Journal Article The Problem of Duopoly Reconsidered Get access R. H. Coase R. H. Coase Liverpool Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 2, Issue 2, February 1935, Pages 137–143, https://doi.org/10.2307/2967560 Published: 01 February 1935
Journal Article The German Method of Combined Debt Liquidation and Export Stimulation Get access H. K. Heuser H. K. Heuser Montreal and London Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 1, Issue 3, June 1934, Pages 210–217, https://doi.org/10.2307/2967484 Published: 01 June 1934
Journal Article The Working of the Pre-War Gold Standard Get access Charles H. Walker Charles H. Walker London Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 1, Issue 3, June 1934, Pages 196–209, https://doi.org/10.2307/2967483 Published: 01 June 1934
We design a compound real options model, which determines the timing of takeovers and characterizes the distribution of the associated surplus. We delineate a relation between the bargaining power of the acquiring firm and the takeover incentives. The takeover threshold is decreasing as a function of the expected primary takeover gain and the embedded divestment gain. Decreased implementation uncertainty stimulates takeover activity. This uncertainty concerns the delay until either primary takeover synergies or subsequent divestment gains are realized. We demonstrate how the relation between volatility and takeover timing depends on the functional form of the profit flow with implementation uncertainty.
We examine execution costs for trades in NYSE issues completed on the NYSE, the NASD dealer market, and the regional stock exchanges during 1994. We find that effective bid-ask spreads are only slightly smaller at the NYSE. However, realized bid-ask spreads, which measure market-making revenue net of losses to betterinformed traders but gross of inventory or order-processing costs, are lower on the NYSE by a factor of two to three. This differential is attributable to the successful ‘cream skimming’ of uninformed trades by off-NYSE market makers. These findings reinforce existing concerns about whether orders are routed so as to receive the best possible execution.
Journal of Financial Intermediation20009(2), 149-168
Damage measures in securities fraud cases are very imprecise because they are based on security price changes that reflect both the correction of previous misrepresentation and other independent information. Consequently, potential plaintiffs have a valuable “free option” to decide whether or not to file suit, and average damage awards are greater than actual damages, much greater when markets are volatile. The “Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995” was intended to curb abusive litigation and to address the problem of excessive damage awards. Motivated by a misdiagnosis that excess awards are due to temporary price drops, the Act limits damages to the difference between the purchase price and the time-averaged trading price from the release of the corrective information until 90 days later or until the sale of the security, whichever is first. Unfortunately, the Act's modified measure of damages suffers from a more severe free-option problem than did the traditional measure. Also, the Act introduced an additional new option to time the sale of the security; the effects of these options may be mitigated by the impact of the positive drift in stock prices over time, if the time-averaged price is not adjusted for market movements. As a result, the bias can be larger or smaller under the new Act, depending on how severe the free-option problem is. We propose an alternative approach to addressing the issue of excessive damages: courts should adopt a threshold of measured damages below which no damage would be awarded. The threshold would depend on several factors, most notably the volatility of the stock in the period under question. That is, damages will be awarded only if measured damages exceed the threshold, and awards would be capped by the formula presented in the Reform Act. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: K22, G38.
Accounting, Organizations and Society200732(7-8), 601-637
In the management control literature there is growing interest in the role of management control systems (MCS) in planned organizational change. The existing literature is concerned with either rational, technical change principles or more social and political interpretations of MCS facilitated change. This paper aims to extend this literature by combining technical approaches to MCS facilitated change with a behavioral approach in the study of two similar organizations. Moreover, the paper employs a holistic approach to change to develop a comprehensive understanding of the role of MCS in planned organizational change. A framework by Huy [Huy, Q. N. (2001). Time, temporal capacity, and planned change. Academy of Management Review 26(4), 601–623] is used to provide an integrative approach that focuses on both rational, systematic practices and the behavioral processes involved in their implementation. This is achieved by identifying four idealized intervention types: commanding, engineering, teaching and socializing. Understanding the application of these four intervention types requires analysis of the way they interact through time.