We assess investment banks’ influence over the agreement between their analysts’ research behavior and their clients’ interests, in the post-reform era. Competing banks discipline their analysts with worse career outcomes for producing biased reports, issuing shirking reports, and for involvement in the earnings guidance game, showing meaningful monitoring of their analysts. Highly reputable banks provide more monitoring discipline of their analysts and bonding of their moral hazard than other banks. The findings agree with the banks taking responsibility for aligning analysts’ behavior with clients’ interests.

Repudiations rarely occur due to their extreme nature. This paper provides an empirical study based on an original database: prices of a Tsarist bond traded in Paris before and after its repudiation by the Soviets. A structural VAR is used to disentangle French market shocks from repudiation specific ones. After the repudiation, we identify shocks that are related with bailouts, hopes of partial bailouts, negotiations with the Soviets and the Russian civil war. We argue that bond prices essentially reflected expected extreme events that never took place and were thus subject to a “Peso problem”.

This article examines the contribution of hedging to firm value and the cost of hedging in a unified framework. Optimal hedging and firm value are explicitly linked to firm risk, the type of debt covenants and the relative priority of the hedging contract. It is shown that in some cases hedging is possible only if the counterparty to the forward contract also holds a significant portion of the debt. Also, the spread in the hedging contract reduces the optimal amount of hedging to less than the minimum-variance hedge ratio. Among other results this article elucidates why some firms hedge using forward contracts while other firms hedge in the futures markets, as well as why higher priority forward contracts are more efficient hedging vehicles.

We evaluate the return performance of long-short, market-neutral and bear mutual funds using multi-factor models and a conditional CAPM that allows for time-varying risk. Differences in the bearish posture of these mutual funds result in different performance characteristics. Returns to long-short mutual funds vary with the market, returns to market-neutral mutual funds are uncorrelated with the market and returns to bear mutual funds are negatively correlated. Using the conditional CAPM we document significant changes in the market-risk exposure of the most bearish of these funds during different economic climates. We then assess the flow-performance relationship for up to 60months following up and down markets and find that investors direct flows towards market-neutral and bearish funds for several months after down markets. Market-neutral funds provide a down market hedge, but bear funds do not generate the returns that investors hope for.

Lawrence D. Brown, John S. Hughes, Michael S. Rozeff, James H. Vanderweide, Expectations Data and the Predictive Value of Interim Reporting: A Comment, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Spring, 1980), pp. 278-288

Private investments in public equities (PIPEs) are an important source of finance for public corporations. PIPE investor returns decline with holding periods, while time to exit depends on the issue's registration status and underlying liquidity. We estimate PIPE investor returns adjusting for these factors. Our analysis, which is the first to estimate returns to investors rather than issuers, indicates that the average PIPE investor holds the stock for 384 days and earns an abnormal return of 19.7%. More constrained firms tend to issue PIPEs to hedge funds and private equity funds in offerings that have higher expected returns and higher volatility. PIPE investors’ abnormal returns appear to reflect compensation for providing capital to financially constrained firms.

In this paper, I ask the question: Does the output-mix of countries change in response to changes in factor endowments? If so: How long does it take? Using data on capital, as well as skilled and unskilled labour employed in three-digit International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) manufacturing industries for a sample of 27 developing and developed countries over the 1973–1990 period, I find that the output-mix of countries does not change in response to endowment changes, even after 15 years. This answer raises another question: How then do countries absorb changes in factor endowments? The data show that in both the short and long runs, an increase in the supply of a production factor reduces its rate of return and makes it more intensively used in all sectors of the economy: changes in production techniques. In the long run, the point estimate is that the reduction in the rate of return is more than 50% larger than in the short run. This is consistent with induced innovations being predominantly biased towards the scarce factor.

Many decisions involve both imprecise probabilities and intractable states of the world. Objective expected utility assumes unambiguous probabilities; subjective expected utility assumes a completely specified state space. This paper analyzes a third domain of preference: sets of consequential lotteries. Using this domain, we develop a theory of Knightian ambiguity without explicitly invoking any state space. We characterize a representation that integrates a monotone transformation of first order expected utility with respect to a second order measure. The concavity of the transformation and the weighting of the measure capture ambiguity aversion. We propose a definition for comparative ambiguity aversion and uniquely characterize absolute ambiguity neutrality. Finally, we discuss applications of the theory: reinsurance, games, and a mean–variance–ambiguity portfolio frontier.

This paper describes several learning processes which converge, with probability one, to the rational expectations (Bayesian-Nash) equilibrium of a stationary linear game. The learning processes include a test for convergence to equilibrium, and a method for changing the parameters of the process when non-convergence is indicated. This self-stabilization property eliminates the need to impose stability conditions on the economic environment. Convergence to equilibrium is proved for two types of self-stabilizing learning mechanisms: a centralized forecasting mechanism and a decentralized strategy adjustment process.