Journal Article Academic Economics in Present Russia Gelesnoff, Grundzüge Get access M. M. Bober M. M. Bober Lawrence College Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 43, Issue 2, February 1929, Pages 352–363, https://doi.org/10.2307/1882478 Published: 01 February 1929

We develop a model of corporate cash holdings that incorporates CEO beliefs. An optimistic CEO views external financing as excessively costly but expects this cost to moderate over time. The optimistic CEO thus delays external financing while funding current investments with existing cash and maintaining a lower cash balance than rational CEOs. We find that, relative to rational CEOs, optimistic CEOs hold 24% less cash, hold lower cash to fund the firms' growth opportunities, and save less cash out of incremental cash flow.

Do merger bonuses to target CEOs facilitate a wealth transfer from target to acquirer shareholders? We test this hypothesis against an alternative that bonuses enable a useful contractual revision in compensation contracts when takeovers generate small synergies. When target CEOs get a merger bonus, acquirers pay lower premiums, but they also typically get less in the form of low synergies. Moreover, both stock and accounting returns to the acquirers are lower on average in deals with target CEO bonuses. These results support the contractual revision alternative. Nevertheless, wealth transfer occurs when merger bonuses are present in deals where targets exhibit high pre-takeover abnormal accruals or are subject to SEC enforcement actions.

This study examines the stock market forecasts and portfolio allocation decisions of small individual investors, based on survey data for 1987-1994. When investors are bullish, they increase their equity holdings; when investors are bearish, they decrease equity holdings. The surveyed investors are unable to time the stock market successfully. However, the shifts in their portfolios reflect past market movements and are consistent with positive feedback trading. I. Introduction There can be no doubt that, over short horizons, stock price changes are highly unpredictable. Nevertheless, many individuals discover seeming in past prices and trade based on the expectation that the trends will persist. De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) call these investors positive feedback traders.

This paper investigates the relation between the form of compensation and the manager's decision horizon. It finds that while all-cash contracts induce managers to underinvest in the long term, all-stock contracts induce overinvestment in the long term. It shows that compensation contracts consisting of both cash and restricted stock can produce efficient investment, thereby providing a rationale for the existence of both cash and stock incentive schemes in executive compensation packages. This explains why the adoption of either type of incentive scheme results in a positive stock price reaction. In addition, the paper derives the following testable hypotheses: i) the proportion of the stock compensation is decreasing in the precision of the manager's ability and increasing in the precision of the firm's cash flows; ii) firms compensate their managers with proportionately more stock in profitable years and proportionately more cash in leaner years; and iii) the greater the growth opportunities, the higher the proportion of stock compensation.

Previous research has separately addressed the problem of estimating risk in the presence of infrequent trading and the problem of estimating quality-adjusted returns in markets with quality variation in the observed price series. This paper simultaneously addresses both problems by applying a signal extraction method for unequally spaced data to decompose the observed price series with varying times between transactions into a quality-adjusted, permanent component (which would be observable in the absence of quality variation) plus a stationary, transitory quality variation component. Stamp auction transaction prices provide an application. Auction quality grading is treated in a manner analogous to bond ratings. Almost all of the observed variance is attributed to the auction quality variation. The observed auction returns and stock index returns are not well related.