We empirically evaluate the predictions of the mispricing hypothesis with limits-to-arbitrage suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and the q-theory with investment frictions proposed by Li and Zhang (2010) on the negative relation between asset growth and average stock returns. We conduct cross-sectional regressions of returns on asset growth on subsamples split by a given measure of limits-to-arbitrage or investment frictions. We show that: (i) proxies for limits-to-arbitrage and proxies for investment frictions are often highly correlated; (ii) the evidence based on equal-weighted returns shows significant support for both hypotheses, while the evidence from value-weighted returns is weaker; and (iii) in direct comparisons, each hypothesis is supported by a fair and similar amount of evidence.

The incentive and project selection effects of agent anonymity are investigated in a setting where an evaluator observes a subjective signal of project quality. Although the evaluator cannot commit ex ante to an acceptance criterion, she decides up front between informed review , where the agent's ability is directly observable, or blind review , where it is not. An ideal acceptance criterion balances the goals of incentive provision and project selection. Relative to this, informed review results in an excessively steep equilibrium acceptance policy: the standard applied to low-ability agents is too stringent and the standard applied to high-ability agents is too lenient. Blind review, in which all types face the same standard, often provides better incentives, but it ignores valuable information for selecting projects. The evaluator prefers a policy of blind (respectively informed) review when the ability distribution puts more weight on high (respectively low) types, the agent's pay-off from acceptance is high (respectively low), or the quality signal is precise (respectively imprecise). Applications discussed include the admissibility of character evidence in criminal trials and academic refereeing.

The massive losses that banks incurred with the meltdown of the subprime mortgage market have raised concerns about their ability to continue lending to corporations. We investigate these concerns. We find that firms paid higher loan spreads during the subprime crisis. Importantly, the increase in loan spreads was higher for firms that borrowed from banks that incurred larger losses. These results hold after we control for firm-, bank-, and loan-specific factors, and account for endogeneity of bank losses. These findings, together with our evidence that borrowers took out smaller loans during the crisis when they borrowed from banks that incurred larger losses, lend support to the concerns about bank lending following their subprime losses. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

Merger simulations are commonly used to simulate the effects of potential mergers. Despite the large resources devoted to merger review, little evidence exists on the accuracy of these methods. This paper uses the acquisition of Tambrands by Proctor and Gamble to provide evidence on the efficacy of merger simulation. Two simple demand systems are estimated under several identification assumptions and combined with a static model of price competition. Simulations predict small price effects of about 1 percent for the merging firms' brands, while direct estimates indicate the merger raised prices by 5–8 percent.

Friedman et al. (2003) develop a model in which, in equilibrium, controlling shareholders may choose either tunneling or propping of their listed companies depending on the magnitude of an adverse shock and the magnitude of the private benefits of control. In this paper, we employ connected transaction data from China to test the implications of their model. We hypothesize that, when listed companies are financially healthy (in financial distress), their controlling shareholders are more likely to conduct connected transactions to tunnel (prop up) their listed companies and the market reacts unfavorably (favorably) to the announcement of these transactions. Our empirical findings strongly support our hypotheses. We also find that all of the transaction types in our sample can be used for tunneling or propping depending on different financial situations of the firms. Finally, political connection is negatively associated with the announcement effect. Overall, our analysis supports Friedman et al.'s (2003) model by furnishing clear evidence for propping and tunneling to occur in the same company but at different times.

Abstract In this paper, we examine the effect of shareholder rights on reducing the cost of equity and the impact of agency problems from free cash flow (FCF) on this effect. We find that firms with strong shareholder rights have a significantly lower implied cost of equity after controlling for risk factors, price momentum, analysts’ forecast biases, and industry and year effects than do firms with weak shareholder rights. Further analysis shows that the effect of shareholder rights on reducing the cost of equity is significantly stronger for firms with more severe agency problems from FCFs.

The willingness of banks to provide funding for real estate purchases depends on the creditworthiness of borrowers. Besides other factors, this creditworthiness depends on the development of real estate prices. Real estate prices, in turn, depend on the demand for homes which is influenced by the supply of mortgages. I develop a theoretical model which explains this circular relationship. I show how different kinds of expectation formations can lead to fluctuations in real estate prices. Furthermore, I show that banks make above-average profits in the upswing phase of the real estate cycle but suffer high losses when the market turns.

We use a novel data set to study return predictability in debt markets. The data are collected from J.P. Morgan’s periodic surveys on its clients’ outlook for changes in US Treasury yields and corporate credit spreads. We document that simple signals constructed from such surveys predict excess returns on debt portfolios formed on the basis of duration (2-years minus zero) or credit quality (BBB minus AAA). A linear trading strategy placing equal weight on Treasury and Credit signals has an annualized Information Ratio equal to 1.18, before transaction costs. We also show that predictability is likely to stem from private information possessed by survey respondents rather than from risk premia.