An integrated model is presented of three relatively distinct views of organizational socialization: the development of work skills and abilities; the acquisition of a set of appropriate role behaviors; and the adjustment to the work group's norms and values. A theoretical rationale is developed to explain the contingencies on which progress through the different socialization processes depend. Three attitudinal variables (general satisfaction, internal work motivation, job development) and three behavioral variables (carrying out role assignments dependably, remaining with the organization, innovation/spontaneous cooperation) are suggested as criteria for measuring progress in socialization.

Abstract ABSTRACT: In 1974, the AAA Committee on the Relationship of Behavioral Science and Accounting called for the development of teaching methods that enabled students to experience behavioral aspects of accounting. This article suggests behavioral accounting research as an important source for the development of such teaching methods. As an example, a behavioral decision simulation adapted from prior research is described, The simulation enables the student to experience the information evaluation method and enables him to contrast his subjective evaluation process with the evaluation process prescribed by a normative model. The article illustrates how this contrast can serve as a basis for classroom discussion of human information processing issues in accounting.

Collective ratemaking has been practiced in various forms by American railway firms for more than a century. Its emergence antedated passage of the Sherman Act, and its survival despite both that legislation and subsequent federal and state antitrust laws stands out as a unique phenomenon in the annals of social control of business. Major challenges to collective railway ratemaking's continuance have occurred at three different periods. The most recent began with enactment of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4R Act), which narrowed the scope of antitrust immunity that had been accorded to rate bureau-based pricing by the Reed-Bulwinkle Act of 1948. Foremost among the 4R Act's changes in immunity were the prohibition of 1) collective determination of particular rates on single line movements, and 2) collective pricing of interline movements by railways which cannot practicably participate in such movements. Interpretation of the 4R Act's antitrust immunity provisions, to delimit their application, occupied a four-year proceeding in which the ICC, in a decision served August 13, 1980, issued a relatively narrow grant of immunity. The ICC also declared that the 4R Act prohibited discussion, as well as voting, on single line rates. In addition, it initiated a move toward elimination of antitrust immunity for collectively determined general rate increases and decreases, and broad changes in tariff conditions on single line traffic-despite a 4R Act provision that the prohibition on single line rate voting and the restriction on jointline rate voting shall not apply to such general rate or broad tariff changes. The ICC, in essence, took the view that intramodal railway rate competition, governed largely by antitrust standards, is workable. The ICC's decision imposes a standard of commercial behavior upon railways which, to the limited extent that it ever existed, was last seen in the nineteenth century. This marked departure from ingrained practice poses the question of whether it holds perceptible potential for improving efficiency in both transport and related sectors, as its proponents envisage. Scrutiny of conditions pertaining to this question, and to prospective consequences of the ICC's decision, occupies the remainder of the paper. Doing so requires the review of some very old but oft-slighted economic and institutional traits of rail transport.