Abstract U.S. equity exchanges have experienced a dramatic increase in competition from new entrants, resulting in the fragmentation of trading across venues. While market quality has generally improved over this period, we show most of the improvements have accrued to the largest stocks. We then show this bifurcation in market quality is related to the fragmentation of trading. Theoretically, more exchange competition should reduce trading costs, yet it may also increase adverse selection for liquidity providers, leading to higher spreads. We document evidence of both effects (fragmentation improves market quality for large stocks while small stocks experience relatively worse quality).

Abstract We study whether long-term cumulative exposure to airborne small particulate matter (PM2.5) affects the probability that an individual receives a new diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease or related dementias. We track the health, residential location, and PM2.5 exposures of Americans aged sixty-five and above from 2001 through 2013. The expansion of Clean Air Act regulations led to quasi-random variation in individuals’ subsequent exposures to PM2.5. We leverage these regulations to construct instrumental variables for individual-level decadal PM2.5 that we use within flexible probit models that also account for any potential sample selection based on survival. We find that a 1 µg/m3 increase in decadal PM2.5 increases the probability of a new dementia diagnosis by an average of 2.15 percentage points (pp). All else equal, we find larger effects for women, older people, and people with more clinical risk factors for dementia. These effects persist below current regulatory thresholds.

Abstract We examine how executive equity incentives are associated with firms' conforming tax avoidance. Conforming tax avoidance is unique compared to nonconforming tax avoidance in that it decreases tax liabilities by reducing pretax income. Thus, conforming tax avoidance presents a unique set of consequences with important links to both risk and value‐creation incentives. Consistent with risk‐taking incentives increasing conforming tax avoidance, we find that linking executive wealth to stock price volatility (i.e., vega) is positively associated with conforming tax avoidance. We also find that linking executive wealth to stock price (i.e., delta) is negatively associated with conforming tax avoidance. The results of our cross‐sectional tests suggest that the negative association between delta and conforming tax avoidance is predominantly driven by a risk aversion effect rather than a value‐creation effect. Our findings add to the literature on the relation between tax avoidance and executive compensation, as well as the trade‐off between book and taxable income.

ABSTRACT Stock exchanges are important intermediaries in how firm information enters price. Trading halts are a key tool, often exercised at the exchanges' discretion, to prevent extraordinary price volatility when new information arrives. We investigate how exchanges use discretion and whether the discretion alters the effectiveness of the halts. We provide evidence consistent with halts reflecting the preferences of listed firms rather than the stated exchange objectives (i.e., minimizing excess volatility and off‐equilibrium trades). Furthermore, when exchanges exercise more discretion (unexplained by firm and information characteristics), the halts are less effective. Specifically, halts with more discretion are less likely to resume trading with efficient prices and are more likely to have been called unnecessarily (i.e., little to no price movement during the halt). These findings are consistent with exchanges using halts to cater to listed firms rather than to meet exchange objectives such as minimizing excess volatility or avoiding trades at off‐equilibrium prices.

Abstract We hypothesize that corporate takeover markets create significant constraints for short sellers. Both short sellers and corporate bidders often target firms with declining economic prospects. Yet, a target firm’s stock price generally increases upon a takeover announcement, resulting in losses for short sellers. Therefore, short sellers should require higher rates of return when the takeover likelihood is higher. Consistent with this prediction, the return predictability of monthly short interest increases with industry-level takeover probability and decreases as takeover defenses are implemented. Our results suggest that efficient takeover markets create trading frictions for short sellers and can therefore inhibit overall market efficiency.

ABSTRACT In this paper, I develop a measure of the difference in the amount of information that investors expect a forthcoming disclosure to contain should it reveal good news versus bad news (the disclosure’s “asymmetry”). To do so, I first show that this asymmetry is linked to the skewness of returns that the disclosure creates. I then show that this skewness can be measured using a weighted change in option-implied return skewness leading up to the disclosure’s release. The measure’s ability to capture investors’ prior beliefs regarding asymmetry is advantageous when studying ex ante decisions including contracting and information acquisition choices. I implement it on a sample of large firms’ quarterly earnings announcements, finding evidence that investors anticipate cross-sectional but not time-series variation in earnings’ asymmetry.

Abstract This paper documents that U.S. equity returns are large and positive during the opening hours of European markets. These returns are pervasive and highly economically and statistically significant. Consistent with models of inventory risk, we demonstrate a strong relationship with order imbalances at the close of the preceding U.S. trading day. Rationalizing unconditionally positive “overnight drift” returns, we uncover an asymmetric reaction to demand shocks: market sell-offs generate robust positive overnight reversals, while reversals following market rallies are much more modest. We argue that demand shock asymmetry can arise in inventory management models with time-varying market maker risk-bearing capacity. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Abstract Firm-level variables that predict cross-sectional stock returns, such as price-to-earnings and short interest, are often averaged and used to predict market returns. Using various samples of cross-sectional predictors and accounting for the number of predictors and their interdependence, we find only weak evidence that cross-sectional predictors make good time-series predictors, especially out-of-sample. The results suggest that cross-sectional predictors do not generally contain systematic information.

We examine whether having an internal labor market can help a firm affiliated with a privately owned business group (POBG) reduce labor cost stickiness. Our findings suggest that, when a POBG-affiliated firm experiences a decrease in sales, it has lower labor cost stickiness than an otherwise equivalent firm that is not affiliated with a POBG. Specifically, we find that, on average, a POBG-affiliated firm entirely mitigates labor cost stickiness when it has a decrease in sales. In addition, we document that, to adjust its labor cost downward, a POBG-affiliated firm hires fewer employees, rather than paying lower wages. We show that the lower labor cost stickiness is due to movement of employees from the focal firm to other firms within the same POBG. When sales fall, the POBG reallocates excess employees at the focal firm to other firms within the business group via an internal labor market, and the focal firm thereby increases its per capita profit. Moreover, we find that agency cost mediates the impact of a POBG on labor cost stickiness. When the external market is less effective or the POBG headquarters have strong incentives, the effect of POBG affiliation on the reduction in an affiliated firm's labor cost stickiness is more salient.

We test between cooperative and extractive theories of the origins of government. We use river shifts in southern Iraq as a natural experiment, in a new archeological panel dataset. A shift away creates a local demand for a government to coordinate because private river irrigation needs to be replaced with public canals. It disincentivizes local extraction as land is no longer productive without irrigation. Consistent with a cooperative theory of government, a river shift away led to state formation, canal construction, and the payment of tribute. We argue that the first governments coordinated between extended households which implemented public good provision. (JEL D72, H11, H41, N45, N55, Q15)