Knowledge that Transforms

Modern growth theory puts invention on the center stage. Inventions are created by individuals, raising the question of whether we can increase the number of inventors. To answer this question, we study the causal effect of MSc engineering education on invention, using data on U.S. patents’ Finnish inventors and the distance to the nearest technical university as an instrument. We find a positive effect of engineering education on the propensity to patent and a negative OLS bias. Our counterfactual calculation suggests that establishing three new technical universities resulted in a 20% increase in the number of USPTO patents by Finnish inventors.

Are differences in local banking development long lasting? Do they affect economic performance? I answer these questions by relying on a historical development that occurred in Italian cities during the Renaissance. A change in Catholic doctrine led to the development of modern banks in cities hosting Jewish communities. Using Jewish demography in 1500 as an instrument, I provide evidence of extraordinary persistence in the level of banking development across Italian cities and substantial effects of local banks on per capita income. Additional firm-level analyses suggest that banks exert large effects on aggregate productivity by reallocating resources toward more efficient firms.

I examine the role of human and physical capital for the creation of scientific knowledge. I address the endogeneity of human and physical capital with two exogenous shocks: the dismissal of scientists in Nazi Germany and World War II bombings. A 10% shock to human capital reduced output by 0.2 SD in the short run, and the reduction persisted in the long run. A 10% shock to physical capital reduced output by 0.05 SD in the short run, and the reduction did not persist. The dismissal of star scientists caused much larger reductions in output because they are key for attracting other successful scientists.

We study theoretically and empirically whether natural resource windfalls affect political regimes. We show that windfalls have no effect on democracies, while they have heterogeneous political consequences in autocracies. In deeply entrenched autocracies, the effect of windfalls is virtually nil, while in moderately entrenched autocracies, windfalls significantly exacerbate the autocratic nature of the political system. To frame the empirical work, we present a simple model in which political incumbents choose the degree of political contestability and potential challengers decide whether to try to unseat the incumbents. The model uncovers a mechanism for the asymmetric impact of resource windfalls on democracies and autocracies, as well as the the differential impact within autocracies.

Multinational firms with operations in high-tax countries can benefit the most from reallocating taxable income to tax havens, though this is sufficiently difficult and costly that only 20.4% of German multinational firms have any tax haven affiliates. Among German manufacturing firms, a 1 percentage point higher foreign tax rate is associated with a 2.3% greater likelihood of owning a tax haven affiliate. This is consistent with tax avoidance incentives and contrasts with earlier evidence for U.S. firms. The relationship is less strong for firms in service industries, possibly reflecting the difficulty of reallocating taxable service income.

Do consumers boycott in response to international conflict? We show that during the 2003 U.S.-France dispute over the Iraq War, the market share of French-sounding, U.S. supermarket brands declined. The dispute was a negative shock to U.S. consumers’ associations with France. French-sounding brands, which consumers perceive to be French imports but are not, allow us to isolate the dispute’s effect on economic behavior, as these brands’ only link to France is through consumers’ associations. Our estimates, derived from a nationwide sample of weekly supermarket sales for over 8, 000 brands, are robust to a variety of alternate explanations. We also show that supermarkets with a higher proportion of customers who are U.S. citizens (i.e., who more strongly identify with the U.S. national identity) exhibited sharper boycotts.

This paper examines empirically whether the measurement of trend inflation can be improved by using disaggregated data on sectoral inflation to construct indexes akin to core inflation but with a time-varying distributed lags of weights, where the sectoral weight depends on the timevarying volatility and persistence of the sectoral inflation series and on the comovement among sectors. The modeling framework is a dynamic factor model with time-varying coefficients and stochastic volatility as in Del Negro and Otrok (2008), and is estimated using U.S. data on seventeen components of the personal consumption expenditure inflation index.

We document that nonrich households consume a larger share of their current income when exposed to higher top income and consumption levels. Permanent income, wealth effects, and upward local price pressures cannot provide the sole explanation for this finding. Instead, we show that the budget shares that nonrich households allocate to more visible goods and services rise with top income levels, consistent with status-maintaining explanations for our primary finding. Nonrich households might have saved up to 3% more annually by the mid-2000s had incomes at the top grown at the same rate as median income since the early 1980s.

This paper models how to use widely available data on wages and housing costs to infer land rents, local productivity, and the total value of local amenities in the presence of federal taxes and locally produced nontraded goods. I apply the model to U.S. metropolitan areas with the aid of visually intuitive graphs. The results improve measures of productivity and feature large differences in land rents. Wage and housing cost differences across metropolitan areas are accounted for more by productivity than quality-of-life differences. Regressions using individual amenities reveal that the most productive and valuable cities are typically coastal, sunny, mild, educated, and large.

Using U.S. Census data for 1990 to 2000, we estimate effects of NAFTAon U.S.wages.We look for effects of the agreement by industry and by geography, measuring each industry's vulnerability to Mexican imports and each locality's dependence on vulnerable industries. We find evidence of both effects, dramatically lowering wage growth for blue-collar workers in the most affected industries and localities (even for service-sector workers in affected localities, whose jobs do not compete with imports). These distributional effects are much larger than aggregate welfare effects estimated by other authors.