Knowledge that Transforms

Scope of the inquiry, 202. — I. Costs in generating power: inadequacy of the data available, 204; two estimates, 205; comparison with conventional power plants, 209; implications, 211. — II. Effects on real output, 213; on household consumption, 215. — Effects on the location of industry: diminished significance of agricultural differentials, 216; power differentials, 217; classification of large users of fuel and power, 218; effects on each, 218. — General considerations: concentration of industry, 222; technical inflexibilities in production, 224; cultural and institutional elements, 224; dynamic forces, 226.

Journal Article The Fallacies of Lord Keynes' General Theory: Reply Get access Jacques Rueff Jacques Rueff Institut d'Études Politiques, Paris Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 62, Issue 5, November 1948, Pages 771–782, https://doi.org/10.2307/1883471 Published: 01 November 1948

Introduction: scope of the paper, 263. — I. Unionism and earnings, 1933–45: the data, 264; analysis of relative wage movements, 267. — II. Alternative hypotheses: differences in skill, 274; urban and rural industries, 275; proportion of women, 276; degree of monopoly, 277; expanding and contracting industries, 277; summary of these considerations, 279. — III. Unionism and earnings, 1890–1926: Douglas' data, 280; appraisal of the indexes, 281; a more fundamental objection, 282. — IV. Implications, 284.

Misunderstanding in the use of the concept: explicit definitions, 396; implicit definitions, 397; criticism of these, 398. — Bargaining power and its effect on price: perfect competition, 400; agreement, 401; major determinants of power, 402; difficulties of definition, 403. — False antithesis between bargaining power and competitive market forces: the bargaining theory of wages, 408; theoretical indeterminateness, 410. — Inequality in power relative to time, direction and magnitude of price movement, 411. — Critique of alternative treatments of bargaining power: Dunlop, 413; Slichter, 414; Shister, 414. — Conclusions, 417.

Introduction: The freedom-control problem involves, beyond economic science, all social science and philosophy; criteria for judging books reviewed, 641. — I. Ordeal by Planning, by John Jewkes, 645. — II. Economic Policy for a Free Society, by Henry Simons, 650. — III. Alternative to Serfdom, by J. M. Clark, 656. — IV. Democracy and Progress, by David McCord Wright, 662.

I. Introduction, 698. — II. The relation of new investment to changes in the use of existing capital, 700. — III. The analysis applied to three concrete problems: (a) vertical integration, 706. — IV. (b) Development of backward areas, 708. — V. (c) The trade cycle, 711.

"Circumstances give in reality to every political principle its distinguishing color and discriminating effect." Edmund Burke, on the Revolution in France. Introduction, 714. — I. The classical economists' theory of the state and of government, 716. — II. Universal economic, yet hmited political, freedom, 725. — III. Reasons for distrust of popular, and of authoritarian, government, 729. — IV. The paradox of free trade and nationalism, 736. — V. The distribution of power: checks and balances, 739. — VI. The free market as the means to political progress, 742. — Conclusion, 746.

The problem, 229. — Plant and envelope curves: plant average cost, 230; average cost, 231; the envelope, 234. — Divisibility and economies of scale: reasons for successively lower minima, 235; the imperfect divisibility analysis, 236; the “mathematics” of divisibility, 238; divisibility and efficiency, 239; capital equipment, 243. — Proportionality and diseconomies of scale: importance of the problem, 246; the unnecessary search for a fixed factor, 247; reasons for higher plant curves, 248; no “most efficient proportion,” 249. — Constant proportions and homogeneity: the curve of constant proportions, 250; the problem of distribution, 252. — Summary: proportions and size, 255. — Appendix: the indifference curve analysis, 257.

I. The problem, 748. — II. One country acts as a monopolist and sets a price which the other accepts, 749. — III. The same, continued, 752. — IV. One country acts as a discriminating monopolist, making an all-or-none offer which the other accepts, 756. — V. The case of pure competition, 759. — VI. Comparison of the three cases, 761.

Introduction: limitations of the study, 475. — I. Summary of Procedure, 476. — II. Summary of Results, 482. — III. Alternative Assumptions: lag in consumption habits, 488; shape of saving schedule, 490; shifting of corporation tax, 493. — Appendix, 497.