We study how derivatives (with nonlinear payoffs) affect the underlying asset’s liquidity. In a rational expectations equilibrium, informed investors expect low conditional volatility and sell derivatives to the others. These derivative trades affect different investors’ utility differently, possibly amplifying liquidity risk. As investors delta hedge their derivative positions, price impact in the underlying drops, suggesting improved liquidity, because informed trading is diluted. In contrast, effects on price reversal are ambiguous, depending on investors’ relative delta hedging sensitivity (i.e., the gamma of the derivatives). The model cautions of potential disconnections between illiquidity measures and liquidity risk premium due to derivatives trading.

We document a substantial customer complaint gap between stock and mutual financial firms. To assess whether this 21% per year complaint gap stems from complaint-prone customers in stock insurers, we examine state-adjudicated complaint success. To further delineate between customer selection or treatment explanations, we exploit within insurer complaints around random claims (natural disasters) and attention shocks (media scrutiny). Further tests reveal the complaint gap widens with greater competition, near insolvency thresholds, and with more price regulation. Overall, the results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that mutual financial firms exhibit low customer satisfaction, suggesting customers find this a beneficial organizational structure.

Using a large hand-collected database of chief executive officer (CEO) bonus structures, we find that when a CEO’s bonus is directly tied to earnings per share (EPS), his company is more likely to conduct a buyback. This effect is especially pronounced when a company’s EPS is right below the threshold for a bonus award. Share repurchasing increases the probability the CEO receives a bonus and the magnitude of that bonus, but only when bonus pay is EPS based. Bonus-driven repurchasing firms do not exhibit positive long-run abnormal returns.

We examine the role of financial analysts in forming institutional investors' investment decisions. In our model, a fund manager invests in a stock based on the optimal weighting of reports created by a biased sell-side analyst and an unbiased buy-side analyst. The manager puts a higher weight on the buy-side analyst's report when the quality of the buyside analyst's information relative to that of the sell-side analyst increases, or when the sell-side analyst's degree of bias or uncertainty about the bias increases. Utilizing a unique dataset of U.S. equity funds, we find evidence supporting our model predictions on how fund managers weigh buy-side research relative to sell-side and independent research.

The actions of the federal government can have a profound impact on financial markets. As prominent participants in the government decision making process, U.S. Senators are likely to have knowledge of forthcoming government actions before the information becomes public. This could provide them with an informational advantage over other investors. We test for abnormal returns from the common stock investments of members of the U.S. Senate during the period 1993–1998. We document that a portfolio that mimics the purchases of U.S. Senators beats the market by 85 basis points per month, while a portfolio that mimics the sales of Senators lags the market by 12 basis points per month. The large difference in the returns of stocks bought and sold (nearly one percentage point per month) is economically large and reliably positive.

We establish a significant and robust connection between asset growth (AG) and style investing by showing that past style returns constructed based on AG and size jointly predict future stock returns significantly. Motivated by this notion, we propose a style momentum strategy based on AG and size and find that it dominates price momentum and size-BM style momentum in generating momentum profits. We examine two explanations for this predictability, including risk exposure to common risk factors and the limited-attention theory. Empirical evidence shows that the AG-size style momentum profit is induced because investors neglect the AG-size style performance, consistent with the limited-attention explanation, but not risk exposure to the investment factor. Further, we show that the profit of the AG-size style momentum is robust to different time periods partitioned by several time-series predictors.

This paper examines the role of investment opportunities and free cash flow in explaining the source of the wealth effect of international joint ventures. We document that firms with promising investment opportunities have significantly positive response to announcements of international joint venture investments, whereas firms with poor investment opportunities have unfavorable response to such announcements. In contrast, we find that free cash flow does not explain the cross-sectional differences in abnormal returns associated with the announcements of international joint ventures. Thus, our results show support for the investment opportunities hypothesis but no support for the free cash flow hypothesis. These findings hold even after controlling for other potential explanatory variables.

To address how technological progress in financial intermediation affects the economy, a costly-state verification framework is embedded into the standard growth model. The framework has two novel ingredients. First, firms differ in the risk/return combinations that they offer. Second, the efficacy of monitoring depends upon the amount of resources invested in the activity. A financial theory of firm size results. Undeserving firms are over-financed, deserving ones under-funded. Technological advance in intermediation leads to more capital accumulation and a redirection of funds away from unproductive firms toward productive ones. With continued progress, the economy approaches its first-best equilibrium.

This paper examines how the departure of star analysts influences the performance of their non-star peers. Using manually collected data from China, we observe that non-star analysts enhance their forecast accuracy after a star analyst leaves. This effect is particularly pronounced when non-star analysts have previously worked within hierarchical teams or when the departing star analyst held significant internal resources within the brokerage. Additionally, the performance improvements are more substantial in environments with greater promotion opportunities and in brokerages characterized by a collective organizational culture. To establish causality, we leverage the suspension and subsequent reform of the star analyst voting system as an exogenous shock. A difference-in-difference (DID) analysis demonstrates that brokerages more affected by this shock exhibit larger improvements in analyst forecast accuracy. These findings offer new insights into the celebrity effect, highlighting how changes in team structure and internal competition influence analyst performance.

This paper examines the influence of bank branch deregulation on corporate borrowers' stock price crash risk. Using a large sample of U.S. public firms over the period 1962–2001, we provide robust evidence that intrastate branch reform contributes to the reduction of firms' stock price crash risk. Further analysis shows that the negative relation between bank branch deregulation and crash risk is more pronounced among firms that are more dependent on external finance and lending relationships, as well as firms that have weaker corporate governance and greater financial constraints. Our findings are consistent with the notion that bank branch reform improves bank monitoring efficiency, thereby reducing borrowing firms' bad news formation and hoarding, and hence their stock price crash risk. Overall, our empirical evidence suggests that, as a reform aimed at removing restrictions on bank branch expansion, bank deregulation also helps protect shareholders' wealth.