Assuming that individual investors account for most odd-lot transactions, we examine oddlot purchases and sales around the turn of the year and find a pattern that is related to the well-known January effect in stock returns. A significant change in the ratio of odd-lot sales to odd-lot purchases occurs at the turn of the year, which supports the hypothesis that the January effect results from trading by individual investors. The trading patterns that we find are not due entirely to tax considerations.

This paper is a cross-section study of the effect of real devaluations on capacity utilization during stabilization programs in LDCs. It finds that such devaluations had a significant negative effect on output as predicted in many recent papers. This was not because devaluation caused a rise in aggregate saving but more because of a sharp contraction in investment. External factors, such as terms of trade and the capacity to import, had a significant positive impact while monetary and fiscal policy played only a minor role. Copyright 1992 by MIT Press.

Using micro-data from the Current Population Survey, the author examines the sensitivity of conclusion regarding time-series changes in inequality to the measure of inequality employed and to the population group analyzed. Although changes in inequality over time are sensitive to the measure of inequality, the author finds a general pattern of stable or decreasing inequality throughout the 1970s followed by a period of increasing inequality. Based upon a decomposition analysis, the author concludes that these changes are not simply the results of the changing employment distribution among groups, defined by sex, age, education or industry. Instead the rise in inequality results from an increase in inequality within these groups. Copyright 1992 by MIT Press.

This paper examines whether experienced players in Major League Baseball are paid more than their contribution to team revenue. The author shows that wages increase with experience independently of productivity gains. The results, therefore, contradict the human capital model of investment. The evidence is in fact consistent with implicit contract models because most older players are relatively overpaid. Copyright 1992 by MIT Press.

This paper examines money-income causality using band spectral filtering techniques. The paper's central finding is that relatively low frequency movements in outside money are responsible for the relationship between money and economic activity. This result is inconsistent with theoretical models in which unanticipated changes in money are responsible for movements in real activity. Reverse causality is also examined. The results are not supportive of a strong feedback relationship from income to inside money. However, there is evidence of strong feedback from income to outside money.

Abstract. A key characteristic of the reporting of private management information is that managers do not always report their information, and they reveal or withhold both “good” and “bad” news. Several recent papers provide models of managers' voluntary disclosure decisions. These models are typically constructed so that managers do not always disclose or withhold their information, despite rational behavior by both the privately informed managers and interested uninformed parties external to the firm. Our paper seeks to contribute further to this literature by developing a richer model of the forces that might influence a manager's decision to disclose private information. Our model is a direct extension of the model in Darrough and Stoughton (1990). In our model, there is a continuum of possible private incumbent signals and the entrant may be privately informed about the cost of entry. Partial disclosure of private information results from the tension that exists between an informed manager's desire to communicate good news to (and hide bad news from) the capital market and his desire to communicate bad news to (and hide good news from) competitors in the firm's product market. Résumé. La communication par la direction de l'information privilégiée qu'elle détient présente une caractéristique déterminante: les gestionnaires ne font pas toujours état de cette information, et ils révèlent ou retiennent l'information aussi bien «positive» que «négative ≫. Dans plusieurs études récentes sont proposés des modèles décisionnels en matière de présentation volontaire d'information par les gestionnaires. Ces modèles sont habituellement construits de telle sorte que les gestionnaires ne communiquent ou ne retiennent pas toujours l'information, malgré le comportement rationnel affiché tant par les gestionnaires dépositaires de l'information privilègiée que par les parties intéressées extérieures à l'entreprise qui ne disposent pas de cette information. Les auteurs ont voulu ici enrichir ces études en élaborant un modèle plus étoffé des forces susceptibles d'influer sur la décision du gestionnaire de communiquer l'information privilégiée dont il dispose.

We estimate the conditional distribution of trade-to-trade price changes using ordered probit, a statistical model for discrete random variables. This approach recognizes that transaction price changes occur in discrete increments, typically eighths of a dollar, and occur at irregularly-spaced time intervals. Unlike existing models of discrete transactions prices, ordered probit can quantify the effects of other economic variables like volume, past price changes, and the time between trades on price changes. Using 1988 transactions data for over 100 randomly chosen U.S. stocks, we estimate the ordered probit model via maximum likelihood and use the parameter estimates to measure several transaction-related quantities, such as the price impact of trades of a given size, the tendency towards price reversals from one transaction to the next, and the empirical significance of price discreteness.

Myron S. Scholes, G. Peter Wilson, Mark A. Wolfson, Firms' Responses to Anticipated Reductions in Tax Rates: The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 30, Studies on Accounting and Taxation (1992), pp. 161-185

Charles E. Boynton, Paul S. Dobbins, George A. Plesko, Earnings Management and the Corporate Alternative Minimum Tax, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 30, Studies on Accounting and Taxation (1992), pp. 131-153

This paper investigates market manipulation trading strategies by large traders in a securities market. A large trader is defined as any investor whose trades change prices. A market manipulation trading strategy is one that generates positive real wealth with no risk. Market manipulation trading strategies are shown to exist under reasonable hypotheses on the equilibrium price process. Sufficient conditions for their nonexistence are also provided.