We examine corporate payout policy in dual-class firms. The expropriation hypothesis predicts that dual-class firms pay out less to shareholders because entrenched managers want to maximize the value of assets under control and the associated private benefits. The pre-commitment hypothesis predicts that dual-class firms pay out more to shareholders because firms use corporate payouts as a pre-commitment device to mitigate agency costs. Our results support the pre-commitment hypothesis. Dual-class firms have higher cash dividend payments and total payouts, and they use more regular cash dividends rather than special dividends or repurchases, compared to their propensity-matched single-class firms. Dual-class firms with severe free cash flow-related agency problems and few growth opportunities rely even more on corporate payouts as a pre-commitment mechanism. We also rule out the alternative explanation that dual-class firms pay out more because super-voting shareholders lack the ability to generate home-made dividends by selling shares since super-voting shares are often non-tradable or very illiquid.

We examine how organizational form affects corporate payouts. Conglomerates pay out more than pure plays in both cash dividends and total payouts (cash dividends plus share repurchases). Furthermore, their payouts are more sensitive to cash flows compared to pure-play firms. The sensitivity of payouts to cash flow increases as the cross-segment correlation in a conglomerate decreases. Corporate payouts increase after mergers and acquisitions (M&As), especially among M&As in which acquirers and targets are less correlated. These results suggest that the coinsurance among different divisions of a conglomerate allows them to pay out more cash flow to their shareholders than pure-play firms.

To what extent conflicts of interest affect the investment value of sell-side analyst research is an ongoing debate. We approach this issue from a new direction by investigating how asset-management divisions of investment banks use stock recommendations issued by their own analysts. Based on holdings changes around initiations, upgrades, and downgrades from 1993 to 2003, we find that these bank-affiliated investors follow recommendations from sell-side analysts in general, increasing (decreasing) their relative holdings following positive (negative) recommendations. More importantly, these investors respond more strongly to recommendations issued by their own analysts than to those issued by analysts affiliated with other banks, especially for recommendations on small and low-analyst-coverage firms. Thus, we find that investment banks “eat their own cooking,” showing that these presumably sophisticated institutional investors view sell-side recommendations as having investment value, particularly when the recommendations come from their own analysts.

A repricing occurs when the issuing firm resets the strike price of an employee stock option (ESO). ESO repricings occur most frequently following a significant decline in the underlying stock price. Typically, the strike price is reset to the new stock price. We develop a new model for valuing ESOs with a repricing feature. Our valuation model is developed within a utility-maximizing framework that accounts for potentially multiple repricings, employee risk aversion, employee non-option wealth, the non-tradeability of ESOs, and the early exercise feature of ESOs. Simulations suggest that these factors can significantly affect ESO value.

We examine over 7400 analyst recommendations made in the year after going public for IPOs from 1999 to 2000. Initiations of coverage at the end of the quiet period come almost exclusively from affiliated analysts, whereas initiations afterward are predominantly from unaffiliated analysts. Contrary to previous findings, we find no evidence that the market discounts recommendations from affiliated analysts once we control for recommendation characteristics and timing. Moreover, analyst coverage in the first year is not affected by underpricing, and after the flurry of initiations at the end of the quiet period, the number of analysts covering a firm during the following 11 months is unrelated to the number of managing underwriters.

We investigate the pricing of 4,989 equity IPOs with offer dates between 1981 and 2000. Approximately three-fourths of these IPOs have integer offer prices. Average initial returns for IPOs with integer offer prices are significantly higher (24.5%) than those priced on the fraction of the dollar (8.1%). This result is robust through time and after conditioning for other effects known to influence initial returns. We hypothesize that integer vs. fractional dollar IPOs are the result of negotiations between the issuing firm and underwriter. Under this negotiation hypothesis, the frequency of integer pricing should be an increasing function of the offer price and the degree of uncertainty surrounding the value of the firm. Empirical evidence, supportive of the negotiation hypothesis, is presented.

We examine the expiration of the IPO quiet period, which occurs after the 25th calendar day following the offering. For IPOs during 1996 to 2000, we find that analyst coverage is initiated immediately for 76 percent of these firms, almost always with a favorable rating. Initiated firms experience a five‐day abnormal return of 4.1 percent versus 0.1 percent for firms with no coverage. The abnormal returns are concentrated in the days just before the quiet period expires. Abnormal returns are much larger when coverage is initiated by multiple analysts. It does not matter whether a recommendation comes from the lead underwriter or not.

We analyze the relation between antitakeover provisions (ATPs) and the performance of spin-off firms. We find that firms protected by more ATPs before spin-offs have higher abnormal announcement returns and greater improvements in post-spin-off operating performance than firms with fewer ATPs. Further, firms that reduce the number of ATPs after spin-offs have greater improvements in operating performance than firms that do not reduce the number of ATPs. Finally, CEOs of pre-spin-off firms tend to retain more ATPs in parent firms and assign fewer ATPs to the spun-off units if they remain as the CEOs of the parents but not the spun-off units. Overall, our results indicate a positive relation between ATPs and the value gains to spin-offs.