We examine a general equilibrium model of asset prices in the presence of a simple informational imperfection. Assets are productive only when combined with managerial services. A manager “controls” an asset; he can conceal some of the output at a cost. This limits the extent to which managers can shed risk by issuing claims. Incentive compatibility drives a wedge, the “value of control”, between physical and financial asset values. Equilibrium allocations can be supported by alternative specifications of the right to “name the next manager”. If this right is assigned to holders of claims, then financial asset prices exhibit “excess volatility.”

This paper examines the effects of employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) on shareholder wealth. ESOPs established in the presence of takeover activity reduce share values, by approximately 4% on average. ESOPs also reduce share values if they are structured to transfer control away from outside shareholders, by creating a new ownership block with veto power over takeover bids. Large ESOPs established with nonvoting stock, so as to preclude any immediate control transfers, result in a significant increase in share values. The wealth effect of any given ESOP thus depends upon both its incentive and control effects on the corporation.

Prebuyout bondholders, on average, suffer statistically significant wealth losses in leveraged buyouts. Bonds with strong covenant protection, however, gain value, while those with no protection lose value. The disposition of bonds after buyouts, e.g., remained outstanding, called, tendered, defeased, is also strongly linked to type of covenant protection. We also document that covenant use declines for bonds issued after 1980. Finally, the losses to bondholders are small compared with the gains accruing to shareholders.

We examine the behavior of common stock prices after a large change in price occurs during a single trading day and find evidence that the stock market appears to have overreacted, especially in the case of price declines; however, the magnitude of the overreaction is small compared to the bid-ask spreads observed for the individual stocks in the sample. We interpret this finding as being consistent with a market that is efficient after transactions costs are considered.

Lumber industry production behavior is modeled using pooled microdata. Explicit recognition of the crucial role of capacity utilization at the mill level is used to generate information concerning product supply and factor demands. To exploit optimally the panel structure of the data base, fixed effects and error components models are estimated, along with the ordinary least squares model. Results for key elasticities are robust and highly significant. Furthermore, the results are more plausible than those from previous studies that rely on aggregate data and flexible functional forms. Copyright 1990 by MIT Press.

Two implications of received theory are (1) mineral net prices rise at the riskless interest rate, and (2) in-ground value is equal to the current net price. Both propositions are false. A correct theory has been joined to mistaken premises. Mineral resources are inexhaustible. The economic problem is not the intertemporal allocation of a stock but coping with the cost of a flow of reserve accretions. Mineral scarcity and price are the uncertain fluctuating result of a tug-of-war between diminishing returns versus increasing knowledge. Hence minerals are risky assets. Development cost, finding cost, and user cost (the penalty for development/production today instead of tomorrow) are all substitutes. Hence change in any one is a proxy for change in any other. Development cost is observable, and has been stable in many countries for pro- longed periods. User cost was also stable in the USA. There is no sign of any pattern of gradual depletion and rising cost. A simple model of an individual reservoir explains observed relations of value and price. The rate of interest has both a positive and negative effect upon the rate of reservoir depletion. The net effect of a change is therefore weak. Expropriation of low-cost oil fields, had they been operated independently to maximize value, would have led to drastic increases in depletion rates. The fact of decrease proves collusive restriction of output to maintain prices.

This article investigates why, in October 1987, almost all stock markets fell together despite widely differing economic circumstances. We construct a model in which “contagion” between markets occurs as a result of attempts by rational agents to infer information from price changes in other markets. This provides a channel through which a “mistake” in one market can be transmitted to other markets. We offer supporting evidence for contagion effects using two different sources of data.