If the choice of domestic versus foreign money and capital market instruments was on the basis of covered yields, funds would universally flow in one direction, from the smallest incentive, to the instruments of highest yields. This paper shows the consequences of different rates of taxation on interest and on exchange gains, the two components of foreign yields. By reference to the U.S.-Canadian situation it is shown how we might observe taxpayers in both countries simultaneously buying securities of the other, or simultaneously buying their own domestic securities. It is also shown how we might find taxpayers of both countries buying the securities with the lower pretax yields.

[In fact, share-farmed lands yield as much as rented or owner-cultivated lands. In traditional theory, share-farmed lands yield less, for share tenants stint their efforts. This article shows that economists' standard assumptions about a market equilibrium reconcile theory with fact: when contracts are enforced, share farmers labor as diligently as others. Evidence is advanced that gain from the joining of tenant and landlord interests, not gain from the dispersion of agricultural risk, is the impetus to share tenancy.]

If the choice of domestic versus foreign money and capital market instruments was on the basis of covered yields, funds would universally flow in one direction, from the smallest incentive, to the instruments of highest yields. This paper shows the consequences of different rates of taxation on interest and on exchange gains, the two components of foreign yields. By reference to the U.S.-Canadian situation it is shown how we might observe taxpayers in both countries simultaneously buying securities of the other, or simultaneously buying their own domestic securities. It is also shown how we might find taxpayers of both countries buying the securities with the lower pretax yields.

In fact, share-farmed lands yield as much as rented or owner-cultivated lands. In traditional theory, share-farmed lands yield less, for share tenants stint their efforts. This article shows that economists' standard assumptions about a market equilibrium reconcile theory with fact: when contracts are enforced, share farmers labor as diligently as others. Evidence is advanced that gain from the joining of tenant and landlord interests, not gain from the dispersion of agricultural risk, is the impetus to share tenancy.

Contrary to popular opinion, the diversion of traffic from railroads to motor carriers has not been the result of minimum rate regulation. The idea that there is a large amount of misallocated traffic is based on the widespread but faulty method of analyzing intermodal competition by means of a simple cost comparison. The paper uses modal split analysis to show that the welfare gain accompanying minimum rate regulation will be modest. The welfare effects of transport controls other than minimum rate regulations are likely to be far more serious.

The efficient market, martingale model of security price movements requires that the arrival of new information be promptly arbitraged away. A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an arbitraged price is that statistical dependence among prices must decrease very rapidly. If persistent statistical dependence is present, the arbitraged price changes do not follow a martingale and should have an infinite variance. Using a technique for detecting long-term dependence, called R/S analysis, 200 daily stock return series are studied; many series are characterized by long-term dependence. Thus, in the presence of long-term dependence, the martingale model does not hold. Also, the distribution of security returns is non-normal stable Paretian as opposed to Gaussian.

[This paper describes a market in which firms vary their quantities of production according to a new adjustment process. Each firm bases its new production entirely upon a knowledge of its own previous productions and profits. It has no knowledge of the payoff functions of the market. Numerical analysis of the process indicates an approach to equilibrium for all initial states. The set of allowed limit points is rigorously characterized, and determined explicitly in the case of two firms. Some exact solutions are found. The process can be regarded as a way of playing a continuous game with a minimum of information.]

I. Introduction, 481.—II. Counterexamples, 482.—III. Economies of scale, 484.—IV. Technological regularity conditions, 487.—V. The profitability of marginal cost pricing, 488.—VI. Concluding remarks, 492.