Knowledge that Transforms

The empirical literature on aid effectiveness has yielded unclear and ambiguous results. This is not surprising given the heterogeneity of aid motives, the limitations of the tools of analysis, and the complex causality chain linking external aid to final outcomes. The causality chain has been largely ignored and as a consequence the relationship between aid and development has been mostly handled as a kind of 'black box'. Making further progress on aid effectiveness requires opening that box. This paper examines the causality chain linking aid flows to development outcomes. It argues that many of the questions that policy makers and economists would like to squeeze data into answering simply cannot be answered due to the complexity and ‘noise ’ along links in the chain, and hence the problem of attribution. It then examines what is known about aid effectiveness along different links in the causality chain. Finally, it turns to recent trends in the way aid is delivered and the new model that appears to be emerging. I. The ‘causality chain’: aid, effectiveness and results The debates around the impact of aid on development have typically aggregated

We develop an equilibrium business cycle model where nonconvex delivery costs lead firms to follow (S, s) inventory policies. Calibrated to postwar US data, the model reproduces two-thirds of the cyclical variability of inventory investment. Moreover, it delivers strongly procyclical inventory investment, greater volatility in production than sales, and a countercyclical inventory-to-sales ratio. Our model challenges several prominent claims involving inventories, including the widely held belief that they amplify aggregate fluctuations. Despite the comovement between inventory investment and final sales, GDP volatility is essentially unaltered by inventory accumulation, because procyclical inventory investment diverts resources from final production, thereby dampening fluctuations in sales. (JEL E22, E32).

We utilize graphical representations of Dictator Games which generate rich individual-level data. Our baseline experiment employs budget sets over feasible payoff-pairs. We test these data for consistency with utility maximization, and we recover the underlying preferences for giving (trade-offs between own payoffs and the payoffs of others). Two further experiments augment the analysis. An extensive elaboration employs three-person budget sets to distinguish preferences for giving from social preferences (trade-offs between the payoffs of others). And an intensive elaboration employs step-shaped sets to distinguish between behaviors that are compatible with well-behaved preferences and those compatible only with not well-behaved cases. (JEL C72, D64)

Interest in behavioral economics has grown in recent years, stimulated largely by accumulating evidence that the standard model of consumer decision making provides an inadequate, positive description of human behavior. Behavioral models are increasingly finding their way into policy evaluation, which inevitably involves welfare analysis. No consensus concerning the appropriate standards and criteria for behavioral welfare analysis has emerged yet. This paper summarizes our effort to develop a unified framework for behavioral welfare economics (for a detailed discussion see Bernheim and Rangel 2007) — one that can be viewed as a natural extension of standard welfare economics. Standard welfare analysis is based on choice, not on utility or preferences. In its simplest form, it instructs the planner to respect the choices an individual would make for himself. The guiding normative principle is an extension of the libertarian deference to freedom of choice, which takes the view that it is better to give a person the thing he would choose for himself rather than something that someone else would choose for him. We show that it is possible to extend the standard choice-theoretic approach to welfare analysis to situations where individuals make inconsistent choices, which are prevalent in behavioral economics.

We elicit traders' predictions of future price trajectories in repeated experimental markets for a 15-period-lived asset. We find that individuals' beliefs about prices are adaptive, and primarily based on past trends in the current and previous markets in which they have participated. Most traders do not anticipate market downturns the first time they participate in a market, and, when experienced, they typically overestimate the time remaining before market peaks and downturns occur. When prices deviate from fundamental values, belief data are informative to an observer in predicting the direction of future price movements and the timing of market peaks. (JEL C91, D12, D84, G11)

At the outbreak of World War I, the biggest gold outflow in a generation posed a doublebarreled threat to American finance: An internal drain of currency from the banking system and an external drain of gold to Europe. The Federal Reserve System, newly authorized by Congress on December 23, 1913, remained on the sidelines during the summer of 1914, a victim of political and administrative delays. The absence of an operational central bank encouraged Treasury Secretary William G. McAdoo to improvise the modern principle of aiming an independent weapon at each policy target. He employed a form of capital controls to deal with the external threat, shutting the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) for more than four months to prevent Europeans from selling their American securities and demanding gold in return. And he invoked the emergency currency provisions of the Aldrich-Vreeland Act to deal with the internal threat, allowing banks to issue national bank notes, an important form of currency in pre-Federal Reserve days, without the normal requirement that the currency be secured by U.S. goverment bonds.

