Knowledge that Transforms

We study how the use of judgment or “add-factors” in macroeconomic forecasting may disturb the set of equilibrium outcomes when agents learn using recursive methods. We examine the possibility of a new phenomenon, which we call exuberance equilibria, in the New Keynesian monetary policy framework. Inclusion of judgment in forecasts can lead to self-fulfilling fluctuations in a subset of the determinacy region. We study how policymakers can minimize the risk of exuberance equilibria. (JEL E17, E31, E52)

In several school choice districts in the United States, the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm is applied after indifferences in priority orders are broken in some exogenous way. Although such a tie-breaking procedure preserves stability, it adversely affects the welfare of the students since it introduces artificial stability constraints. Our main finding is a polynomial-time algorithm for the computation of a student-optimal stable matching when priorities are weak. The idea behind our construction relies on a new notion which we call a stable improvement cycle. We also investigate the strategic properties of the student-optimal stable mechanism. (JEL C78, D82, I21)

Five stationary concepts for completely mixed 2x2-games are experimentally compared: Nash equilibrium, quantal response equilibrium, action-sampling equilibrium, payoff-sampling equilibrium (Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein 1998), and impulse balance equilibrium. Experiments on 12 games, 6 constant sum games, and 6 nonconstant sum games were run with 12 independent subject groups for each constant sum game and 6 independent subject groups for each nonconstant sum game. Each independent subject group consisted of four players 1 and four players 2, interacting anonymously over 200 periods with random matching. The comparison of the five theories shows that the order of performance from best to worst is as follows: impulse balance equilibrium, payoff-sampling equilibrium, action-sampling equilibrium, quantal response equilibrium, Nash equilibrium. (JEL C70, C91)

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Context can influence decisions. This malleability of choice is usually invoked as evidence that people do not maximize stable preference orderings. In a market equilibrium, however, context conveys payoff-relevant information to consumers. Consequently, these consumers rationally violate naïve formulations of standard choice theoretic principles. I identify informational asymmetries under which apparently anomalous behaviors, namely the compromise effect and choice overload, arise as market equilibria. Firms respond to consumers' contextual inference; in case of the compromise effect, a firm may introduce premium loss leaders (expensive goods of overly high quality that increase the demand for other goods). (JEL D11, D83, M31)

We modify the Salop (1979) model of price competition with differentiated products by assuming that consumers are loss averse relative to a reference point given by their recent expectations about the purchase. Consumers' sensitivity to losses in money increases the price responsiveness of demand—and hence the intensity of competition—at higher relative to lower market prices, reducing or eliminating price variation both within and between products. When firms face common stochastic costs, in any symmetric equilibrium the markup is strictly decreasing in cost. Even when firms face different cost distributions, we identify conditions under which a focal-price equilibrium (where firms always charge the same “focal” price) exists, and conditions under which any equilibrium is focal. (JEL D11, D43, D81, L13)

We report 28 new experiment sessions consisting of up to three experience levels to examine the robustness of learning and “error” elimination among participants in a laboratory asset market and its effect on price bubbles. Our answer to the title question is: “yes.” We impose a large increase in liquidity and dividend uncertainty to shock the environment of experienced subjects who have converged to equilibrium, and this treatment rekindles a bubble. However, in replications of that same challenging environment across three experience levels, we discover that the environment yields a rare residual tendency to bubble even in the third experience session. Therefore, a caveat must be placed on the effect of twice-experienced subjects in asset markets: in order for price bubbles to be extinguished, the environment in which the participants engage in exchange must be stationary and bounded by a range of parameters. Experience, including possible “error” elimination, is not robust to major new environment changes in determining the characteristics of a price bubble. (JEL C91, D83)

Economics began with Xenophon’s Oeconomicus (c 360 BCE), in which Socrates interviews a model citizen who has two primary concerns. He goes out to his farm in the country to monitor and motivate his workers there. Then he goes back to the city, where his participation in various political institutions is essential for maintaining his rights to own this farm. Such concerns about agents’ incentives and political institutions are also central in economic theory today. But they were not always. Two centuries ago, economics developed as an analytical social science by focusing on produc tion and allocation of material goods, developing methodologies of national-income accounting and price theory. Questions about resource allocation seemed particularly amenable to math ematical analysis, because flows of goods and money are measurable and should satisfy flowbalance equations and no -arbitrage conditions. From this perspective, the classical economic problem was that people’s ability to satisfy their desires is constrained by limited resources. The classical economic result was that unrestricted free trade can achieve allocative efficiency, in the sense that reallocating the available resources cannot improve everyone’s welfare. A shift of focus from allocation of resources back to analysis of incentives began from the time of Augustin Cournot (1838), when economic theorists began to analyze optimal decisions of rational individuals as a tool for understanding supply and demand in price theory (see Jurg

Purely forward-looking versions of the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) generate too little inflation persistence. Some authors add ad hoc backward-looking terms to address this shortcoming. We hypothesize that inflation persistence results mainly from variation in the long-run trend component of inflation, which we attribute to shifts in monetary policy. We derive a version of the NKPC that incorporates a time-varying inflation trend and examine whether it explains the dynamics of inflation. When drift in trend inflation is taken into account, a purely forward-looking version of the model fits the data well, and there is no need for backward-looking components. (JEL E12, E31, E52)

In this paper, we describe a set of trade-offs that policymakers face with respect to fluctua? tions at different frequencies. A complete treat? ment is given in Brock, Durlauf, and Rondina (2008). The presence of frequency-specific effects of policy choices has generally not been a focus of macroeconomic policy analysis, important exceptions include Alexei Onatski and Noah M. Williams (2003). Our analysis dif? fers from previous studies in that our objective is to understand to what extent a policymaker is forced, when choosing a feedback rule to sta? bilize the economy, to exacerbate volatility at some frequencies in order to reduce them at oth? ers, or whether it is possible to reduce volatil? ity at all frequencies. These trade-offs, known as design limits in the control theory literature, are important in understanding what stabiliza? tion policies do, and also possess implications for policy design in the presence of policymaker ignorance.