Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT Understanding the association between quasi‐indexer ownership and insider trading is important given the externalities that insider trading can impose on shareholders, the importance of quasi‐indexers in the capital markets, and their mixed monitoring incentives. The prior literature has produced an inconsistent set of results regarding this association. These results are difficult to interpret because the association between them is likely endogenous, and prior studies have not employed effective identification strategies to address this issue. In this study, we examine the effects of quasi‐indexer institutional ownership on insider trading using the plausibly exogenous discontinuity in quasi‐indexer ownership around the Russell 1000/2000 index cutoff. Using both regression discontinuity and instrumental variable research designs, we find higher quasi‐indexer ownership leads to less insider trading (both buys and sells) and less profitable sell trades. The effects for sells are concentrated among insider trades that, ex ante, are more likely to be based on private information. Our evidence on the profitability of buys is mixed. In addition, we find firms with higher quasi‐indexer ownership are more likely to have and/or more strictly enforce blackout policies. Overall, our results suggest that quasi‐indexers can reduce the agency costs associated with insider trading through their direct and indirect monitoring activities.

ABSTRACT When information asymmetry is a major market friction, earnings forecasts can lead to higher price efficiency even after the information in forecasts completely dissipates upon earnings realizations. We show this in an experimental market that features information asymmetry (i.e., some traders possess differential private information). Earnings forecasts reduce information asymmetry and lead to prices that reflect a greater amount of private information. Traders can learn more about others' information from prices. This information learned from past prices continues to reduce information asymmetry and improve price efficiency even after earnings realizations. We contribute to the disclosure literature by showing the evidence that the learning‐from‐price effect amplifies the impact of public disclosure on price efficiency.

ABSTRACT Using the relationship between institutional trades and sequential public information, this study provides a systematic way to identify institutional trades that are informative about future equity returns. By studying the US financial institutions from 1994 to 2016, I show that institutional trades initiated by managers responding proactively to upcoming informational signals strongly predict future stock returns. The predictability of informed institutions is more evident for stocks with higher information asymmetry and in periods of higher profit opportunities. The informed institutions outperform the uninformed ones by 2% on an annualized basis and their performance gap is persistent. Importantly, the return predictability of informed institutional trades is not subsumed by the return‐predictive signals documented in prior research, computed either from institutional holdings or from financial statements. Further analyses show that the informed institutional investors derive their superior ability to forecast future stock returns from processing corporate fundamentals and acquiring private information. This study derives a novel return predictor using the institutions' proactive trading behavior and identifies various informational sources of informed traders.

ABSTRACT Using detailed data for fieldwork hours and audit hours by rank from audit engagements in Korea, we examine whether audits conducted under workload imbalance, proxied by busy‐season audits, impair audit quality, and how auditors adjust staff assignments for busy‐season audits. We generally find that busy‐season audits are associated with lower audit quality, and that audit firms reduce the involvement of senior auditors during busy‐season audits. In addition, the greater the involvement of senior auditors and junior auditors, the lesser the deterioration in audit quality. Finally, although there is no increase in interim audits in response to workload imbalance during busy seasons, increasing interim audits can mitigate the negative impact of busy‐season audits on audit quality. Our results are relevant to auditors and regulators, who have expressed concerns about the adverse effects of workload imbalance on audit quality.

ABSTRACT As firms increasingly use social media to provide disclosures to investors, it is important to understand whether the characteristics that are associated with these disclosures lead to different reactions from investors than disclosures provided via more traditional channels. In this paper, we use an experiment to examine whether linguistic formality in positive news disclosures, and engagement of social media users surrounding the disclosures (e.g., “likes” and “retweets”), affect investors' judgments about a firm and its management. Results suggest that, as predicted, investors are more sensitive to signals of audience engagement when disclosures use informal rather than formal language. Specifically, when associated with signals of high audience engagement, the use of informal language leads to greater willingness to invest than the use of formal language in a disclosure. However, also as predicted, the use of informal language hurts willingness to invest when associated with signals of low audience engagement. In two follow‐up experiments, we investigate how news valence and linguistic formality are expected to affect the level of audience engagement in the first place, and we investigate whether managers strategically vary their use of linguistic formality based on characteristics of the setting. Overall, our results provide evidence on how firms might use social media disclosures to better connect with investors. This study contributes to the growing literature on linguistic attributes of disclosures, and the emerging literature investigating the consequences of issuing financial disclosures through social media.

