Knowledge that Transforms

We consider two life cycle models of labor supply that use nonconvexities to generate retirement. In each case we derive a link between hours worked prior to retirement, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for labor (IES), and the size of the nonconvexities. This link is robust to allowing for credit constraints and human capital accumulation by younger workers and suggests values for the IES that are .75 or higher.

The payoff of actions is estimated and the resulting empirical payoff is controlled for in regression analyses to formulate a test of rational expectations in information cascade experiments. We show that the empirical payoff of actions is a function of estimates of choice probabilities and estimates of the information parameters of the game. We introduce an alternative empirical payoff of actions with true values of the information parameters. Our improved measure of the success of social learning confirms that rational expectations are violated, but deviations from rational expectations are statistically significantly smaller than in Weizsacher (2010).

Many important issues in business-to-business markets involve price discrimination and negotiated prices, situations where theoretical predictions are ambiguous. This paper uses new panel data on buyer-supplier transfers and a structural model to empirically analyze bargaining and price discrimination in a medical device market. While many phenomena that restrict different prices to different buyers are suggested as ways to decrease hospital costs (e.g., mergers, group purchasing organizations, and transparency), I find that: (i) more uniform pricing works against hospitals by softening competition; and (ii) results depend ultimately on a previously unexplored bargaining effect.

Over the business cycle young workers experience much greater volatility of hours worked than prime-aged workers. This can arise from age differences in labor supply or labor demand characteristics. To distinguish between these, we document that, for young workers, both the cyclical volatilities of hours and wages are greater than those of the prime-aged. We argue that a general class of models featuring only age-specific labor supply differences cannot reconcile these facts. We then show that a simple model featuring labor demand differences can.

This paper analyzes a dynamic lending relationship where the borrower cannot be forced to make repayments, and the lender offers long-term contracts that are imperfectly enforced and repeatedly renegotiated. No commitment and full commitment by the lender are special cases of this model where the probability of enforcement equals zero and one, respectively. I show that an increase in the degree of enforcement can lower social welfare. Furthermore, properties of equilibrium investment dynamics with partial commitment drastically differ from those with full and no commitment. In particular, investment is positively related to cash flow, consistent with empirical findings.

The standard assumption that asset demand increases in income and decreases in price has its origin in Arrow's classic model with one risky and one risk free asset, where both are held long, and preferences exhibit decreasing absolute and increasing relative risk aversion. However if one allows shorting of the risk free asset or decreasing relative risk aversion, the risk free asset can not only fail to be a normal good but can be a Giffen good. This behavior can occur even for members of the popular HARA utility family. More generally, Giffen behavior can occur over multiple income ranges.

This paper contributes to the existing literature on the effect of legal status on educational access among immigrant youth in the United States. The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 granted amnesty to undocumented immigrants who entered the United States before 1982. Using a difference-indifferences framework, I analyze the effect of this large amnesty program on immigrant youth's postsecondary educational access. My main finding shows that immigrant youths who were granted amnesty under IRCA are more likely to enroll in postsecondary education.

The literature on the determinants of firms' financing constraints has paid little attention to gender as a determinant of access to finance. Using data for 34,342 firms from 90 developing countries, the paper analyzes the determinants of firms' financing constraints and assesses whether female-owned firms are more financially constrained than male-owned businesses. The results show that female-owned firms in sub-Saharan Africa are more likely to be financially constrained than male-owned firms, but there is no gender gap in other developing regions. The gender gap in sub-Saharan Africa is robust to variations in specifications and econometric estimation procedures.

Firms face competing needs to expand product variety and reduce production costs. Access to larger markets enables innovation to reduce costs. Although firm scale increases, foreign competition reduces markups. Firms' ability to recapture lost markups depends on the interplay between within-firm competition and across-firm competition. Narrowing product variety eases within-firm competition but lowers market share. I provide a theory detailing the impact of trade policy on product and process innovation. Unbundling innovation provides new insights into welfare gains and innovation policy. Product innovation increases welfare beyond standard gains from trade. The relative returns to innovation policy change with trade liberalization.

This paper applies a regression discontinuity design to the Romanian secondary school system, generating two findings. First, students who have access to higher achievement schools perform better in a (high stakes) graduation test. Second, the stratification of schools by quality in general, and the opportunity to attend a better school in particular, result in significant behavioral responses: (i) teachers sort in a manner consistent with a preference for higher achieving students; (ii) children who make it into more selective schools realize they are relatively weaker and feel marginalized; (iii) parents reduce effort when their children attend a better school.