[We provide new evidence linking board characteristics and performance. Using manually collected governance data from the mutual fund industry, we find an inverse relation between board size and fund performance. We also find evidence that organizational form plays an important role in determining operational performance. Overall, the results are consistent with the notion that there may not be a single optimal board structure that is applicable to all funds, that attempts to regulate board attributes should be considered with caution, and that sponsor-level factors are important board structure considerations.]

[We evaluate why individuals invest in high-fee index funds. In our experiments, subjects each allocate $ 10,000 across four S&P 500 index funds and are rewarded for their portfolio's subsequent return. Subjects overwhelmingly fail to minimize fees. We reject the hypothesis that subjects buy high-fee index funds because of bundled nonportfolio services. Search costs for fees matter, but even when we eliminate these costs, fees are not minimized.Instead, subjects place high weight on annualized returns since inception. Fees paid decrease with financial literacy. Interestingly, subjects who choose high-fee funds sense they are making a mistake.]

We investigate the equity valuation effects of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA 2006). The PPA 2006 has two main provisions: (1) firms must fully fund their pension plans within seven years (previously allowed 30 years to fund 90 percent of the pension liability) and (2) firms receive a tax deduction for contributions up to 150 percent of the pension liability (previously 100 percent). After controlling for the effects of SFAS 158, growth opportunities, the cost of external funds, and other information released during our sample period, we examine pension firms’ abnormal returns surrounding key dates in the legislative process leading to the adoption of the PPA 2006. First, we find a mean negative abnormal return of −4.20 percent during the period in which the PPA 2006 was first voted on by Congress. The mean (median) firm in our sample experienced a $310 million ($60 million) decline in market capitalization. Second, we find that the valuation effect was more negative for firms with larger unfunded pension liabilities and larger capital expenditure requirements, while firms with higher marginal tax rates experienced a positive effect. Third, we find no evidence of differential valuation effects for firms in different “at risk” categories as defined by the PPA 2006. Finally, we find a significant number of pension freezes occurred during our sample period. Our results are stronger when excluding these firms from our sample.

We investigate the equity valuation effects of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (hereafter PPA 2006). The PPA 2006 has two main provisions: (1) firms must fully fund their pension plans within seven years (previously allowed 30 years to fund 90 percent of the pension liability), and (2) firms receive a tax deduction for contributions up to 150 percent of the pension liability (previously 100 percent). After controlling for the effects of SFAS 158, growth opportunities, the cost of external funds and other information released during our sample period, we examine pension firms' abnormal returns surrounding key dates in the legislative process leading to the adoption of the PPA 2006. First, we find a mean negative abnormal return of -4.20 percent during the period in which the PPA 2006 was first voted on by Congress. The mean (median) firm in our sample experienced a $310 million ($60 million) decline in market capitalization. Second, we find that the valuation effect was more negative for firms with larger unfunded pension liabilities and larger capital expenditure requirements, while firms with higher marginal tax rates experienced a positive effect. Third, we find no evidence of differential valuation effects for firms in different at risk categories as defined by the PPA 2006. Finally, we find a significant number of pension freezes occurred during our sample period. Our results are stronger when excluding these firms from our sample.

