We develop a method of measuring ex-ante real interest rates using prices of index and nominal bonds. Employing this method and newly available data, we directly test the Fisher hypothesis that the real rate of interest is independent of inflation expectations. We find a negative correlation between ex-ante real interest rates and expected inflation. This contradicts the Fisher hypothesis but is consistent with the theories of Mundell and Tobin, Darby and Feldstein, and Stulz. We also find that nominal interest rates include an inflation risk premium that is positively related to a proxy for inflation uncertainty.
While the theoretical relation between taxes and capital structure has been extensively analyzed, the empirical evidence on this issue has thus far been inconclusive. One of the main difficulties confronting previous empirical studies of the cross-sectional relationship between taxes and leverage was the control of intervening variables. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA), which drastically changed the tax regime, provides a unique opportunity to assess the interaction between taxes and leverage decisions in a controlled environment. We test the relationship between leverage and certain tax-related variables for a large sample of companies in the years surrounding the enactment of the TRA. The results support the tax-based theories of capital structure. The findings indicate that there exists a substitution effect between debt and nondebt tax shields, and that both corporate and personal tax rates affect leverage decisions.
[While the theoretical relation between taxes and capital structure has been extensively analyzed, the empirical evidence on this issue has thus far been inconclusive. One of the main difficulties confronting previous empirical studies of the cross-sectional relationship between taxes and leverage was the control of intervening variables. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA), which drastically changed the tax regime, provides a unique opportunity to assess the interaction between taxes and leverage decisions in a controlled environment. We test the relationship between leverage and certain tax-related variables for a large sample of companies in the years surrounding the enactment of the TRA. The results support the tax-based theories of capital structure. The findings indicate that there exists a substitution effect between debt and nondebt tax shields, and that both corporate and personal tax rates affect leverage decisions.]
We document a seasonal pattern in stock returns around quarterly earnings announcement dates: small firms show large positive abnormal returns and a sizable increase in the variability of returns around these dates. Only part of the large abnormal returns can be accounted for by the tendency of firms with good news to announce early. Large firms show no abnormal returns around announcement dates and a much smaller increase in variability.
ABSTRACT This paper develops a model in which managers can signal their firms' true values by using either a dividend or a stock repurchase or both. The authors explain a number of stylized facts about these cash‐disbursement mechanisms, particularly those concerning the relative magnitudes of stock price responses to dividends and repurchases. Most importantly, they explain why a stock repurchase elicits a significantly higher price response, on average, than a dividend announcement.
This paper develops a model in which managers can signal their firms' true values by using either a dividend or a stock repurchase or both. The authors explain a number of stylized facts about these cash-disbursement mechanisms, particularly those concerning the relative magnitudes of stock price responses to dividends and repurchases. Most importantly, they explain why a stock repurchase elicits a significantly higher price response, on average, than a dividend announcement.
This paper demonstrates that preferred stock may arise as an optimal security in a tax-induced equilibrium. This result is driven by graduated tax schedules and by uncertainty. In a more general sense, our results can be interpreted as a template for including any security with a different tax treatment in a firm's capital structure. The first part of the paper demonstrates that the Miller equilibrium framework can accommodate more than two securities if different investor classes are taxed differently on each security and the tax schedule for each investor group is upward sloping. We then simplify the tax schedule, but introduce uncertainty, which implies the possibility of bankruptcy and the possible loss of tax shelters. The interaction of tax rates and seniority now affects the contribution of each security to after-tax firm value, as in some states the firm may not be able to pay either interest (or dividends) or even principal to its various claimholders. It is shown why and how these features, i.e. the various tax rates and seniority, determine the financing equilibrium, which is obtained by equating the expected marginal tax benefit of all securities. We demonstrate that non-profitable firms will tend to issue preferred shares whereas profitable firms will not find preferred stock advantageous in our framework. Comparative statics with respect to various tax rates are derived as well. These predictions are tested using a large sample of firms for the last 25 years. The empirical testing broadly confirms the theoretical predictions.