We analyze the optimal contract to finance the series of investments of a growing firm. The analysis is based on the need to repeatedly raise funds when informed insiders can expropriate outside investors. The optimal contract can be implemented by a sequence of one-period debt contracts and equity ownership by outsiders. Debt is optimal, as it reduces the expected cost of auditing, while partial equity ownership by insiders is optimal, as it mitigates the need for auditing in the presence of valuable growth opportunities. The model yields time-series implications regarding capital structure, investment and its fraction financed externally, and profitability.

In this paper we study the optimal design of credit derivative contracts when banks have private information about their ability in the loan market and are subject to capital requirements. First, we prove that when banks are subject to a maximum loss capital requirement the optimal signaling contract is a binary credit default basket. Second, we show that if credit derivative markets are opaque then banks cannot commit to terminal-date risk exposure, and therefore the optimal signaling contract is more costly. The above results allow us to discuss the potential implications of different capital adequacy rules for the credit derivative markets

This paper argues that banks must be sufficiently levered to have first-best incentives to make new risky loans. This result, which is at odds with the notion that leverage invariably leads to excessive risk taking, derives from two key premises that focus squarely on the role of banks as informed lenders. First, banks finance projects that they do not own, which implies that they cannot extract all the profits. Second, banks conduct a credit risk analysis before making new loans. Our model may help understand why banks take on additional unsecured debt, such as unsecured deposits and subordinated loans, over and above their existing deposit base. It may also help understand why banks and finance companies have similar leverage ratios, even though the latter are not deposit takers and hence not subject to the same regulatory capital requirements as banks

We examine the impact of geographical proximity on the acquisition decisions of US public firms over the period 1990–2003. Transactions where the acquirer and target firms are located within 100 km of each other are classified as local transactions. We find that acquirer returns in local transactions are more than twice that in non-local transactions. The higher return to local acquirer is not explained by related, either horizontal or vertical, industry transactions, and appears to be related to information advantages arising from geographical proximity. These information advantages facilitate acquisition of targets that, on average, create higher overall return. The higher return to local acquirers is preserved by the use of target termination fee contracts.

We test the market timing theory of capital structure using an earnings-based valuation model that allows us to separate equity mispricing from growth options and time-varying adverse selection; thus avoiding the multiple interpretations of book-to-market ratio. We find that equity market mispricing plays a significant, if not dominant, role in the security choice decision. Our results are robust to the inclusion of proxies for time-varying growth options and alternate methods of measuring misvaluation.

Bank runs in the literature take the form of withdrawals of demand deposits payable in real goods, which deplete a fixed reserve of goods in the banking system. That framework describes traditional bank runs based on currency withdrawals as occurred historically in the US and more recently in developing countries. However, in a modern banking system, large withdrawals typically take the form of electronic payments of inside money, with no analog of a depletion of a scarce reserve from the banking system. In a new framework of nominal demand deposits repayable in inside money, pure liquidity-driven bank runs do not occur. If there were excessive early withdrawals, nominal deposits would hedge the bank and flexible monetary prices in the goods market would limit real consumption. The maturity mismatch of short term liabilities and long term assets is not sufficient for multiple equilibria bank runs without other frictions. A key role of the bank is to ensure optimal real liquidity, which allows markets to optimally distribute consumption goods through the price mechanism.

We develop a simple model of the housing market in which financial imperfections can serve to stabilize aggregate fluctuations, and not necessarily aggravate them as in much of the previous literature; we term this a financial decelerator. Stabilization can occur in our model because lenders are imperfectly informed as to borrowers' propensity to default. As a result, it is too costly for lenders to impose borrowing constraints that guarantee repayment in every possible eventuality. This allows some borrowers to default when house prices are low, thereby leaving them with more wealth. This then serves as an endogenous stabilizing force.

Generalizing Cooper-Kaplanis (1994), we estimate implied costs that reconcile international portfolios with InCAPM predictions. Costs depend on home- and host-country characteristics and on interactions; we estimate risk tolerance rather than pre-specifying it; and we control for currency risk, inflation hedging, fixed-interest investments, round-tripping and omitted countries. Estimates for developed markets are lower than reported before, but those for new markets are quite high: 2001-2004 inward shadow costs range from 0.01 %p.a. (US) to 37 (Indonesia). We find that equity home bias is related to a mixture of risks and frictions, such as information asymmetries, institutional factors and explicit costs.

Extant research posits that cross-listing improves firms' access to lower cost external financing. But so far, there is scarce evidence that improved access to external funds through cross-listing contributes to higher firm growth. Documenting the relation between firm growth and cross-listing is critical because the presumption in prior research is that funds raised via cross-listing will be channeled towards potentially profitable projects. Using a sample of firms from thirty-seven countries that are cross-listed in the USA, we find a positive association between cross-listing and subsequent externally financed firm growth rates. However, we do not find that increases in externally financed firm growth after cross-listing vary systematically as a function of the home-country attributes of the cross-listed firms. Overall, our results provide new and direct evidence on the impact of cross-listing on the firm growth rates.

Large U.S. banks dramatically increased their capitalization during the 1990s, to the highest levels in more than 50 years. We document this buildup of capital and evaluate several potential motivations. Our results support the hypothesis that regulatory innovations in the early 1990s weakened conjectural government guarantees and enhanced bank counterparties' incentives to monitor and price default risk. We find no evidence that a bank holding company's (BHC's) market capitalization increases with its asset volatility prior to 1994. Thereafter, the data display a strong cross-sectional relation between capitalization and asset risk.