This paper examines the credit rationing debate using detailed contract information on over one million commercial bank loans from 1977 to 1988. While commercial loan rates are "sticky," consistent with rationing, this stickiness varies with loan contract terms in ways that are not predicted by equilibrium credit rationing theory. In addition, the proportion of new loans issued under commitment does not increase significantly when credit markets are tight, despite the fact that borrowers without commitments can be rationed whereas commitment borrowers are contractually insulated from rationing. Overall, the data suggest that equilibrium rationing is not a significant macroeconomic phenomenon.

This paper examines the credit rationing debate using detailed contract information on over one million commercial bank loans from 1977 to 1988. While commercial loan rates are "sticky," consistent with rationing, this stickiness varies with loan contract terms in ways that are not predicted by equilibrium credit rationing theory. In addition, the proportion of new loans issued under commitment does not increase significantly when credit markets are tight, despite the fact that borrowers without commitments can be rationed whereas commitment borrowers are contractually insulated from rationing. Overall, the data suggest that equilibrium rationing is not a significant macroeconomic phenomenon.

We study the broad question about the sources of FinTech lending growth by examining a specific representative product for which the technologies of both FinTech and the incumbent competitors can be identified and compared—small business lending. We test whether the presence of incumbents employing different technologies affects FinTech penetration, and find more FinTech lending where large/out-of-market banks are more prevalent. Using stress test exposures and Community Reinvestment Act examinations as instruments, we find that FinTech credit more often substitutes for loans by large/out-of-market banks than small/in-market banks. Results are consistent with FinTech advantages in processing hard information, rather than hardening soft information.

We formulate and test hypotheses about the role of bank type – small versus large, single-market versus multimarket, and local versus nonlocal banks – in banking relationships. The conventional paradigm suggests that “community banks” – small, single-market, local institutions – are better able to form strong relationships with informationally opaque small businesses, while “megabanks” – large, multimarket, nonlocal institutions – tend to serve more transparent firms. Using the 2003 Survey of Small Business Finance (SSBF), we conduct two sets of tests. First, we test for the type of bank serving as the “main” relationship bank for small businesses with different firm and owner characteristics. Second, we test for the strength of these main relationships by examining the probability of an exclusive relationship and main bank relationship length as functions of main bank type and financial fragility, as well as firm and owner characteristics. The results are often not consistent with the conventional paradigm, perhaps because of changes in lending technologies and deregulation of the banking industry.

Corporate governance theory predicts that leverage affects agency costs and thereby influences firm performance. We propose a new approach to test this theory using profit efficiency, or how close a firm’s profits are to the benchmark of a best-practice firm facing the same exogenous conditions. We are also the first to employ a simultaneous-equations model that accounts for reverse causality from performance to capital structure. We find that data on the US banking industry are consistent with the theory, and the results are statistically significant, economically significant, and robust.

Financial intermediation has distinct value from transforming financial claims to create liquidity and mitigate risks. However, research and policy competition analyses often neglect this value or minimally account for it. We review findings to better incorporate this value. We suggest shifting the mix of individual services analyzed to better represent the distinct value, focusing more on topics closely aligned with the distinct value concept beyond individual services, and accounting for the multimarket nature of financial intermediation. We recommend attention on future competition with digital FinTech, BigTech, and DeFi firms and policies to best preserve the distinct value of financial intermediation.

We use novel monthly survey data from 1993 to 2012 on small business managerial perceptions of financial constraints and other conditions, matched with information on banks in their local markets. The data suggest that small banks have comparative advantages in alleviating these constraints. These advantages tend to be greater during adverse economic conditions and do not appear to decrease or increase secularly. Small banks also appear to have comparative advantages in providing liquidity insurance to small business customers of large banks experiencing liquidity shocks during financial crises. Our findings suggest a source of social costs from ongoing consolidation of the banking industry. Received December 28, 2015; editorial decision January 13, 2017 by Editor Philip Strahan.

We use novel monthly survey data from 1993 to 2012 on small business managerial perceptions of financial constraints and other conditions, matched with information on banks in their local markets. The data suggest that small banks have comparative advantages in alleviating these constraints. These advantages tend to be greater during adverse economic conditions and do not appear to decrease or increase secularly. Small banks also appear to have comparative advantages in providing liquidity insurance to small business customers of large banks experiencing liquidity shocks during financial crises. Our findings suggest a source of social costs from ongoing consolidation of the banking industry.