Knowledge that Transforms

This study extends extant research on the determinants of financial analyst bias by examining the role that political incentives play. Using a series of scheduled provincial political events in China, we document that analysts are significantly more likely to issue favorable recommendations or revise their recommendations upward during political event periods, and the effect of political events on optimism is larger for analysts employed by brokerage firms affiliated with politicians. Cross‐sectional evidence suggests that the impact of political events on analyst optimism is concentrated in those provinces where capital market development is a more important performance indicator for politicians or where the incumbent politicians face a pending promotion. Stock return analyses reveal that favorable recommendations issued during political event periods are significantly less profitable in the long run and are less credible according to investor perceptions. Reinforcing our main evidence, we also find that financial analysts are more likely to issue optimistic earnings forecasts during political event periods. Collectively, our results imply that political incentives distort analyst opinions and political‐economic factors affect the corporate information environment in China.

Exploiting mergers between lenders and shareholders of the same firm as an exogenous shock to shareholder–creditor conflicts, we examine the causal effect of these conflicts on firms' ex ante expected stock price crash risk evident in the options implied volatility smirk. The decrease in conflicts of interest between lenders and shareholders induces dual holders to encourage the disclosure of more information to alleviate costly information asymmetry with other investors and better execute their oversight role in constraining managers' bad news suppression. Consistent with expectations, we find that a firm's ex ante expected crash risk declines after a shareholder–creditor merger. We also report strong, robust evidence that the negative impact of mergers on firms' expected crash risk increases when institutional investors or lenders have a greater stake in the treatment firms or when shareholder–creditor conflicts are apt to be exacerbated. Additionally, we document that firms issue management earnings forecasts (especially bad news forecasts) more frequently after these mergers. Finally, we find that expected crash risk decreases more after mergers in firms suffering worse information asymmetry and with weak monitoring mechanisms. Our evidence suggests that option market participants value the dual holder's role in deterring managers' bad news hoarding.

Foreign workers have been an important part of the labor force in public accounting firms over the past two decades. In this paper, we investigate whether and why foreign workers influence audit quality. We find that audit offices with more newly hired foreign labor have a lower mean absolute value of discretionary accruals and a smaller rate of restatements for their clients. The effect is more pronounced for audit offices that face more resource constraints or require greater foreign expertise. The results of improved audit quality are robust to alternative measures of immigrant intensity and audit quality, alternative samples, and using different ways to address endogeneity concerns. Overall, our paper contributes to the literature by showing the impact of foreign labor in the auditing profession and provides public policy implications for the recent H‐1B visa debate.

Exclusions from street earnings can include both expected exclusions, forecasted ex ante by analysts, and unexpected exclusions, revealed after earnings are reported. While prior research largely examines total exclusions from street earnings, unexpected exclusions reflect the news or surprise in exclusions. We investigate the properties and informativeness of unexpected exclusions for future profitability, benchmark beating, analyst forecast errors, and future stock returns. We find that unexpected exclusions represent a mix of transitory and recurring items and are informative about future street earnings. In an analysis of hand‐collected analysts' reports, we find that unexpected exclusions are more likely to reflect misestimated recurring items when analysts forecasted exclusions, and unexpected transitory items when analysts did not forecast exclusions. We also examine benchmark‐beating behavior, in which street earnings meet street forecasts but GAAP earnings miss GAAP forecasts. We observe that benchmark beating is more likely to occur when analysts forecast exclusions than when they do not. Moreover, we find unexpected exclusions are more persistent when street earnings meet street forecasts but GAAP earnings miss GAAP forecasts. These findings are consistent with recurring earnings amounts being opportunistically shifted to excluded items to meet analysts' street forecasts. Finally, we find some evidence that analysts and investors react to, but do not fully incorporate, the information in unexpected exclusions, based on forecast revisions and stock price reactions.

Firms allocate significant amounts of common costs, and these allocations have implications for performance evaluation and remuneration. Non‐insulating cost allocations distribute costs based on same‐period relative performance, creating a contemporaneous interdependence between managers that in turn adds uncertainty to the link between effort and performance. In contrast, insulating cost allocations are independent of relative performance during the period and can thus be determined with greater certainty ex ante. In an experiment, we predict and find that managers' effortful performance in a stable production environment—where the pre‐allocation return for effort is constant—is higher when costs are allocated via an insulating allocation compared to when costs are allocated via a non‐insulating allocation. We further find that in an unstable production environment—where the pre‐allocation return for effort can vary from period to period—there are no differences in performance between the allocation methods when managers face a lower return for effort. Conversely, when managers face a higher return for effort in this environment, performance is greater when costs are allocated via an insulating allocation. Taken together, overall performance in the unstable production environment is greater when managers work under insulating cost allocations, suggesting the net effects of cost allocation methods are similar in each type of production environment. As such, our study identifies an important cost—lower effortful performance—of using non‐insulating methods to allocate common costs.

