Eric A. Monke, Lester D. Taylor, International Trade Constraints and Commodity Market Models: An Application to the Cotton Market, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 67, No. 1 (Feb., 1985), pp. 98-107

A model is presented in which governments can select real expenditure levels that are feasible, but are sufficiently high that a balanced budget is impossible. Thus, governments with large expenditures are committed to inflationary finance schemes. This is the case, even though the governments in question have access to lump-sum taxes. In addition, the model can explain why poorer countries tend to make heavier use of the inflation tax than do wealthier countries, and can account for the existence of country-specific fiat monies. The government that does not have access to the printing press can, nonetheless, use emergency taxes or compulsory loans for emergency financing. S.Fischer [1982, p. 297]

This paper tests for the existence of wage premiums based on geographic and industry unemployment differences. These differences are broken down into permanent and transitory components in equations controlling for variation in state generosity of unemployment insurance benefits. Findings indicate that wage premiums arise for long-run unemployment differences, but that negative short-run shocks to industries generate wage cuts, while positive shocks generate wage hikes. Therefore, labor contracts accommodate long-term anticipated unemployment, and entail sharing of short-term unemployment risks.

A firm’s actions in one market can change competitors’ strategies in a second market by affecting its own marginal costs in that other mar-ket. Whether the action provides costs or benefits in the second market depends on (a) whether it increases or decreases marginal costs in the second market and (b) whether competitors’ products are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. The latter distinction is determined by whether more “aggressive” play (e.g., lower price or higher quantity) by one firm in a market lowers or raises compet-ing firms’ marginal profitabilities in that market. Many recent results in oligopoly theory can be most easily understood in terms of strategic substitutes and complements.

This study applies citation analysis to evaluate the research contributions of accounting faculties, doctoral programs, and individuals to contemporary accounting research (CAR). A research contribution is measured as CAR citations to a journal article written by an accountant, and CAR is defined as all main articles published in The Accounting Review, Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of Accounting and Economics, and Accounting, Organizations and Society between 1976 and 1982. The advantages and disadvantages of the technique are discussed, and the sensitivity of the results to alternative citation measurement metrics is examined.

Reviews the book "Measurement Error and Banks' Reported Earnings," by Reed H. McKnight.

Reviews the book "Accounting Information Systems: A Control Emphasis," by David H. Li.

[A simplified audit setting is used to illustrate the crucial nature of strategic interactions in audit planning and in assessing audit risk. Unlike single-person decision-theoretic models which essentially represent games against nature, the model developed here allows a prospective audit to influence the behavior of the auditee. We reformulate the problem in a game-theoretic framework with rational players which (1) encompasses strategic factors for both the auditor and auditee, (2) is consistent with behavioral hypotheses regarding the effect of an audit, and (3) is consistent with certain audit phenomena such as randomized strategies. An illustration is provided which demonstrates several points. First, both the auditor and the auditee may frequently use a randomized strategy. Second, the auditor's strategy depends on the interaction between the accounting control system and the auditee's actions. In addition, the use of traditional single-person decision theory may frequently cause errors in estimating audit risk because it fails to consider audit influences on the auditee. Settings in which decision theory may serve as an adequate model simplification are also considered.]

[This study applies citation analysis to evaluate the research contributions of accounting faculties, doctoral programs, and individuals to contemporary accounting research (CAR). A research contribution is measured as CAR citations to a journal article written by an accountant, and CAR is defined as all main articles published in The Accounting Review, Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of Accounting and Economics, and Accounting, Organizations and Society between 1976 and 1982. The advantages and disadvantages of the technique are discussed, and the sensitivity of the results to alternative citation measurement metrics is examined.]

A simplified audit setting is used to illustrate the crucial nature of strategic interactions in audit planning and in assessing audit risk. Unlike single-person decisiontheoretic models which essentially represent games against nature, the model developed here allows a prospective audit to influence the behavior of the auditee. We reformulate the problem in a game-theoretic framework with rational players which (1) encompasses strategic factors for both the auditor and auditee, (2) is consistent with behavioral hypotheses regarding the effect of an audit, and (3) is consistent with certain audit phenomena such as randomized strategies. An illustration is provided which demonstrates several points. First, both the auditor and the auditee may frequently use a randomized strategy. Second, the auditor's strategy depends on the interaction between the accounting control system and the auditee's actions. In addition, the use of traditional single-person decision theory may frequently cause errors in estimating audit risk because it fails to consider audit influences on the auditee. Settings in which decision theory may serve as an adequate model simplification are also considered.