility, we construct a novel model-based semi-parametric metric (JLoss) that computes the expected joint loss of the banking sector in each country conditional on a country-level systemic event. Our metric of banking fragility is positively associated with sovereign credit spreads, after controlling for the standard determinants of sovereign credit risk, a comprehensive set of measures of systemic risk, and country and time fixed effects. The results additionally indicate that countries with more fragile banking sectors are more exposed to global (exogenous) financial factors than those with more resilient banking sectors. These findings underscore that regulators must ensure the stability of the banking sector to improve governments’ borrowing costs in international debt markets

This study explores the empirical link between income inequality and banks’ Loan Loss Provisions (LLPs) through a sample of banking institutions from 132 countries, applying a panel regression methodology. The evidence reveals that higher LLPs have a positive impact on income inequality, and the findings remain valid across various model specifications and income inequality measures. The results also hold against various robustness tests, such as different bank sizes, developed vs. emerging countries, the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis, and the controlling for risk. The implications are relevant for stakeholders, including regulators that endeavor to protect banking systems against expected and unexpected losses via LLPs. Specifically, since credit decisions have substantial effects on income inequality, regulators should mitigate the accumulation of LLPs, allowing more funds to be available for other banking system activities and functions

We document novel evidence on the spillover effect of a corporate control regulation on local mortgage markets. We find that banks directly targeted by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) to rectify their internal control weaknesses reduce mortgage originations following the regulation’s enactment. This causes mortgage credit to be reallocated toward other banks in the same local markets: while competing public banks expand lending to safer borrowers, private banks increase lending toward risky applicants. Consequently, loans originated by private banks in spillover counties report higher default rates

We conduct an international study on the effect of climate policy uncertainty on the systemic risk of banks from G20 countries. We find that climate policy uncertainty is associated with lower bank systemic risk. This relation is more pronounced in countries with high innovation capacity, climate readiness, more systemically important banks, and a more competitive banking system. Climate-related information disclosure and sustainable investments are critical economic channels through which the effect of climate policy uncertainty works. Our findings alleviate the concern that climate transition risk may contribute to financial instability and provide practical implications for regulators to design climate transition policies