We investigate how internal distribution motives can affect the implementation of an important macroeconomic policy: capital controls. To do this, we study one of history’s largest debt repatriations, which took place under strict capital controls in 1930s Germany, providing a wealth of quantitative and historical evidence. We show that the authorities kept private repatriations under strict control, thus avoiding detrimental macroeconomic effects, while allowing discretionary repatriations in order to reap internal political benefits. We formalize this mechanism in a model in which elite capture can affect optimal debt repatriations and the management of official reserves under capital controls.

We propose a supply-side channel for the transmission of monetary policy. We show that when high-markup firms have lower pass-throughs than low-markup firms, then positive demand shocks, such as monetary expansions, alleviate cross-sectional misallocation by reallocating resources to high-markup firms. Consequently, positive ?demand shocks? are accompanied by endogenous positive ?supply shocks? that raise productivity and lower inflation. We derive a tractable, four-equation model where monetary shocks generate hump-shaped productivity responses. In our calibration, the supply-side effect amplifies the total impact of monetary shocks on output by about 70%. We provide empirical evidence validating our model?s predictions using identified monetary shocks.