Abstract. During the past decade, public accounting firms have found themselves targets of litigation. The legal costs associated with the “expectations gap” have been observed to be nontrivial. Among the responses made by some firms in the profession is the increased use of auditor decision aids in an effort to improve auditor adherence to a “standard” that these firms believe they can defend in court. However, once implemented, these “standards,” if not adhered to, may have profound legal ramifications. This paper reports on a behavioral study of these issues. The subjects were 82 U.S. general jurisdiction judges. Findings indicate that the jurists did rely on internal firm guidance when evaluating injured‐party claims. Résumé. Depuis une dizaine d'années, les cabinets d'experts‐comptables ont été la cible de poursuites en justice. Les observations effectuées démontrent que les frais juridiques associés au « déficit par rapport aux attentes » sont appréciables. Certains cabinets de la profession réagissent, entre autres, en recourant davantage aux aides à la décision conçues pour les vérificateurs, de façon à favoriser chez leurs employés le respect de « normes » que ces cabinets estiment pouvoir défendre devant les tribunaux. Or, une fois établies, ces « normes ≫, si elles ne sont pas respectées, peuvent avoir de sérieuses conséquences juridiques. Les auteurs rendent compte d'une étude de comportement relative à ces questions. Dans le cadre de cette étude, 82 juges américains de compétence générale ont été interrogés. Les résultats de l'étude indiquent que les juristes se sont appuyés sur les directives internes du cabinet dans l'évaluation des griefs des parties lésées.

We examine changes in the pricing and financial structure of large management buyouts in the 1980s. Over time, (1) buyout price to cash flow ratios rose in absolute terms (particularly in deals financed using public junk bonds); (2) required bank principal repayments accelerated, leading to sharply lower ratios of cash flow to total debt obligations; (3) private subordinated and bank debt were replaced by public junk debt; and (4) management teams and dealmakers took more money out of transactions up front. These patterns are consistent with an “overheating” phenomenon in the buyout market. Preliminary post-buyout evidence lends some support to this interpretation.

Keith C. Brown, W. V. Harlow, Seha M. Tinic, The Risk and Required Return of Common Stock following Major Price Innovations, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Mar., 1993), pp. 101-116

Karen C. Denning, Kuldeep Shastri, Changes in Organizational Structure and Shareholder Wealth: The Case of Limited Partnerships, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Dec., 1993), pp. 553-564

This paper considers the Arbitrage Pricing Theory when investors have incomplete information on the parameters generating asset returns. Each asset in the economy may have a different amount of information available on it. Bayesian investors use their prior beliefs in conjunction with the total available information to assign an expected return and a set of factor betas to each asset. The assigned expected returns are shown to be linear in their associated factor betas. However, the factor betas and prices of assets differ from those under complete information. Specifically, risky assets with high (low) information are priced relatively higher (lower). On the other hand, factor betas of high (low) information assets are relatively lower (higher). The analysis has econometric implications for testing the APT. In this paper's framework, maximum likelihood estimates of factor betas, which are based on normality assumptions, are too high (low) for high (low) information assets. In addition, sequentially increasing the sample size by adding new securities to a factor analysis procedure can result in the detection of apparent additional priced factors when they do not really exist.