Knowledge that Transforms

Most interpretations of prevalent counterinsurgency theory imply that increasing government services reduces rebel violence. Empirically, however, development programs and economic activity sometimes increase violence. Using new panel data on development spending in Iraq, we show that violence-reducing effects of development assistance are greater when: (i) projects are small; (ii) troop strength is high; and (iii) professional development expertise is available. These findings are consistent with an information-centric (“hearts and minds”) model, which implies that violence-reduction is greatest when projects are secure, valued by community members, and services derived are conditional on government control of the territory.

We model the dynamics of risk premia during crises in asset markets where the marginal investor is a financial intermediary. Intermediaries face an equity capital constraint. Risk premia rise when the constraint binds, reflecting the capital scarcity. The calibrated model matches the nonlinearity of risk premia during crises and the speed of reversion in risk premia from a crisis back to precrisis levels. We evaluate the effect of three government policies: reducing intermediaries borrowing costs, injecting equity capital, and purchasing distressed assets. Injecting equity capital is particularly effective because it alleviates the equity capital constraint that drives the model's crisis. (JEL E44, G12, G21, G23, G24)

We extend the model of Fullerton, Karney, and Baylis (2012) to explore cost-effectiveness of unilateral climate policy in the presence of leakage. We ignore the welfare gain from reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and focus on the welfare cost of the emissions tax or permit scheme. Whereas that prior paper solves for changes in emissions quantities and finds that leakage may be negative, we show here that all cases with negative leakage in that model are cases where a unilateral carbon tax results in a welfare loss. With positive leakage, however, a unilateral policy can improve welfare.

This paper studies the effect of improved early life health care on mortality and long-run academic achievement in school. We use the idea that medical treatments often follow rules of thumb for assigning care to patients, such as the classification of Very Low Birth Weight (VLBW ), which assigns infants special care at a specific birth weight cutoff. Using detailed administrative data on schooling and birth records from Chile and Norway, we establish that children who receive extra medical care at birth have lower mortality rates and higher test scores and grades in school. These gains are in the order of 0.15–0.22 standard deviations.

An individual who takes an HIV test can be informed about their own status and risk. Similarly, when friends, family or neighbors learn of a person's HIV status, they may update their beliefs about HIV infection among people they know. Using an experiment conducted in rural Malawi which randomly assigned incentives to learn HIV results, we find that as people in the community learn their HIV results, individuals revise their beliefs downward about deaths attributable to HIV/AIDS. We find corresponding behavioral responses with a significant decrease in condom use and no significant increase in multiple partnerships among those who are HIV-negative.

I use an applied general equilibrium model to quantify the influence of a new, theoretical channel for carbon leakage effects, as identified by Fullerton, Karney and Baylis (2012). I first produce parameterizations of the model that generate a close correspondence with the theory, isolating the quantitative effect of this channel. I then produce parameterizations that allow for an examination of net leakage rates in a model with a more comprehensive set of leakage channels. I find that the new channel exerts a negative influence on net leakage rates but that positive forces of leakage dominate in the comprehensive assessment.

We present a new framework to identify supply elasticities of storable commodities where past shocks are used as exogenous price shifters. In the agricultural context, past yield shocks change inventory levels and futures prices of agricultural commodities. We use our estimated elasticities to evaluate the impact of the 2009 Renewable Fuel Standard on commodity prices, quantities, and food consumers' surplus for the four basic staples: corn, rice, soybeans, and wheat. Prices increase 20 percent if one-third of commodities used to produce ethanol are recycled as feedstock, with a positively skewed 95 percent confidence interval that ranges from 14 to 35 percent. (JEL Q11, Q16, Q42, Q48)

Preliminary findings are presented from a research project which examined the interactions between informal risk sharing, index insurance and risk-taking. Rainfall insurance contracts were randomly offered to cultivating and landless households in a set of Indian villages where preexisting census data on caste networks allowed the characterization of the nature and extent of informal risk sharing. We study how informal risk sharing mediates the demand for index insurance, whether index insurance or informal indemnification allows farmers to invest in risky technologies, and the general equilibrium effects of offering insurance contracts to cultivators and agricultural laborers.

Participating in insurgency is physically risky. Why do people do so? Using new data on 3,799 payments to insurgent fighters by Al Qa'ida Iraq, we find that: (i) wages were extremely low relative to outside options, even compared to unskilled labor; (ii) the estimated risk premium is negative; and (iii) the wage schedule favors equalization and provides additional compensation for larger families. These results challenge the notion that fighters are paid their marginal product, or the opportunity cost of their time. They may be consistent with a “lemons” model in which fighters signal commitment by accepting low wages.

We compare answers to policy questions by economic experts and a representative sample of the US population. We find a 35 percentage point difference between the two groups. This gap is only partially explained by differences in ideological or personal characteristics of the two samples. Interestingly, the difference is the largest on the questions where economists agree the most and where there is the largest amount of literature. Informing people of the expert opinions does not seem to have much of an impact. Ordinary people seem to be skeptical of the implicit assumptions embedded into the economists' answers.