Knowledge that Transforms

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This paper investigates whether there is a link between cognitive ability, risk aversion, and impatience, using a representative sample of roughly 1,000 German adults. Subjects participate in choice experiments with monetary incentives measuring risk aversion, and impatience over an annual horizon, and conduct two different, widely used, tests of cognitive ability. We find that lower cognitive ability is associated with greater risk aversion, and more pronounced impatience. These relationships are significant, and robust to controlling for personal characteristics, education, income, and measures of credit constraints. We perform a series of additional robustness checks, which help rule out other possible confounds.

A major puzzle in international finance is that high interest rate currencies tend to appreciate (forward discount puzzle). Motivated by the fact that only a small fraction of foreign currency holdings is actively managed, we calibrate a two-country model in which agents make infrequent portfolio decisions. We show that the model can account for the forward discount puzzle. It can also account for several related empirical phenomena, including that of “delayed overshooting.” We also show that making infrequent portfolio decisions is optimal as the welfare gain from active currency management is smaller than the corresponding fees. (JEL F31, G11, G15)

Research on the impact of teachers on student achievement (e.g., Jonah E. Rockoff 2004; Steven G. Rivkin, Hanushek, and John Kain 2005) has established two stylized facts: (1) teacher effectiveness varies widely, and (2) outside of experience, qualifications that determine a teacher’s certification and salary bear little relation to outcomes. This provides motivation to understand how to identify effective and ineffective teachers, particularly early in their careers. Studies that examine how student achievement data can predict teachers’ impacts on student outcomes in the future (e.g., Robert Gordon, Thomas J. Kane, and Douglas O. Staiger 2006; Dan Goldhaber and Michael Hansen 2010) conclude that using such data to selectively retain teachers could yield large benefits. However, “value-added” measures of effectiveness are noisy and can be biased if some teachers are persistently given students that are difficult to teach in ways that are hard to observe. Thus, using other information may achieve more stability and accuracy in teacher evaluations. There is also a literature on subjective teaching evaluations (i.e., evaluations by the school principal or evaluations based on classroom observation protocols or “rubrics”), which also finds significant relationships between evaluations and achievement gains. However, these studies typically investigate how evaluations predict the exam performance of current, not

The US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) estimates that the return on investments of foreign subsidiaries of US multinational companies over the period 1982–2006 averaged 9.4 percent annually after taxes; US subsidiaries of foreign multinationals averaged only 3.2 percent. BEA returns on foreign direct investment (FDI) are distorted because most intangible investments made by multinationals are expensed. We develop a multicountry general equilibrium model with an essential role for FDI and apply the BEA's methodology to construct economic statistics for the model economy. We estimate that mismeasurement of intangible investments accounts for over 60 percent of the difference in BEA returns. (JEL F23, F32)

The theory of international trade has paid scant attention to market institutions. Neither neoclassical theory nor new trade models typically specify the process by which supply and demand meet. Yet in the real world, intermediaries play a central role in materializing the gains from exchange outlined by standard trade theories. In Antr’and Costinot (2010), we have developed a stylized but explicit model of intermediation in trade. In this short paper, we present a variant of this model that illustrates the potential role of intermediaries in facilitating the realization of the gains from trade.

We conducted experiments in Vietnamese villages to determine the predictors of risk and time preferences. In villages with higher mean income, people are less loss-averse and more patient. Household income is correlated with patience but not with risk. We expand measurements of risk and time preferences beyond expected utility and exponential discounting, replacing those models with prospect theory and a three-parameter hyperbolic discounting model. Comparable risk parameter estimates have been found for Chinese farmers, using our method. (C83, D12, O12, P38)

Zhao (2008) presents an interesting “all-or-nothing monitoring” result for a multitask moral hazard agency problem with partial effort observation. We argue that the optimal contract based on the non-verifiable observation of the agent's effort in Zhao (2008) can be regarded as a limitation on the incentive schemes available to the principal. I then propose some arguably more appropriate approaches for analyzing such agency problems. (D82, D86, M54)

I revisit the question of indeterminacy in US monetary policy using limited-information identification-robust methods. I find that the conclusions of Clarida, Galí, and Gernter (2000) that policy was inactive before 1979 are robust, but the evidence over the Volcker-Greenspan periods is inconclusive. I show that this is in fact consistent with policy being active over that period. Problems of identification also arise because policy reaction has been more gradual recently. At a methodological level, the paper demonstrates that identification issues should be taken seriously, and that identification-robust methods can be informative even when they produce wide confidence sets. (E31, E32, E52, E65,)