Many individuals are motivated to exert effort because they care about their jobs, rather than because there are monetary consequences to their actions. The intrinsic motivation of bureaucrats is the focus of this paper, and three primary results are shown. First, bureaucrats should be biased. Second, sometimes this bias takes the form of advocating for their clients more than would their principal, while in other cases, they are more hostile to their interests. For a range of bureaucracies, those who are biased against clients lead to more efficient outcomes. Third, self-selection need not produce the desired bias. Instead, selection to bureaucracies is likely to be bifurcated, in the sense that it becomes composed of those who are most preferred by the principal, and those who are least preferred. (JEL D64, D73, D82)

Consumer bankruptcy provides partial insurance against bad luck, but, by driving up interest rates, makes life-cycle smoothing more difficult. We argue that to assess this trade-off one needs a quantitative model of consumer bankruptcy with three key features: life-cycle component, idiosyncratic earnings uncertainty, and expense uncertainty (exogenous negative shocks to household balance sheets). We find that transitory and persistent earnings shocks have very different implications for evaluating bankruptcy rules. More persistent shocks make the bankruptcy option more desirable. Larger transitory shocks have the opposite effect. Our findings suggest the current US bankruptcy system may be desirable for reasonable parameter values. (JEL D14, D91, K35)

The principal motivating factor in our lives is the pursuit of happiness. In most cultures, when seeking this end, individuals place a high priority on income, and spend much of their waking time procuring this intermediate goal. The connection between income and happiness is by no means trivial, however. Two critical factors come into play. First, beyond subsistence level, the positive effect of a permanent change in income tends to be short lived. We rapidly become accustomed to a more expensive lifestyle. A common name for this feature is habit formation. Second, the satisfaction derived from a given level of income is sharply dependent on how it compares to the income of peers. See, for example, Andrew B. Abel (1990), Becker (1996), and William A. Brock and Steven N. Durlauf (2001) for a demonstration of the influence of habits and peer comparisons over behavior, and see Shane Frederick and George Loewenstein (1999) for a review of the underlying psychology. Habits and peer comparisons mean that an individual is not concerned mainly with her absolute level of income, but rather with the difference between her income and a benchmark that changes over time. In recent years, economists have become increasingly interested in this fact. This interest has been both applied (i.e., the study of habits and peer influences over behavior and the analysis of happiness surveys) and theoretical (i.e., a search for biological foundations). But unlike other more developed areas of economics, these two approaches remain fairly separate from each other. In particular, the existing theoretical work is motivated only by the most basic empirical observations. And the existing applied work, for the most part, has not been influenced by theoretical results. In this essay, we seek to reduce the distance between these two literature strands. In particuHabits, Peers, and Happiness: An Evolutionary Perspective

Economics has always been concerned not only with describing or predicting economic behavior but also with understanding economic well-being. The traditional, official way economists (claimed to) have assessed well-being is from “revealed preference’’—observing what people choose under the maintained hypothesis of 100 percent rationality. For instance, when we teach millions of students each year the conditions under which interfering with free-market exchange will make people worse off, by interfering with satisfying their wants, we do so under the compelling assumption that people tend to make choices that rationally maximize their own well-being. While economists are humble about the fact that we are not in a privileged position to declare what goals society should pursue, welfare economics has provided guidance on the determinants of well-being according to this restrictive set of criteria. Although all of us also assess well-being in other ways, it is only recently that economists have begun to do so in a more focused way. A growing number of researchers have begun to study alternatives to the 100 percent rationality assumption, while other researchers have used sundry techniques to measure well-being directly. In this article, we explore some conceptual issues as to why and how one might use these new assumptions and approaches to supplement and modify the revealed-preference approach as it is conventionally conceived. We take the central question of welfare economics to be: how do different situations or economic environments affect people’s well-being? When doing so with sensible ancillary assumptions, inferring people’s well-being from their choices, based on the presumption that they are rationally pursuing their goals, is, in our view, the best scientific approach to research on well-being yet formulated. Our first goal in this