Recent research on sell‐side analysts emphasizes the centrality of social ties and social interactions to what they do. However, we know little about how analysts create or maintain relationships over both the short and long terms. We remedy that in this qualitative study by illustrating the microlevel processes that analysts engage in as part of developing a network of relations around them. Starting from the premise that economic actions are embedded in social relations and drawing on interviews with analysts, fund managers, and investor relations officers in China, we show how analysts forge both weak and strong social ties to create an infrastructure of social networks that is foundational to information intermediation. This perspective broadens our understanding of sell‐side analysts as social, rather than solely information, intermediaries and highlights how information asymmetries often have a social basis.

In this study, we examine whether the use of artificial intelligence (AI) can reduce the effect of independence conflicts on audit firm liability. In two experiments, we manipulate (1) whether procedures are performed by a human auditor or with AI and (2) whether the audit firm was careful in maintaining the appearance of independence from the audit client. Results of both experiments indicate that the use of AI significantly reduces the impact of the appearance of independence conflicts on jurors' judgments of audit firm liability. When concerns relating to the appearance of independence conflicts are present, the use of AI helps maintain the perceived objectivity of the auditor, which results in jurors maintaining higher overall trust in the audit process. Our study contributes to literature on determinants of auditor litigation risk and how technological change that is likely to grow in prominence might affect audit firm liability.

We examine whether peer audit choices influence a bank's decision to obtain an audit voluntarily. We find that the likelihood of a bank voluntarily obtaining an audit is significantly associated with the audit decisions of peers. The relation is stronger when the peers are more salient due to closer geographic proximity, similarity in loan portfolio, and similarity in size. In addition, we find that peer influence on a bank's audit decision is moderated by the bank's existing level of assurance. Specifically, banks already obtaining a lower level of assurance are less likely to begin an audit in response to peer influence. We also find no evidence that peer influence extends to banks' decisions to cease obtaining an audit. Overall, our findings are consistent with peer influence significantly influencing banks' decisions to begin obtaining an audit.

IPOs and direct listings (DLs) offer two different mechanisms for firms to go public. In contrast to IPOs, DLs do not employ an underwriter or raise new capital. Using a sample of IPOs and DLs on major stock markets in the European Union, we document that firms that choose to go public via DLs are larger, more profitable, and less levered, on average, than IPO firms. These pre‐listing differences suggest that DL firms should be less risky than IPO firms; however, controlling for this selection effect, we find that DLs have higher aftermarket price volatility than IPOs. This is consistent with some policy‐makers' concerns that, because they lack an underwriter, DLs expose investors to higher risk than IPOs in the immediate post‐listing period. We show that this heightened price volatility persists, on average, for the first 20 trading days after listings, and is larger in industries where listed peer firms provide relatively low‐quality disclosures. Our results provide new evidence regarding the types of firms that choose to list via DLs versus IPOs and the riskiness of IPOs versus DLs in the immediate post‐listing period; additionally, our results are consistent with underwriters improving the quality of information available to investors for IPO firms in the pre‐listing period.

Prior research shows that contingent liabilities do not accurately predict future cash payments due to the managerial discretion afforded by accounting standards. We examine the extent to which current accounting guidance for a material contingent liability—the reserve for unrecognized tax benefits (UTBs) under Financial Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48)—generates accruals that are predictive of future income tax cash outflows. We document that UTBs fully unwind as cash tax payments over the subsequent 5 years, suggesting that managers, on average, accurately incorporate their expectations of future tax liabilities. This result persists for firms that are (1) most affected by the implementation of FIN 48, (2) unable to impound detection risk into their reserves, (3) engaged in relatively more ex ante tax avoidance, (4) suspected to have engaged in earnings management through the tax accounts, and (5) subject to plausibly exogenous shocks to tax reporting. Overall, our results suggest that current accounting guidance under FIN 48 for contingent tax liabilities enables managers to accurately report, and financial statement users to reliably predict, future cash obligations.