Research shows that displaying face time—being observed by others at work—leads to many positive outcomes for employees. Drawing on this prior work, we argue that face time helps employees to receive better work and leads to career advancement because it is a strong signal of their commitment to their job, their team, and their organization. But when employees are geographically distributed from managers who control the assignment of work, they are often unable to display face time. To compensate, employees must engage in other behaviors that signal commitment. Our study of two large, globally distributed, product-development companies demonstrates that employees who engage in certain behaviors can effectively signal their commitment to the organization and, as a consequence, will receive better work assignments. But because they operate in a competitive signaling environment, they have to continually engage in the behaviors that produce desired signals to the point where they often feel that they are sacrificing their personal lives for their job. We induct a model from our data that explains why simple behaviors that signal commitment eventually turn into feelings of sacrifice and why employees at headquarters who have the power to assign better work fail to notice the sacrifice behind the signals. We discuss the implications of this model and the signal misalignment it explains for theories of distributed work and signaling in organizations. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2018.1265 .

Abstract We build on the intuitive (static) modeling framework of Rosen (1974) and specify a simple, forward-looking model of location choice. We use this model, along with a series of graphs, to describe the potential biases associated with the static model and relate these biases to the time series of the amenity of interest. We then derive an adjustment factor that allows the potentially biased static estimates to be converted into forwardlooking estimates. Finally, we illustrate these concepts with two empirical applications: the marginal willingness to pay to avoid violent crime and the marginal willingness to pay to avoid air pollution.

[Research Summary: Why do top executives leave their firms? Research on executive turnover has either focused on CEO dismissal or on group-level top management team (TMT) departure rates, mostly ignoring individual-level factors that would predict why non-CEO executives exit. Here, we extend the shock perspective of the unfolding model of turnover used in organizational behavior research to show how relational and reputational shocks influence turnover at the executive level. Our sample includes over 4,000 executives from S&P 1500 firms over 11 years. We hypothesize and find that relational and reputational shocks increase the likelihood of top executive exit. We also consider the moderating influence of pay disparity on these relationships, which impacts how each type of shock influences executive turnover. Managerial Summary: Replacing top executives can be extremely costly for firms. Consequently, understanding the reasons behind top executive exit are important. We examine the effect of different types of shock on the likelihood a top executive will exit their firm. We find that both relational shocks (e.g., other members of the TMT leaving), as well as reputational shocks (e.g., litigation or shareholder activism against the firm), increase turnover. However, we find that higher status executives experience these shocks differently than lower status executives.]

In a transformation model , where the errors are i.i.d. and independent of the explanatory variables , the parameters can be estimated by a pseudo‐maximum likelihood (PML) method, that is, by using a misspecified distribution of the errors, but the PML estimator of is in general not consistent. We explain in this paper how to nest the initial model in an identified augmented model with more parameters in order to derive consistent PML estimators of appropriate functions of parameter . The usefulness of the consistency result is illustrated by examples of systems of nonlinear equations, conditionally heteroscedastic models, stochastic volatility, or models with spatial interactions.

From 2007 to 2016, S&P 500 firms distributed $7 trillion via buybacks and dividends, over 96% of their aggregate net income, prompting claims that “short-termism” is impairing firms’ ability to invest and innovate. We show that, accounting for both direct and indirect equity issuances, net shareholder payouts by all public firms during this period totaled only 41% of net income. And, during this decade, investment substantially increased while cash balances ballooned. In short, S&P 500 shareholder-payout figures cannot provide much basis for the notion that short-termism has been depriving public firms of needed capital. Received September 23, 2018; Editorial decision November 13, 2018; Editor Andrew Ellul

Abstract Research Summary Our paper sheds new light on the performance implications associated with insider versus outsider CEOs. We frame CEO selection as risk‐taking, in which outsiders are relatively risky hires, with a greater tendency to generate extreme performance outcomes—either positive or negative—as compared to insiders. We base this expectation on two complementary theoretical perspectives: human capital and information asymmetry. We conduct multiple tests on large samples of CEO successions, with controls for endogeneity, and find that outsiders are indeed associated with more extreme performance outcomes than are insiders. Managerial Summary We shed new light on the performance implications associated with outsider CEOs. Instead of asking the customary question, “Do outsider CEOs, on average, perform better or worse than insider CEOs?,” we frame CEO selection as risk‐taking. Under this view, outsiders are relatively risky hires, with a greater likelihood of generating extreme performance outcomes—either positive or negative—as compared to insiders. We conduct multiple tests on large samples of CEO successions and find that outsiders are indeed associated with more extreme performance outcomes than are insiders.

Studies on abusive supervision have adopted justice and resource perspectives to explain its effects on employee organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) and counterproductive work behavior (CWB). However, these studies have not provided a comprehensive account of why abusive supervision affects OCB and CWB and which of these two mediating mechanisms matters more. To address these questions, we conducted two studies using meta-analytic structural equation modeling. In the main study, we analyzed 427 primary studies that incorporated 973 independent correlations ( N = 336,236). The results showed that both organizational justice (the justice lens) and work stress (the resource lens) mediated the influence of abusive supervision on OCB and CWB. Furthermore, organizational justice accounted for a greater proportion of abusive supervision’s effect on OCB than did work stress, whereas work stress accounted for a greater proportion of abusive supervision’s effect on CWB than did organizational justice. Finally, between-study moderation analyses showed that the effect of abusive supervision on CWB was stronger in masculine cultures than in feminine cultures. The supplementary study incorporated effect sizes from six existing meta-analyses ( N = 151,381) and largely replicated the main study’s findings.