Knowledge that Transforms

The configuration of equilibrium in the market for automobile collision insurance is examined empirically by representing the premium-deductible menu and the demand function as a standard hedonic system. Using contractual data from a representative insurer, we estimate a reduced-form hedonic premium equation and the inverse of the marginal bid equation for insurance coverage. The data reveal an equilibrium with adverse selection and market signaling but lead us to reject the hypothesis that high risks receive contracts subsidized by low risks.

Journal editors who publish papers authored by colleagues and former graduate students have been charged with practicing favoritism, with the implication that the papers in question are of lower quality than those written by scholars with no ties to the editor. Using citation analysis, the authors find strong evidence that although journal editors occasionally publish subpar papers authored by colleagues and former graduate students, on balance their use of professional connections enables them to identify and 'capture' high-impact papers for publication. This implies that a practice interpreted as favoritism by many scholars in fact serves to enhance efficiency in the market for scientific knowledge.

This paper seeks to understand what motivates workers to be altruistic toward one another and studies whether firms benefit from encouraging these "human relations" in the workplace. The paper first proposes that feelings of altruism can be individually rational in certain settings in which the variables controlled by the workers are strategically linked. The paper then studies what this implies for equilibrium altruism in two situations. The first has workers who are paid as a function of joint output. The second is the relationship between subordinates and their supervisors.

This paper calculates numerical solutions to the principal-agent problem and compares the results to the stylized facts of CEO compensation. The numerical predictions come from parameterizing the models of Grossman and Hart and of Holmstrom and Milgrom. While the correct incentives for a CEO can greatly enhance a firm's performance, providing such incentives need not be expensive. For many parameter values, CEO compensation need only increase by about $10 for every $1,000 of additional shareholder value; for some values, the amount is 0.003 cents. The paper thus answers two challenges posed by Jensen: that principal-agent theory does not yield quantitative predictions, and that CEO compensation is insufficiently sensitive to firm performance.

It is currently popular to identify monetary policy shocks with innovations in some measure of reserves or in the federal funds rate. These assumptions about the interest elasticity of the supply of or demand for reserves imply monetary policy shocks that produce dynamic responses of macroeconomic variables that are anomalous relative to traditional monetary analyses. This paper tentatively identifies supply and demand shocks in the markets for reserves and M2 for the 1980s and contrasts them with results for the 1970s. In the later period, identified monetary policy shocks have dynamic impacts that are fully consistent with traditional analyses.

Previous studies of congressional spending have typically found a large positive effect of challenger spending but little evidence for effects of incumbent spending. Those studies, however, do not adequately control for inherent differences in vote-getting ability across candidates. This paper examines elections in which the same two candidates face one another on more than one occasion; differencing eliminates the influence of any fixed candidate or district attributes. Estimates of the effects of challenger spending are an order of magnitude below those of previous studies. Campaign spending has an extremely small impact on election outcomes, regardless of who does the spending.

03 We show how comparisons between the within-twin correlations of human capital outcomes across identical and nonidentical twins can be used to identify the variability in the individual-specific component of endowments and the responsiveness of schooling to individual-specific endowments in the family and in the marriage market even when schooling is measured with error. Estimates from two twins samples indicate that 27 (42) percent of the variance in log earnings (obesity) is due to variability in individual-specific endowments, allocations of schooling reinforce specific endowments, and individual-specific earnings endowments of men and their wives' schooling are negatively associated.

College enrollment of black eighteen-nineteen-year-old high school graduates declined from 1980 through 1984 and then rebounded. This paper presents data from a time series of cross-sections of eighteen-nineteen-year-old youths from 1973 through 1988 to test the role of family background, direct college costs, local economic conditions, and returns to college in driving these trends. The evidence suggests that, on the one hand, increases in direct college costs were driving enrollment rates downward. On the other hand, dramatic increases in average parental education exerted upward pressure on college enrollment by blacks, particularly in the latter half of the decade.

The empirical literature on executive compensation generally fails to specify a model of executive pay on which to base and test hypotheses regarding its determinants. In contrast, this paper analyzes a simple principal-agent model to determine how well it explains variations in CEO incentive pay and salaries. Many findings are consistent with the basic intuition of principal-agent models that compensation is structured to trade off incentives with insurance. However, statistical significance for some of the effects is weak, although the magnitudes are large. Also, there is little evidence of the use of relative performance pay. Nevertheless, while puzzles remain, it seems clear that principal-agent considerations play a role in setting executive compensation.

The semiconductor industry is often cited as a strategic industry in part because important learning spillovers may justify special industrial policies. Using quarterly, firm-level data on seven generations of dynamic random access memory semiconductors over 1974-92, the authors find that learning rates average 20 percent, firms learn three times more from an additional unit of their own cumulative production than from an additional unit of another firm's cumulative production, learning spills over just as much between firms in different countries as between firms within a given country, and intergenerational learning spillovers are weak.