We assess the impact of the Eurosystem's Targeted Long-Term Refinancing Operations (TLTROs) on the lending policies of euro area banks. We first build a theoretical model in which banks compete in the credit and deposit markets. We distinguish between direct and indirect effects. Direct effects take place because bidding banks expand their loan supply due to the lower marginal costs implied by the TLTROs. Indirect effects on non-bidders operate via changes in the competitive environment in banks’ credit and deposit markets. We then test these predictions with a sample of 130 banks from 13 countries. Regarding direct effects, we find an easing impact on margins on loans to relatively safe borrowers, but no impact on credit standards. Regarding indirect effects, there is a positive impact on the loan supply on non-bidders but, contrary to the direct effects, the transmission of the TLTROs takes place through an easing of credit standards.

Extant literature documents that aggregate accruals positively predict future market returns and attributes this relation to either changes in discount rates or systematic earnings management. We offer an alternative explanation: aggregate merger and acquisition (M&A) activity drives this relation. M&A activity affects the magnitude of accruals, which in turn drives the market return predictability of aggregate accruals. We find that the ability of both aggregate accruals and discretionary aggregate accruals (a measure of systematic earnings management) to predict market returns disappears after controlling for aggregate M&A activity. Furthermore, aggregate M&A activity predicts future market returns, consistent with a price response to improvements in macroeconomic outcomes due to aggregate M&A activity.

Regulators have expressed concerns that an emphasis on non-audit services (NAS) could distract from the audit function, even for clients with minimal NAS purchases. Motivated by this concern, we examine whether a greater emphasis on providing NAS to audit clients generally (i.e., not to a specific client) can distract from the audit function, thus reducing audit quality. We find evidence of an NAS distraction effect, where a greater emphasis on NAS at the audit office-level results in more client financial statement restatements, even after controlling for client-specific NAS. Further, the association exists among clients that purchase minimal NAS, suggesting that this association relates to distraction effects in addition to independence issues examined in prior research. This study should be of interest to audit firms, audit committees, and regulators because it provides new evidence regarding issues related to a business model that includes both audit and non-audit services.

ABSTRACT Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) Form 8‐K filings provide a venue where managers release information to the market as a whole that they designate as being material . Using this setting, we study trading patterns immediately prior to the public disclosure of material information. We offer three main results. First, using both intraday and daily trading data, we find abnormal trading volume of 21 percent (13 percent) in the hour (day) prior to the public disclosure, respectively. Second, we find that this pre‐disclosure abnormal trading volume is concentrated in firms that are smaller, have more growth opportunities, issue fewer voluntary disclosures, and have weaker external monitoring. Finally, we find that this pre‐disclosure volume is concentrated in subsamples in which the information relates to a firm's material contracts, a firm holds investor/analyst conferences, and there is insider trading activity in a firm's shares. Our results do not concentrate in a small number of firms or industries, and do not appear to be explained by the form through which managers first release the material information (e.g., Form 8‐K, press release, website posting, or social media). Our results are also robust to controlling for the firm's other filings and peer filings that occur around the disclosure. Overall, the trading patterns we document may show that, inconsistent with the spirit of Reg FD, a subset of investors trade on information managers deem material prior to its broad, public release.

ABSTRACT Staggered boards (SBs) are one of the most potent common entrenchment devices, and their value effects are considerably debated. We study SBs' effects on firm value, managerial behavior, and investor composition using a quasi‐experimental setting: a 1990 law that imposed SBs on all Massachusetts‐incorporated firms. We find that relative to a matched control group of companies, for treated companies the law led to an increase in Tobin's Q, investment in capital expenditures and R&D, patents, and higher‐quality patented innovations, resulting in higher profitability. These effects are concentrated in innovating firms, especially those facing greater Wall Street scrutiny. An increase in institutional and dedicated investors also accompanied the imposition of SBs, facilitating a longer‐term orientation. The evidence suggests that SBs can benefit early‐life‐cycle firms facing high information asymmetries by allowing their managers to focus on long‐term investments and innovations.

Good information on self-employment is needed to inform the ongoing discussion of the rise of the gig economy and its implications for workers. Tax data show significant growth in self-employment not captured in the Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS-ASEC). The growing gap reflects both self-employment in tax data missing from the CPS-ASEC and self-employment misreported as wage and salary work. We document consistent patterns in the discrepancies between the tax and survey data but are able to explain only a modest share of the growing disagreement between them.

We study the interaction between firm uncertainty and corporate policies, emphasizing the role of skewness in the distribution of performance shocks reflected in stock returns. Conditional on volatility and other characteristics, firms with more negatively skewed performance shocks adopt more conservative policies, including greater cash holdings, a lower likelihood of dividend payments and increases in payout levels, and less financial leverage. These relationships are significant and robust for asymmetry proxies constructed from stock return innovations, in contrast to results for measures based on accounting performance shocks. This disparity highlights the importance of asymmetries in long-run performance shocks for corporate policy choices.

Leveraging the availability of three years of pre-IPO data and related vs unrelated-party customer information for Chinese firms, we examine the impact of customer strategic alliances (CSA) on IPO underpricing from 2007 to 2015. Our core findings suggest that IPO firms with CSAs have less IPO underpricing than those without such a relationship. The decrease in underpricing is more salient for IPO firms that have non-related-party customers. Additional analysis suggests that the core findings are primarily driven by firms with good information environment pre-IPO, including high audit quality, high analyst following, and low earnings management. We interpret the results as indicating that a good pre-IPO information environment enhances the credibility of CSA relationships and signals high IPO quality. Furthermore, we document that a CSA relationship has a positive impact on an IPO firm's post-IPO performance, especially when the firm has non-related-party customers. Overall, CSAs reduce IPO underpricing and enhance IPO returns post-IPO.

ABSTRACT Over the past three decades, academic research has sought to understand how cash shortfalls impact a firm's ability to take all available value‐increasing investment projects. We investigate whether firms facing greater financing constraints turn to tax strategies that generate lower cash effective tax rates (ETRs) to mitigate the adverse effect of these financing constraints. We use the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA 2006) as an exogenous shock to financing constraints for pension firms, but not for other firms. Using a difference‐in‐differences research design, we predict and find that pension firms experience a decrease in their cash ETRs by 1.8%–2.4% after the PPA 2006, relative to other firms. These cash tax savings mitigate the investment shortfall brought about by financing constraints by 19%. We also predict and find that the decline in cash ETRs is greater among firms more adversely affected by the PPA 2006. Our paper sheds light on the direction, causality, and economic magnitude of the association between financing constraints and tax planning activities. We also provide insight into the role of tax planning activities within firms' broader corporate business strategies in responding to financing constraints.