Lawrence D. Brown, John S. Hughes, Michael S. Rozeff, James H. Vanderweide, Expectations Data and the Predictive Value of Interim Reporting: A Comment, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Spring, 1980), pp. 278-288

Private investments in public equities (PIPEs) are an important source of finance for public corporations. PIPE investor returns decline with holding periods, while time to exit depends on the issue's registration status and underlying liquidity. We estimate PIPE investor returns adjusting for these factors. Our analysis, which is the first to estimate returns to investors rather than issuers, indicates that the average PIPE investor holds the stock for 384 days and earns an abnormal return of 19.7%. More constrained firms tend to issue PIPEs to hedge funds and private equity funds in offerings that have higher expected returns and higher volatility. PIPE investors’ abnormal returns appear to reflect compensation for providing capital to financially constrained firms.

In this paper, I ask the question: Does the output-mix of countries change in response to changes in factor endowments? If so: How long does it take? Using data on capital, as well as skilled and unskilled labour employed in three-digit International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) manufacturing industries for a sample of 27 developing and developed countries over the 1973–1990 period, I find that the output-mix of countries does not change in response to endowment changes, even after 15 years. This answer raises another question: How then do countries absorb changes in factor endowments? The data show that in both the short and long runs, an increase in the supply of a production factor reduces its rate of return and makes it more intensively used in all sectors of the economy: changes in production techniques. In the long run, the point estimate is that the reduction in the rate of return is more than 50% larger than in the short run. This is consistent with induced innovations being predominantly biased towards the scarce factor.

Many decisions involve both imprecise probabilities and intractable states of the world. Objective expected utility assumes unambiguous probabilities; subjective expected utility assumes a completely specified state space. This paper analyzes a third domain of preference: sets of consequential lotteries. Using this domain, we develop a theory of Knightian ambiguity without explicitly invoking any state space. We characterize a representation that integrates a monotone transformation of first order expected utility with respect to a second order measure. The concavity of the transformation and the weighting of the measure capture ambiguity aversion. We propose a definition for comparative ambiguity aversion and uniquely characterize absolute ambiguity neutrality. Finally, we discuss applications of the theory: reinsurance, games, and a mean–variance–ambiguity portfolio frontier.

This paper describes several learning processes which converge, with probability one, to the rational expectations (Bayesian-Nash) equilibrium of a stationary linear game. The learning processes include a test for convergence to equilibrium, and a method for changing the parameters of the process when non-convergence is indicated. This self-stabilization property eliminates the need to impose stability conditions on the economic environment. Convergence to equilibrium is proved for two types of self-stabilizing learning mechanisms: a centralized forecasting mechanism and a decentralized strategy adjustment process.

Competitive rational expectations models have the unsatisfactory property, dubbed the “schizophrenia” problem by Hellwig, that each trader takes the equilibrium price as given despite the fact that he influences that price. An examination of information aggregation in a non-competitive rational expectations model using a Nash equilibrium in demand functions shows that the schizophrenia problem is avoided by having each trader take into account the effect his demand has on the equilibrium price. Given a distribution of private information across traders, prices reveal less information than in the competition equilibrium, and prices no longer become fully informative in the limit as noise trading vanishes or as traders become risk neutral. With small traders, the model may become one of monopolistic competition, not perfect competition. In contrast to the competitive model, a reasonable model of endogenous acquisition of costly private information is obtained, even when traders are risk-neutral.

An identified model is not necessary for statistical inference, but ambiguities can arise. This paper examines some simple examples and proposes a framework that distinguishes between the “refutation” and “confirmation” aspects of testing in an unidentified model. One particular problem is the interpretation given to overidentifying restrictions: a common view is that these are somehow not properly testable.

The natural growth rate of most renewable resource stocks is in part stochastic. This paper examines the implications of such ecological uncertainty for competitive equilibrium in a market with property rights. We show that stochastic fluctuations add a risk premium to the rate of return required to keep a unit of stock in situ, and we examine the effects of fluctuations on resource rent. Examples are used to show that extraction can increase, decrease, or be left unchanged as the variance of the fluctuations increases, depending on the extent of market "self-correction". Regulatory implications are also discussed.

This paper is concerned with the design of non-cooperative game forms for economic decision problems. A decision problem is presented which admits non-dictatorial game forms with the following properties: Nash equilibria exist and all Nash equilibrium outcomes are Pareto optimal; or dominant strategies exist and all dominant strategy equilibria are Pareto optimal; but not both. This is, any (non-dictatorial) game form whose Nash equilibria are well behaved does not have dominant strategies, and any game form with well behaved dominant strategy equilibria must have at least one non-optimal non-dominant strategy Nash equilibrium.

Much attention in the theory of revealed preference has been devoted to the problem of demand functions generated from continuous utility functions. First Samuelson (1938), the originator of the theory of revealed preference, presented assumptions for P2+. Later Houthakker (1950) developed this model of consumer's behaviour for the n-dimensional case. A gap in Houthakker's proof has been recently closed by B. Stigum (1973). Uzawa (1960) presented a different version of Houthakker's theorem. His conditions AI-AIV and the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference establish the existence of an upper semicontinuous utility function generating the given demand function. Uzawa's query whether these conditions guarantee the existence of a continuous utility function was answered in the negative by a counterexample of Hurwicz and Richter (1971). At approximately the same time E. Gordon (1971) published an article in the Review of Economic Studies where he tried to demonstrate that the axioms AI-AIV and the Strong Axiom do imply the existence of a continuous utility function. Unfortunately the proof of his Proposition 3 (p. 327) contains an error which led to this wrong conclusion. The purpose of this paper is to correct Gordon's theorem by adding conditions which are essentially due to Stigum. We will see that supporting hyperplanes play an important part in the method of the proof. The correction of Gordon's proof, based on results of Uzawa, turns out to be another method to prove Houthakker's theorem.