We analyze how countercyclical liquidity policy—via reserve requirements (RRs)—affects the credit cycle. For identification, we exploit supervisory credit register data and RR changes in Brazil made for monetary and macroprudential purposes and affecting banks differently. We find that countercyclical liquidity policy smooths credit supply cycles at the loan and firm levels. The effects of easing during crises are three times stronger than are those of tightening during booms, particularly for low-risk firms. We also explore interest rate policy. Credit supply effects are stronger among high-risk firms and during tightening, when interest rates are more effective than RRs.

Nonbank financial intermediaries (NBFIs) have grown significantly relative to banks. We argue that this growth reflects a transformation of the activities and risks of banks and NBFIs, driven at least in part by changes in bank regulation. We document through new regulatory data, case studies, and empirical analyses that banks remain special as providers of both routine and emergency liquidity to NBFIs and that the sectors have become increasingly interdependent. We discuss some potential regulatory responses, including considering the two sectors holistically and exploring new ways to internalize the costs of systemic risk arising from bank-NBFI interconnectedness.

We model mortgage refinancing as a bargaining game involving the borrowing household, the incumbent lender, and outside banks. We show that bargaining can provide a competitive advantage to the incumbent bank. In equilibrium, the borrower’s ability to refinance depends on the incumbent bank’s cost (dis)advantage relative to locally present competing banks and on the average creditworthiness of borrowers in the relevant market. It is also driven by borrower impatience and switching costs. We find empirical support for the key predictions of our model in an administrative data set covering the universe of mortgages in Belgium.

We study the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance in a unique private firm setting. The simplicity of the ownership structure and nature of our sample firms help isolate the incentive-aligning effect of managerial ownership from the influence of other effects. We find that managerial ownership is positively associated with firm performance. This positive association is concave but not reversed as ownership increases, indicating a diminishing effect of ownership on performance. We use unique features of the data to further mitigate endogeneity concerns. Our findings support managerial ownership as an effective incentive-aligning tool in the absence of managerial entrenchment.

Delegating high-stakes decisions creates a fundamental tension: incentivizing experts to acquire unobservable information inevitably distorts their final choices. In a principal-agent setting, we characterize the optimal compensation contract under hidden learning, showing it endogenously generates either contrarian or conformist bias. The direction of this bias depends on learning costs and the precision of public and private information. Our framework links information acquisition incentives to systematic biases in experts’ choices and offers a unifying explanation for conflicting empirical evidence in financial advice: why analysts issue excessive contrarian recommendations, and why inexperienced analysts follow the consensus more than their experienced peers.

We study a nonlinear relationship between corporate investment and Tobin’s q in the cross section of firms. After correcting for nonlinear errors using a repeated measurement of q derived from analysts’ forecasts, we find evidence of varying investment-q sensitivity across firms. The investment-q sensitivity is low for firms with low q. It then becomes more pronounced at intermediate values before weakening at high values of q, resulting in an S-shaped pattern. In the cross section, the true investment-q relation is therefore not strictly linear. Firm investment is predicted to remain similar among firms with low q, suggesting that increases in q do not necessarily lead firms to increase investment significantly.

The presence of shadow banks in corporate term loan syndicates adversely affects credit lines’ liquidity provision, despite shadow banks not directly funding credit lines. Within the same syndicated loan deal, shadow banks attract not only riskier borrowers but also fewer banks as co-lenders, both in the term loan and in the credit line. Furthermore, credit lines in deals funded by shadow banks, compared to those without shadow bank participation, are smaller, with shorter maturities, and lower drawdown rates. Overall, our results highlight that syndicated loan deals with a strong presence of shadow banks offer borrowers lower liquidity protection. JEL G21, G22, G23

We examine the influence of consultants on the portfolio choices and performance of institutional asset owners’ private equity (PE) investments. We find that asset owners using the same search consultant make similar investment choices. Asset owners advised by consultants that focus on a narrower list of PE managers perform better. Among asset owners that share a consultant, those with the largest PE mandates (top clients) end up with better-performing investments. For mechanisms underlying consultants’ performance impact, we find evidence for both access and selection abilities.

Using a data set of public procurement auctions and registered shareholders of all bidding firms in Singapore, we study the effects of ownership networks on prices and efficiency in product markets. We find participating bidders with common owners or common owners’ owners are more likely to submit identical bids, and the identical bids are associated with higher contract prices. Our structural estimates suggest removing ownership network effects improves a procurer’s cost efficiency. Our findings are robust to falsification tests, bid rounding concerns, placebo tests using other common stakeholder relationships, and weighting based on a machine-learning prediction of the auction format.

About 37% of Chinese listed firms have medical expertise, as measured by the existence of senior executives with a medical degree or medical-industry experience. Using the COVID-19 outbreak in China as a natural experiment, we find that the stock returns of firms with medical expertise, excluding those within the healthcare and pharmaceutical industry, are significantly higher than those without. The positive impact is more pronounced if a CEO or Chairman has medical expertise and if the firm is not state-owned. Overall, this study underlines the importance of diversified executive human capital on firm performance through disentangling macro shocks.