This research identifies those characteristics that could potentially influence a choice to create an internal audit department and tests via discriminant analysis to evaluate whether such attributes significantly distinguish between companies with and without an internal audit department. In addition, qualitative characteristics of such departments are described, as is the association of such traits with errors and the overall control environment. A sample of 260 companies is examined. Companies with internal audit departments are observed to be significantly larger, more highly regulated, more competitive, more profitable, more liquid, more conservative in accounting policies, more competent in their management and accounting personnel, and subject to better management controls. Key discriminant variables are the degree of regulation, decentralization, size, the duration of association with present auditors, the existence of an audit committee, EDP control, and pressures by external parties on management to achieve budgetary goals. Qualitative attributes of internal audit are systematically associated with the overall quality of the control environment, as well as errors. The most important attribute appears to be the independence of internal audit in terms of the propriety of the reporting level. An advantage of internal auditing is that external auditors report a 10 percent reduction in the number of hours incurred and greater flexibility appears to exist in the proportion of work performed in off‐peak periods. Résumé. Les auteurs dressent l'inventaire des caractéristiques susceptibles d'influer sur le choix de créer un service de vérification interne et soumettent ces attributs à des tests, par voie d'analyse discriminante, afin de déterminer s'ils permettent d'établir une distinction claire entre les entreprises ayant et n'ayant pas de service de vérification interne. De plus, ils décrivent les caractéristiques qualitatives de ces services, de même que l'association de ces carctéristiques aux erreurs et au contexte global du contrôle. Les auteurs procèdent à l'examen d'un échantillon de 260 entreprises. L'étude révèle que les entreprises possédant des services de vérification interne sont beaucoup plus souvent des entreprises de grande taille, faisant l'objet d'une réglementation plus rigoureuse, plus concurrentielles, plus rentables, ayant davantage de liquidités, plus prudentes dans leurs conventions compatables, possédant une équipe de gestion et un personnel comptable plus compétents et soumises à de meilleurs contrôles de gestion. Les principales variables discriminantes sont le degré de réglementation, la décentralisation, la taille, la durée de l'association avec les vérificateurs actuels, l'existence d'un comité de vérification, le contrôle dans un cadre informatique et les pressions exercées par les tiers sur la direction pour l'atteinte des objectifs budgétaires. Les attributs qualitatifs de la vérification interne sont systématiquement asociés à la qualité globale du cadre de contrôle, de même qu'aux erreurs. L'attribut le plus important semble être le degré d'autonomie du service de vérification interne, c'est‐à‐dire le caractère approprié de ses liens hiérarchiques. La vérification interne comporte un avantage: les vérificateurs externes font état d'une réduction de 10 pour cent dans le nombre d'heures consacrées à la vérification, et il semble exister une plus grande souplesse dans la proportion du travail de vérification effectué en dehors des périodes de pointe.

I. Practice of discriminating monopolists often under conditions at variance with the common theoretical assumptions, 490. — II. The theoretical problem of unlimited and limited discrimination in its simplest form, 491. — III. Limiting conditions, 491. — IV. Fixed price difference, 492. — V. Varying price difference, 493. — VI. Adjusting the price difference to maximize profit, 495. — VII. Increase or decrease of prescribed price difference might increase profits, 496. — VIII. Comparison of discriminating monopoly and monopoly without discrimination, 496. — IX. The necessary restrictive assumptions, 497. — X. Illustration of proposition II, 499. — XI. Conclusion, 500.

Journal Article The Concluding Volume of Marx's Capital Get access W. Lexis W. Lexis Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 10, Issue 1, October 1895, Pages 1–33, https://doi.org/10.2307/1884938 Published: 01 October 1895

The problem of expanding food supply has been made more complex and more dependent on technological progress by the encroachment of a burgeoning population on a limited land area. Rapid growth in the rural labor force in the low-income developing countries not only increases the problem of providing adequate employment, particularly in the face of diminishing scope for expanding the land area, but also reduces the possibility of solving poverty problems simply by a redistribution of assets and income flows. Section II reviews past trends and current levels of food production, trade, and consumption. Section III discusses a controversial issue: the extent and seriousness of food deprivation. These sections lead to the same conclusion: the choice of development strategy is decisive in determining the level at which the food equation balances. An examination of contrasting development strategies and their implications for food production (Section IV) is followed by an exploration of the emerging consensus on the complex and difficult task of implementing a unimodal pattern of accelerated agricultural development, consistent with a high rate of growth in employment and food consumption. Interacting health-, nutrition-, and family-planning programs are viewed as important claimants of organizational and other resources. The review leadsmore » to the conclusion that reduction of malnutrition and related manifestations of poverty requires a set of interacting forces, characterized as a ring, that link nutritional need, generation of effective demand for food on the part of the poor, increased employment, a strategy of development that structures demand towards goods and services that have a high employment content, production of wage goods, and an emphasis on growth in agriculture. 183 references, 4 tables.« less

Five papers explore the effects of regulation, the causes and consequences of its dramatic growth in the United States, and the prospects for deregulation. Specific topics include the impact of public utilities and transportation regulation on prices, output, investment, health and safety regulation, and environmental regulation; the indirect effects of regulation on competition (e.g., on the cost of new capacity and competitive positions of firms); the causes and consequences of major shifts in business-government relationships; conceptual and practical problems in measuring the costs of regulation; and an analysis of the legislative deregulation of the airline industry, with projections for deregulation in the railroad and trucking industries.

[Using a sample of municipal bond offerings, I find that "local" investment banks have substantial comparative and absolute advantages over nonlocal counterparts--locals charge lower fees and sell bonds at lower yields. Local investment banks' strongest comparative advantage is at underwriting bonds with higher credit risk and bonds not rated by rating agencies. These findings suggest that high-risk bonds and nonrated bonds are more difficult to evaluate and market, and that investment banks with a local presence are better able to assess "soft" information and place difficult bond issues.]

Institutional investors' demand for a security this quarter is positively correlated with their demand for the security last quarter. We attribute this to institutional investors following each other into and out of the same securities ("herding") and institutional investors following their own lag trades. Although institutional investors are "momentum" traders, little of their herding results from momentum trading. Moreover, institutional demand is more strongly related to lag institutional demand than lag returns. Results are most consistent with the hypothesis that institutions herd as a result of inferring information from each other's trades.

Over the past decade several countries, including the US, have introduced or redesigned legislation that confers priority in bankruptcy upon all or some bank deposits. We argue that in the presence of contracting costs such rules can increase efficiency. We first show in a private information model that a borrower can reduce overall costs of finance by letting informationally heterogeneous lenders choose between junior and senior debt. In particular, we find that debt priorities reduce socially wasteful information gathering by investors. We then argue why, particularly in banking, legal standardization of debt priorities may be superior to bilateral private arrangements.

Over the past decade several countries, including the US, have introduced or redesigned legislation that confers priority in bankruptcy upon all or some bank deposits. We argue that in the presence of contracting costs such rules can increase efficiency. We first show in a private information model that a borrower can reduce overall costs of finance by letting informationally heterogeneous lenders choose between junior and senior debt. In particular, we find that debt priorities reduce socially wasteful information gathering by investors. We then argue why, particularly in banking, legal standardization of debt priorities may be superior to bilateral private arrangements.