Knowledge that Transforms

The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was one of the earliest and, some believe, one of the most successful laws enacted by the New Deal. The stock market crash in 1929 and the Great Depression provided the impetus for reform of the stock markets in the belief that weaknesses of the institutions and ineptitude and/or chicanery among brokers and bankers were partially responsible for the losses incurred by stockholders. Although many critics, reformers and congressmen wanted Congress to enact blue skies legislation that would require all securities sold and traded to be approved by the federal government, President Franklin Roosevelt preferred the concept of (see Francis Wheat (1967)). Rather than having the government approve or disapprove securities, corporations whose securities are publicly sold and traded are required to disclose a large amount of predominantly financial information to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) who make these data available to the public. Indeed, the Securities Exchange Act is described in its title and usually referred to as a statute. Although the financial community generally opposed this legislation and the preceding Securities Act of 1933,1 most brokers, investors and government officials probably would find it difficult to conceive of the successful operation of the stock markets without the Securities Acts. Yet the economic rationale for the regulation of the securities markets was not examined carefully before the legislation was passed (which is not surprising, given turbulent times) nor has it been since,2 even though the Securities Act of 1934 was extended in 1964 to include most corporations whose stock is publicly owned. Such an examination of one important part of the law-the financial disclosure requirements-is presented here. This analysis is particularly timely because the SEC appears to be shifting its emphasis towards increasing the disclosure requirements of almost all corporations whose stock is traded in the markets.3

This paper reports the results of an empirical study of real output-inflation tradeoffs, based on annual time-series from eighteen countries over the years 1951-67. These data are examined from the point of view of the hypothesis that average real output levels are invariant under changes in the time pattern of the of inflation, or that there exists a rate of real output. That is, we are concerned with the questions (i) does the natural lead to expressions of the output-inflation relationship which perform satisfactorily in an econometric sense for all, or most, of the countries in the sample, (ii) what testable restrictions does the impose on this relationship, and (iii) are these restrictions consistent with recent experience? Since the term 'natural theory refers to varied aggregation of models and verbal developments,' it may be helpful to sketch the key elements of the particular version used in this paper. The first essential presumption is that nominal output is determined on the aggregate demand side of the economy, with the division into real output and the price level largely dependent on the behavior of suppliers of labor and goods. The second is that the partial rigidities which dominate shortrun supply behavior result from suppliers' lack of information on some of the prices relevant to their decisions. The third presumption is that inferences on these relevant, unobserved prices are made optimally (or rationally) in light of the stochastic character of the economy. As I have argued elsewhere (1972), theories developed along these lines will not place testable restrictions on the coefficients of estimated Phillips curves or other single equation expressions of the tradeoff. They will not, for example, imply that money wage changes are linked to price level changes with a unit coefficient, or that {long-run' (in the usual distributed lag sense) Phillips curves must be vertical. They will (as we shall see below) link supply parameters to parameters governing the stochastic nature of demand shifts. The fact that the implications of the natural come in this form suggests an attempt to test it using a sample, such as the one employed in this study, in which a wide variety of aggregate demand behavior is exhibited. In the following section, a simple aggregative model will be constructed using the elements sketched above. Results based on this model are reported in Section II, followed by a discussion and conclusions.

The relationship of agency is one of the oldest and commonest codified modes of social interaction. We will say that an agency relationship has arisen between two (or more) parties when one, designated as the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as representative for the other, designated the principal, in a particular domain of decision problems. Examples of agency are universal. Essentially all contractural arrangements, as between employer and employee or the state and the governed, for example, contain important elements of agency. In addition, without explicitly studying the agency relationship, much of the economic literature on problems of moral hazard (see K. J. Arrow) is concerned with problems raised by agency. In a general equilibrium context the study of information flows (see J. Marschak and R. Radner) or of financial intermediaries in monetary models is also an example of agency theory. The canonical agency problem can be posed as follows. Assume that both the agent and the principal possess state independent von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, G(.) and U(.) respectively, and that they act so as to maximize their expected utility. The problems of agency are really most interesting when seen as involving choice under uncertainty and this is the view we will adopt. The agent may choose an act, aCA, a feasible action space, and the random payoff from this act, w(a, 0), will depend on the random state of nature O(EQ the state space set), unknown to the agent when a is chosen. By assumption the agent and the principal have agreed upon a fee schedule f to be paid to the agent for his services. T he fee, f, is generally a function of both the state of the world, 0, and the action, a, but we will assume that the action can influence the parties and, hence, the fee only through its impact on the payoff. T his permits us to write,

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