In a partially reformed economy, distortions beget distortions. Segments of the economy that are freed from centralized control respond to the rent-seeking opportunities implicit in the remaining distortions of the economy. The battle to capture, and then protect, these rents leads to the creation of new distortions, even as the reform process tries to move forward. In this paper I illustrate this idea with a study of the People's Republic of China. Under the plan, prices were skewed so as to concentrate profits, and hence revenue, in industry. As control over factor allocations was loosened, local governments throughout the economy sought to capture these rents by developing high margin industries. Continued reform, and growing interregional competition between duplicative industries, threatened the profitability of these industrial structures, leading local governments to impose a variety of interregional barriers to trade. Thus, the reform process led to the fragmentation of the domestic market and the distortion of regional production away from patterns of comparative advantage.

Using limit order data provided by the NYSE, we investigate the impact of reducing the minimum tick size on the liquidity of the market. While both spreads and depths (quoted and on the limit order book) declined after the NYSE's change from eighths to sixteenths, depth declined throughout the entire limit order book as well. The combined effect of smaller spreads and reduced cumulative limit order book depth has made liquidity demanders trading small orders better off; however, traders who submitted larger orders in lower volume stocks did not benefit, especially if those stocks were low priced.

This article surveys the theory of the public enforcement of law—the use of public agents (inspectors, tax auditors, police, prosecutors) to detect and to sanction violators of legal rules. We first present the basic elements of the theory, focusing on the probability of imposition of sanctions, the magnitude and form of sanctions, and the rule of liability. We then examine a variety of extensions of the central theory, concerning accidental harms, costs of imposing fines, errors, general enforcement, marginal deterrence, the principal-agent relationship, settlements, self-reporting, repeat offenders, imperfect knowledge about the probability and magnitude of fines, and incapacitation.

We investigate the reliability of mandatory annual fair value estimates for UK investment property. We find that appraisal estimates understate actual selling prices and are considerably less biased and more accurate measures of selling price than respective historical costs. Investigations of managerial discretion over fair value reporting reveal that managers select among permissible accounting methods to report higher earnings, time asset sales to smooth reported earnings changes, smooth reported net asset changes and boost fair values prior to raising new debt. Finally, we find that the reliability of appraisal estimates increases when monitored by external appraisers and Big 6 auditors.

This paper evaluates the information content of the treasury stock method for computing diluted earnings per share (EPS). We demonstrate that the treasury stock method decreases the annual association between earnings changes and stock returns and explain why this is the case. Further, we show that the treasury stock method leads to a dilutive adjustment that biases the random walk model of annual earnings in a predictable direction. Finally, we demonstrate that using the treasury stock method appears to confuse both analysts and investors: analysts' forecast errors increase with the size of the dilutive adjustment, and the association between unexpected earnings and stock returns at the earnings announcement date weakens as the dilutive adjustment increases.

Abstract Graphs in corporate annual reports form part of a powerfully designed annual report package that offers considerable potential for “impression management.” The primary purpose of this paper is to determine whether graph use depends on corporate performance. Time‐series analysis, not previously used in the financial graphs literature, allows discretionary changes in graph use by companies to be identified and related to changes in individual companies' corporate performance over time. Based on the prior financial graphs and accounting choice literature, we develop two hypotheses that relate changes in graph use to changes in corporate performance. These hypotheses focus on the aggregate and individual company levels. We base our analysis on the corporate annual reports of 137 top UK companies that were in continued existence during the five‐year period from 1988 to 1992. At both the aggregate and individual company levels, we find the decision to use key financial variable (KFV) graphs, the primary graphical choice, to be associated positively with corporate performance measures. This finding is consistent with the manipulation hypothesis ‐ that is, that financial graphs in corporate annual reports are used to “manage” favorably the reader's impression of company performance, and hence that there is a reporting bias.

3LIa HqAq LWIDIMOW $I3flM PGMGU LJLW bGqOLIIJSIJCG suq fIG Gdfl!?. OMUGl2pIb suq AOfU 2P.nCUILC O fiG UUJJ

Optimal ownership structure is an important issue in corporate governance debates. This study uses piece-wise regression analysis to examine the impact of ownership structure on the risk of CEO compensation. We show that when the CEO and the board of directors control low levels of voting stock (i.e., below 13% of total shares) increases in ownership are positively related to CEO compensation risk. For ownership levels above 13% but below 22%, increases in ownership are negatively related to CEO compensation risk. This evidence provides a partial explanation for the non-monotonic relationship between Tobin's Q and management ownership observed by Morck et al. (1988) [Morck, R., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1988. Management ownership and market valuation: an empirical analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 20 (1988) 293–316.].

When a risk factor is missing from an asset pricing model, the resulting mispricing is embedded within the residual covariance matrix. Exploiting this phenomenon leads to expected return estimates that are more stable and precise than estimates delivered by standard methods. Portfolio selection can also be improved. At an extreme, optimal portfolio weights are proportional to expected returns when no factors are observable. We find that such portfolios perform well in simulations and in out-of-sample comparisons.