Knowledge that Transforms

Accelerated investment in electricity transmission could reduce total costs and enhance renewable integration. I document static allocative inefficiencies induced by incomplete market integration in 2 major US markets; these have risen over time and totaled $2 billion in 2022. I also argue that estimating firm-level impacts is important, as incumbents may have the power to block new lines and other reforms. I show that 4 firms would have experienced a collective $1.3 billion drop in net revenues in 2022 had the market been integrated, and there are reports of some of these firms blocking transmission projects. (JEL D22, D24, L13, L94, Q42, Q48)

Galí (2014) showed that a monetary policy rule that raises rates when bubbles exceed some steady-state benchmark can paradoxically lead to larger deviations from steady state. Nevertheless, this comment shows that a central bank can always dampen a bubble by setting a higher-than-expected rate, although it may have to raise the rate aggressively. This is a different point from the Miao, Shen, and Wang (2019) comment on Galí (2014). They showed that when the central bank targets a different steady state than Galí considered, raising rates when bubbles exceed this alternative benchmark leads to smaller deviations from steady state. (JEL E13, E32, E44, E52, G12)

We quantify the employer's role in unemployment insurance (UI) take-up. Employer effects on claiming and appeals are substantial, and those effects are negatively correlated, consistent with appeals deterring claims. Low-wage workers are less likely to claim and more likely to have their claims appealed than median-wage workers. Employer effects help explain these income gradients, so equalizing employer effects on claiming would increase the progressivity of UI. Finally, the main source of targeting error in UI is that eligible workers do not claim. (JEL J22, J31, J63, J64, J65)

The US net foreign asset position declined sharply after 2007, reaching negative 60 percent of GDP by the third quarter of 2023. This deterioration primarily reflects a US-specific rise in corporate asset values that inflated the value of US equity liabilities to the rest of the world. To interpret these trends, we develop an international macrofinance model of flows, stocks, asset valuations, the current account, and the net foreign asset position. We find that the welfare impact of rising asset values for a representative US household has been quite negative given extensive foreign ownership of US corporate equity. (JEL F32, F21, F40, G15)

Military spending has large and persistent effects on output because it shifts the composition of public spending toward R&D. This boosts innovation and private investment in the medium term and increases productivity and GDP at longer horizons. Public R&D expenditure stimulates economic activities beyond the business cycle even when it is not associated with war spending. In contrast, the effects of public investment are shorter-lived, while public consumption has a modest impact at most horizons. We reach these conclusions using BVAR with long lags and 125 years of US data, including newly reconstructed series of government spending by main categories since 1890. (JEL E21, E22, E23, E62, H50, H56, O30)

This paper studies how a large increase in the price level is transmitted to the real economy through firm balance sheets. Using newly digitized macro- and micro-level data from the German inflation of 1919–1923, we show inflation led to a large reduction in real debt burdens and bankruptcies. Firms with higher nominal liabilities at the onset of inflation experienced a larger decline in interest expenses, a relative increase in their equity values, and higher employment during the inflation. The results are consistent with real effects of a debt-inflation channel that operates even when prices and wages are flexible. (JEL D22, E23, E31, G32, N14, N24)

This paper demonstrates that labor market regulations, such as minimum wages or payroll taxes, shape trade competition in labor-intensive activities. I exploit data from a large European trade program where firms from different countries supply labor services at the same location but face different payroll taxes and minimum wage rules. Country case studies and model-consistent gravity estimates show large trade responses to tax and regulatory reforms, with an elasticity of trade in services to labor costs larger than one. The results imply that absent regulatory and fiscal harmonization, export competitiveness depends, in part, on domestic labor market policies. (JEL F14, F16, F42, H25, J22, J23, K31)

What makes politicians respond to civil society organizations' demands? I use new data on government transfers to French associations and exploit close elections to show that politicians grant more funds to ideologically close organizations when the local incumbent is a political ally and was elected by a small margin. The results are consistent with politicians and organizations exchanging financial support for electoral support. Organizations secure funding because of the votes they can deliver, not because of their campaign contributions; however, the fact that transfers appear to be conditioned on support may undermine their ability to help hold politicians accountable. (JEL D23, D72, H81, L31)

Identifying the optimal set of individuals to first receive information (“seeds”) in a social network to maximize expected diffusion is a widely studied question in many settings. Several studies propose network-centrality-based heuristics to select seeds likely to increase diffusion. Here, we show that, for the classic independent cascade model of diffusion, either seeding a few more individuals at random can prompt a larger diffusion than optimal seeding or optimal seeding itself results in limited spread. These findings hold across a broad range of random networks and are supported by simulations on real-world networks. (JEL D83, D85, O12, O18, P25, P32, Z13)

Should central banks’ inflation targets remain set in stone? We study a dynamic mechanism design problem between a government and a central bank. The central bank has persistent private information about structural shocks. Firms learn the state from the central bank’s reports and form inflation expectations. A dynamic inflation target implements the full-information commitment allocation. The central bank is delegated the authority to adjust the target’s level and flexibility one period in advance. A declining natural interest rate and a flattening Phillips curve imply opposite optimal target adjustments. Our results speak to practical policy questions of inflation target design. (JEL D82, E12, E31, E52, E58)