ABSTRACT Regulators and researchers provide evidence that auditors' judgment quality is problematic in complex audit tasks. We introduce a framework for improving auditor judgment in these tasks. The framework builds on dual‐process theory to recognize that high‐quality judgment in complex tasks requires that auditors (i) possess the knowledge needed for the task, (ii) recognize the need for analytical (versus heuristic) processing, and (iii) have sufficient cognitive capacity to complete the analytical processing. Based on the framework, we predict that auditors' need for cognition (NFC), a characteristic theoretically linked to recognizing the need for analytical processing, is associated with higher quality complex judgments. Analysis of 11 studies supports this assertion. We demonstrate the usefulness of the framework by predicting and finding that priming auditors with an accuracy goal improves judgments, particularly for lower NFC auditors, who are less likely to spontaneously engage in analytical processing. The framework facilitates systematic development of interventions to improve auditor judgment by highlighting that solutions should address the specific conditions causing judgment problems.

ABSTRACT Regulators are concerned about the quality of group audits because of poor inspection results, recent enforcement actions against component auditors, and the significance of these audits to the global economy. Yet research in this area is nascent. In response, we survey and interview US‐based global group audit leads to better understand the group audit process and their perceptions of challenges that arise on such engagements. Our findings indicate that group auditors organize their audits consistent with the client's structure, which drives component auditor selection, scoping, and fees. Group auditors routinely find fault with component auditors, perceiving that work performed and/or documentation provided is not sufficient, not appropriate and/or not communicated timely, to comply with US standards and reporting deadlines. In some cases, they perceive that the component auditor is unable and/or unwilling to comply and in others, that the component auditor misunderstands group instructions due to language proficiency or differing interpretation of the standards. Notably this perspective is ethnocentric, as group auditors almost exclusively attribute issues to component auditors. While ethnocentric tendencies appear myopic, they provide insight into unrecognized or overlooked aspects of the global firm model of cooperative arrangements. This study highlights the significance of the global firm's network structure to global group audits. Thus, we encourage intercommunity research, among (quantitative and qualitative) scholars and standard setters, to consider group audits in the broader context of firm networks.

ABSTRACT This study examines the association between internal information quality and state tax planning. Prior literature documents a positive association between internal information quality and summary measures of tax avoidance. However, we know little about specific forms of tax planning and internal information quality. State tax planning is difficult because of the number of jurisdictions, variety of tax rules, variation of enforcement, and apportionment requirements. We find that internal information quality facilitates state tax planning and is most important when firms face more restrictive state tax laws and when domestic firms relative to multinational firms have international income shifting opportunities. Our results provide a baseline of the economic effects of internal information quality on different forms of tax planning. Understanding internal information quality's role in state tax planning is especially relevant as countries propose to modify international tax rules to mirror the state taxation format of a single‐entity system with apportionment.

ABSTRACT Data analytics is transforming our global markets and significantly impacting the financial reporting environment. We investigate how auditors, company managers, and regulation interact with data analytics and one another to affect the diffusion (i.e., development and spread) of data analytics throughout the financial reporting environment. We interview company managers and their audit partners, as well as additional stakeholders, including regulators. We interpret findings from our interviews using theory that highlights the importance of dynamic interactions between people and their environments, which include the prevailing rules (e.g., regulatory guidance). Our findings contribute to the accounting literature and practice by revealing three areas of conflict emerging from stakeholders' disparate preferences for data analytics. First, we uncover growing tensions between managers and audit partners regarding audit fees. Second, we find that managers and auditors believe the lack of accounting regulation specific to data analytics causes confusion and frustration. Finally, auditors report that they strategically leverage data analytics to provide clients with business‐related insights. However, regulators voice concerns that this practice might impair auditor independence and reduce audit quality. These areas of conflict suggest a need to revisit key tensions surrounding the audit function in a contemporary context characterized with significant technological shift.

ABSTRACT The “coopetition” paradox exists when two or more organizations are simultaneously involved in cooperative and competitive interactions. In the accounting industry, small firms encounter coopetition when they align themselves with other independent firms to form accounting associations and networks (AANs). AANs are a type of interorganizational relationship (IOR) that provide opportunities for member firms to collaborate by sharing important resources such as expertise, best practices, and manpower. However, member firms also compete in the marketplace for clients and human capital, which incentivizes uncooperative and opportunistic behavior. If managed inadequately, coopetitive tensions can significantly hamper AAN benefits and may lead to IOR failure. Given the considerable longevity of AANs, we interview 42 high‐level accounting professionals to understand AANs' apparent successful management of these tensions. Leveraging coopetition and IOR theory, our analysis suggests that transactional mechanisms (contractual agreements, organizational structure, selection/monitoring processes) and relational mechanisms (trust, social ties, reciprocity) play key roles in encouraging healthy cooperation and competition among member firms. One of our main conclusions is that these mechanisms contribute to AAN success because they are leveraged comprehensively across each IOR life cycle phase, and they are mutually reinforcing, with transactional mechanisms providing the foundation to inspire confidence and encourage the development of relational mechanisms. Our research enriches existing accounting and coopetition literature, provides a new perspective for AANs, and responds to calls to understand key factors of IOR success.