Knowledge that Transforms

We study how to regulate a monopolistic firm using a robust-design, non-Bayesian approach. We derive a policy that minimizes the regulator’s worst-case regret, where regret is the difference between the regulator’s complete-information payoff and his realized payoff. When the regulator’s payoff is consumers’ surplus, he caps the firm’s average revenue. When his payoff is the total surplus of both consumers and the firm, he offers a piece rate subsidy to the firm while capping the total subsidy. For intermediate cases, the regulator combines these three policy instruments to balance three goals: protecting consumers’ surplus, mitigating underproduction, and limiting potential overproduction. (JEL D21, D42, D83, H25, L51)

We estimate and validate test score–based measures of school quality (school value added, or SVA) in Pakistan. We document substantial variation in SVA within villages and within the public and private sectors, leading to a wide range of possible estimates of the private premium. We also show that parents value SVA. Heterogeneity in parental demand for quality helps explain both the evolution of the market over time and cross-market variation in school quality. The supply side responds to parental demand for quality in the private sector, but there is no evidence it does so in the public sector. (JEL H44, I21, I26, I28, O15)

We study changes in political discourse during campaigns, using a novel dataset of candidate websites for US House elections, 2002–2016, and manifestos for French parliamentary and local elections, 1958–2022. We find that candidates move to the center in ideology and rhetorical complexity between the first round (or primary) and the second round (or general election). This convergence reflects candidates’ strategic adjustment to their opponents, as predicted by Downsian competition: Using an RDD we show that candidates converge to the platform of opponents who narrowly qualified for the last round as opposed to those who narrowly failed to qualify. (JEL D72, D83, D91)

We estimate the long-term effect of public R&D on growth in manufacturing by analyzing new data from the Cold War–era space race. We develop a novel empirical strategy that leverages US-Soviet rivalry in space technology to isolate windfall R&D spending. Our results demonstrate that public R&D conducted by NASA contractors increased manufacturing value added, employment, and capital accumulation in space-related sectors. While migration responses were important, they were not sufficient to generate a wedge between local and national effects. The iconic moonshot R&D program had only modest economic effects for both the local and national space-related sectors. (JEL E22, H54, L60, N12, N42, N62, O47)

Do land market frictions cause misallocation in agriculture? In a field experiment in western Kenya, we randomly subsidize owners to rent out land. Induced rentals mostly persist after the subsidy ends and increase output and value added, consistent with misallocation. Gains from trade arise from renters choosing higher-value crops, having higher productivity, and adopting more nonlabor inputs, while renters use similar quantities of labor as owners. Induced rentals are not those with the largest predicted gains, underlining the importance of the joint distribution of gains and frictions, with frictions arising from search, risk, and learning.(JEL C93, O13, O18, Q12, Q15, Q24, R52)

Geographic dispersion of depositors, borrowers, and banks may prevent funding from flowing to high-loan-demand areas, limiting credit access. Using bank-county-year-level data, we provide evidence of geographic imbalance of deposits and loans and develop a methodology for investigating the contribution to this imbalance of branch networks, market power, and scope economies. Results are based on a novel measure of imbalance and estimation of a structural model of bank competition that admits interconnections across locations and between deposit and loan markets. Counterfactual experiments show branch networks, scope economies, and local competition affect credit flow to disadvantaged markets. (JEL C43, G21, G28, L13, R32)

Economists routinely make functional form assumptions on demand curves to derive welfare conclusions. How sensitive are these conclusions to such assumptions? In this paper, we develop robustness measures that quantify the extent to which the true demand curve must deviate from common functional form assumptions in order to overturn a welfare conclusion. We parametrize this variability in terms of the gradient and curvature of the demand curve. By leveraging tools from information design, we show that our measures are easy to compute. Our measures are also flexible and easy to use, as we illustrate through empirical applications. (JEL D01, D60, F13, H55, Q48)

At the announcement of a new policy, agents form a view of state-contingent policy actions and impact. We develop a method to estimate this state-contingent perception and implement it for many asset-purchase interventions worldwide. Expectations of larger support in bad states—“policy puts”—explain a large fraction of the announcements' impact. For example, when the Fed introduced purchases of corporate bonds in March 2020, markets expected five times more price support had conditions worsened relative to the median scenario. Perceived promises of additional support in bad states alter asset prices, risk, and the response to future announcements. (JEL E52, E58, G12, G13, G14, G21, G28)

There is substantial spatial heterogeneity in household carbon emissions. I leverage movers in two decades of administrative Decennial Census and American Community Survey data to estimate place effects—the amount by which carbon emissions change for the same household living in different places—for almost 1,000 cities and roughly 61,500 neighborhoods across the United States. I estimate that place effects account for 14–23 percent of overall heterogeneity. A change in neighborhood-level place effects from 1 standard deviation above the mean to 1 below would reduce household carbon emissions from residential energy and commuting by about 40 percent. (JEL D12, D15, L94, Q41, Q54, R11, R23)

Entry represents a fundamental threat to cartels. We study the extent and effect of this behavior in the largest price-fixing case in US history, which involves generic drug manufacturing. We link information on the cartel’s internal operations to regulatory filings and market data. There is a substantial increase in entry after cartel formation, but regulatory approvals delay most entrants by two to four years. We estimate a structural model and simulate counterfactual equilibria. Absent entry, cartel profits would be dramatically higher. Correspondingly, reducing regulatory delays by just 1–2 years equates to consumer compensating variation of $612 million–$1.5 billion. (JEL L12, L13, L25, L51, L65, M31, O34)