Abstract The U.S. banking sector had nearly 70% fewer banks in 2022 relative to 1989, primarily because of mergers. We develop a methodology to estimate cross-market spillover effects of bank mergers and test whether the operations of incumbents facing consolidating competitors in one market are affected in other markets. We find that nonmerging banks within a market that are one standard deviation more exposed to mergers in other markets increase deposits by 2.1% relative to their less exposed competitors. Our methodology may be applied elsewhere to assess the aggregate impacts of industry consolidation and illustrates challenges with product-based or geographic market definitions.

Though trading halts are a common feature in securities markets, the issues associated with the coordination of these halts across markets are not well understood. In fact, regulations often allow traders to circumvent trading halts through the use of alternative venues. Using a sample of order imbalance delayed openings on the NYSE, we examine the costs and benefits of continued trading on alternative venues when the main market calls a halt. We find that trades routed to off-NYSE venues during NYSE halts are associated with significant price discovery and lead to an improved post-halt trading environment. In addition, limit orders routed through ECNs reflect price-relevant information even prior to the halt, with limit book imbalances decreasing and depth filling in during the halt around the eventual reopening NYSE price. However, these informational benefits come at a substantial cost, as both execution costs and volatility are extremely high on off-NYSE venues during NYSE halts.

Our data show that nearly all firms borrow for the first time in their life from a single bank, but soon afterward some of them start borrowing from additional banks. Duration analysis shows that the likelihood of a firm substituting a single relationship with multiple relationships increases with the duration of that relationship. It also shows that this substitution is more likely to occur for firms with more growth opportunities and for firms with poor performance. The analysis of the ex post effects of the initiation of multiple relationships, in turn, shows that firms with higher levels of investment prior to the initiation of multiple relationships increase their investment even further when they start to borrow from multiple banks and that firms with poor prior performance continue to perform poorly afterward. These results suggest that concerns with hold-up costs, together with an unwillingness by the incumbent bank to increase its exposure to a firm because of its past poor performance, are the key reasons for these firms to initiate an additional relationship this early in their life. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G21, G32.

Abstract Given the complex and controversial nature of short-selling regulation, we review the academic literature and provide insights for policy makers and academics. We organize the complex history of short-selling regulation into three areas: trading restrictions, securities lending regulations, and disclosure requirements. We identify, analyze, and discuss 45 distinct regulations promulgated from 1896 to 2021, primarily by reviewing the academic literature and the data sources employed. We provide several insights regarding the effectiveness of regulatory approaches and the wider impact of short-selling regulation on markets. (JEL G2, G12, G14, G15, G34)

The 2007–9 financial crisis began with increased uncertainty over funding conditions in money markets. We show that funding uncertainty can explain diverse elements of commercial banks’ behavior during the crisis, including: (i) reductions in lending volumes, balance sheets, and profitability; (ii) more intense competition for retail deposits (including deposits turning into a “loss leader”); (iii) stronger lending cuts by more highly extended banks with a smaller deposit base; (iv) weaker pass-through from changes in the central bank’s policy rate to market interest rates; and (v) a binding “zero lower bound” as well as a rationale for unconventional monetary policy.

Using a large, new database of contractual provisions governing the allocation of cash flow rights in venture capital (VC) financings, we investigate how contract design is related to VC abilities to monitor and provide value-added services to the entrepreneur. We find that more experienced VCs, who have superior abilities and more frequently join the boards of their portfolio companies, obtain weaker downside-protecting contractual cash flow rights than less experienced VCs. Several pieces of evidence suggest that this relation is unlikely to be driven by selection effects. The results suggest that VCs with better governance abilities focus less on obtaining downside protections, which entail risk-sharing costs, and more on other aspects of the contract (such as obtaining board representation) during negotiations with entrepreneurs. The results also imply that previous estimates of the amount entrepreneurs pay for affiliation with high-quality VCs are overstated.

Abstract Mutual fund returns are significantly related to stock characteristics in the cross-section after controlling for risk via factor models. We develop a new double-adjusted approach that controls for both factor model betas and stock characteristics in one performance measure. The new measure substantially affects performance rankings, with a quarter of funds experiencing a change in their percentile ranking greater than 10. Double-adjusted performance produces strong evidence of persistence in relative performance. Inference based on the new measure often differs, sometimes dramatically, from that based on traditional performance estimates. Received November 22, 2019; editorial decision June 28, 2020; Editor: Jeffrey Pontiff. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix,which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

We evaluate the performance of various methods for estimating factor returns in an approximate factor model. Differences across estimators are most pronounced when there is cross-sectional heteroscedasticity or when cross-sectional sample sizes, n, have fewer than 4,000 assets. Estimators incorporating either cross-sectional or time-series heteroscedasticity outperform the other estimators when those types of heteroscedasticity are present. The differences are most pronounced when the cross-sectional sample is small. Received December 2, 2015; editorial decision May 16, 2017 by Editor Jeffrey Pontiff.

We investigate an asset pricing model with preferences cycling between high risk aversion and low EIS in fall/winter and the reverse in spring/summer. Calibrating to consumption data and allowing plausible preference parameter values, we produce returns that match observed equity and Treasury returns across the seasons: risky returns are higher and risk-free returns are lower or stable in fall/winter, and they reverse in spring/summer. Further, risky returns vary more than risk-free returns. A novel finding is that both EIS and risk aversion must vary seasonally to match observed returns. Further, the degree of necessary seasonal change in EIS is small. (JEL E44, G11, G12)

We analyze the costs and benefits of clawback provisions that enable firms to recover incentive compensation from top management if financials are restated. In a simple contracting model, we find that a clawback provision effectively lengthens the horizon of incentives and curbs misreporting. However, such a provision can add noise to the underlying performance measure, reducing managerial effort and firm value. Our empirical tests support the model’s predictions regarding which types of firms are likely to voluntarily use clawback provisions. We also document that clawback provisions are associated with higher reporting quality, greater CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity, and higher CEO compensation.