Les auteurs étudient les répercussions de la Pension Protection Act de 2006 (PPA 2006) sur la valeur boursière des actions. La PPA 2006 contient deux dispositions principales : 1) les entreprises doivent assurer la capitalisation intégrale de leur régime de retraite en sept ans (alors qu’une période de trente ans leur était auparavant accordée pour capitaliser 90 pour cent de leur passif au titre du régime) et 2) elles peuvent se prévaloir d’une déduction fiscale à l’égard des cotisations à concurrence de 150 pour cent du passif au titre du régime (alors que le plafond de la déduction était antérieurement de 100 pour cent). Une fois contrôlés l’incidence de la norme SFAS 158, les possibilités de croissance, le coût du financement externe et les autres informations publiées au cours de la période d’échantillonnage, les auteurs examinent les rendements anormaux des entreprises ayant un régime de retraite, à proximité des dates marquantes du processus législatif ayant menéà l’adoption de la PPA 2006. Premièrement, ils observent un rendement anormal moyen négatif de – 4,20 pour la période au cours de laquelle la PPA 2006 a fait l’objet d’un premier vote au Congrès. La capitalisation boursière de l’entreprise moyenne (médiane) de l’échantillon a enregistré un déclin de 310 millions de dollars (60 millions de dollars). Deuxièmement, les auteurs constatent que les répercussions sur la valeur boursière sont plus négatives dans le cas des entreprises présentant des passifs non capitalisés plus importants au titre du régime et devant faire face à des dépenses en immobilisations plus substantielles, alors que les entreprises dont les taux d’imposition marginaux sont plus élevés enregistrent des répercussions positives. Troisièmement, les auteurs ne relèvent aucun élément permettant d’affirmer que les répercussions sur la valeur boursière varient selon les différentes catégories de risque définies par la PPA 2006. Enfin, ils recensent un nombre appréciable de cas de blocage du régime au cours de la période soumise à l’étude. Les résultats sont plus marqués encore lorsque ces entreprises sont retirées de l’échantillon.

We study the compensation and productivity of more than 2,000 Methodist ministers in a 43‐year panel data set. The church appears to use pay‐for‐performance incentives for its clergy, as their compensation follows a sharing rule by which pastors receive approximately 3% of the incremental revenue from membership increases. Ministers receive the strongest rewards for attracting new parishioners who switch from other congregations within their denomination. Monetary incentives are weaker in settings where ministers have less control over their measured performance.

We examine how residents of the United States allocate their stock portfolios internationally. We find that a large U.S. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) position in a destination country in 1990 is associated with a relatively large stock portfolio position in that country in the 2001–2006 period. Moreover, a change in the U.S. FDI position from 1980 to 1990 helps predict the change in the U.S. Foreign Portfolio Investment position from 1994 to 2006. These results are rationalized by Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp’s (2009) equilibrium model of learning and portfolio choice under an information processing constraint. FDI establishes marginal differences in the endowments of information about different countries, which later translate into differences in stock portfolio holdings. We control for cross-country differences in capital controls, proximity along different dimensions, corporate governance, and economic and capital market development. Our results also hold for the G6 countries collectively.

Using a unique dataset of 592 cash and synthetic securitizations issued by 54 banks from the EU-15 plus Switzerland over the period from 1997 to 2007 this paper provides empirical evidence that credit risk securitization has a positive impact on the increase of European banks’ systematic risk. Baseline results hold when comparing estimated beta coefficients with a control group of similar non-securitizing banks. Building several sub-samples we additionally find that (a) the increase in systematic risk is more relevant for larger banks that repeatedly engage in securitization, (b) securitization is more important for small and medium financial institutions, (c) banks have a higher incentive to retain the larger part of credit risk as a quality signal at the beginning of the securitization business in Europe, and (d) the overall risk-shifting effect due to securitization is more distinct when the pre-event systematic risk is low.

Recent research shows that bond yields are influenced by monetary policy decisions. To learn how this works in a bond market that differs significantly from those in the US and Europe, we model Chinese bond yields using the one-year deposit interest rate as a state variable. We also include the spread between the one-year market interest rate and the one-year deposit interest rate as another factor. The model is developed in an affine framework and closed-form solutions are obtained. We then test the model empirically with a Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation procedure. The results show that the new model that incorporates the official rate in China characterizes the changing shape of the yield curve well.

Assuming that firms’ suppliers are better able to extract value from the liquidation of assets in default and have an information advantage over other creditors, the paper derives six predictions on the use of trade credit. (1) Financially unconstrained firms (with unused bank credit lines) take trade credit to exploit the supplier's liquidation advantage. (2) If inputs purchased on account are sufficiently liquid, the reliance on trade credit does not depend on credit rationing. (3) Firms buying goods make more purchases on account than those buying services, while suppliers of services offer more trade credit than those of standardized goods. (4) Suppliers lend inputs to their customers but not cash. (5) Greater reliance on trade credit is associated with more intensive use of tangible inputs. (6) Better creditor protection decreases both the use of trade credit and input tangibility.