ABSTRACT In this paper, we examine sequential exercise strategies by warrantholders and the gain from hoarding warrants. We analyze several obstacles to acquiring large blocks in order to exploit sequential strategies. First, we identify several reinvestment policies for which sequential exercise is not advantageous, thereby eliminating the gain from hoarding. However, sequential exercise strategies may be advantageous for monopoly or oligopoly warrantholders, even absent dividends, because using exercise proceeds to repurchase stock or to expand the firm's scale increases the riskiness of an equity share. Second, oligopoly warrantholders can receive a smaller warrant value than perfectly competitive warrantholders, suggesting a potential cost to unsuccessful hoarding.

ABSTRACT The due‐on‐sale clause contained in most conventional home mortgage contracts is equivalent to a prepayment penalty equal to the difference between the face value and market value of the loan. We analyze a bilateral game with asymmetric information and show that the bank demands the full penalty unless the market value of the loan is sufficiently low. In that case, the bank demands a prepayment penalty which is independent of the market value of the loan in order to induce additional prepayments. We also demonstrate, by a risk‐sharing argument, that the due‐on‐sale clause is optimal in some settings, even though it eliminates some beneficial home sales.

As a centralized, computerized, limit order market, the Paris Bourse is particularly appropriate for studying the interaction between the order book and order flow. Descriptive methods capture the richness of the data and distinctive aspects of the market structure. Order flow is concentrated near the quote, while the depth of the book is somewhat larger at nearby valuations. We analyze the supply and demand of liquidity. For example, thin books elicit orders and thick books result in trades. To gain price and time priority, investors quickly place orders within the quotes when the depth at the quotes or the spread is large. Consistent with information effects, downward (upward) shifts in both bid and ask quotes occur after large sales (purchases).

This article characterizes optimal dynamic consumption and portfolio decisions in the presence of capital gains taxes and short-sale restrictions. The optimal decisions are a function of the investor's age, initial portfolio holdings, and tax basis. Our results capture the trade-off between the diversification benefits and tax costs of trading over an investor's lifetime. The incentive to rediversify the portfolio is inversely related to the size of the embedded gain and investor's age. Contrary to standard financial advice, the optimal equity holding increases well into an investor's lifetime in our model due to the forgiveness of capital gains taxes at death.

This article reexamines the value of tax trading when the tax rate on long-term realizations is less than that on short-term realizations. In particular, the value of the option to realize long-term capital gains and repurchase stock in order to increase one’s tax basis and restart the option to realize future losses short term is examined empirically. Our estimate of the incremental value of restarting, which is based on the results of simulations of several alternative tax trading policies over a large number of independent return sequences, is generally much smaller than that reported by Constantinides (1984). The incremental value of restarting is shown to depend critically on the particular pattern of realized returns and the assumed tax treatment of unrealized capital gains at the end of the simulation period. The effects of stock price volatility, transaction costs, portfolio offset rules, and realization cutoff levels on the value of tax trading are also investigated.

[This article reexamines the value of tax trading when the tax rate on long-term realizations is less than that on short-term realizations. In particular, the value of the option to realize long-term capital gains and repurchase stock in order to increase one's tax basis and restart the option to realize future losses short term is examined empirically. Our estimate of the incremental value of restarting, which is based on the results of simulations of several alternative tax trading policies over a large number of independent return sequences, is generally much smaller than that reported by Constantinides (1984). The incremental value of restarting is shown to depend critically on the particular pattern of realized returns and the assumed tax treatment of unrealized capital gains at the end of the simulation period. The effects of stock price volatility, transaction costs, portfolio offset rules, and realization cutoff levels on the value of tax trading are also investigated.]

We derive and investigate empirically arbitrage pricing restrictions among three bonds of RJR Nabisco Holdings Capital Corporation. The three RJR bonds are virtually identical in all respects, except for the form in which interest is paid. We document large and persistent errors in the market pricing of the three bonds over a two-year period. The cash-paying bond was consistently more expensive than either the pay-in-kind or deferred-coupon bonds. The magnitude of the pricing errors is too large to be explained by market imperfections.

[This article examines the information content and consequences of third-party voting advice that arrives as news at an interim stage in corporate proxy contests. We first document significant stock returns around announcements of proxy vote recommendations. We then develop a multi-equation empirical procedure for disentangling the price impact of prediction effects (changes in contest outcome probabilities) from the price impact of certification effects (changes in outcome-contingent valuations). Both effects are present in the data: Voting advice is both predictive about contest outcomes and informative about the ability of dissidents to add value. Consequently, proxy advice plays a dual informational role.]