This paper uses a unique financial instrument in the U.S. Treasury market to study the price behavior of the put option embedded in the November 2009 14 callable U.S. Treasury bond. We find that, beginning in August 1993, the estimated option value was persistently negative on nearly every day for the ensuing eight months. We show that the anomalous pricing behavior arose because the underlying callable bond became the cheapest to deliver issue against U.S. Treasury bond futures contracts. Hence, this paper provides direct evidence that derivative assets can significantly distort pricing in the primary asset market.

[A simple time-series market microstructure model is constructed within which existing models of spread components are reconciled. We show that existing models fail to decompose the spread into all its components. Two alternative extensions of the simple model are developed to identify all the components of the spread and to estimate the spread at which trades occur. The empirical results support the presence of a large order processing component and smaller, albeit significant, adverse selection and inventory components. The spread components differ significantly according to trade size and are also sensitive to assumptions about the relation between orders and trades.]

A simple time-series market microstructure model is constructed within which existing models of spread components are reconciled. We show that existing models fail to decompose the spread into all its components. Two alternative extensions of the simple model are developed to identify all the components of the spread and to estimate the spread at which trades occur. The empirical results support the presence of a large order processing component and smaller, albeit significant, adverse selection and inventory components. The spread components differ significantly according to trade size and are also sensitive to assumptions about the relation between orders and trades.

Until 1983, the language of instruction for most subjects in grades 6 and above in Moroccan public schools was French. Beginning in 1983, the language of instruction for new cohorts of Moroccan sixth graders was switched to Arabic. We use this policy change to estimate the effect of French language skills on test scores and earnings. The estimates suggest that the elimination of compulsory French instruction led to a substantial reduction in the returns to schooling for Moroccans affected by the change. This reduction appears to be largely attributable to a loss of French writing skills.

Recent models of IPO underpricing suggest that high-quality firms underprice their IPOs to differentiate themselves from low-quality firms and, thus, receive a more favorable market response to subsequent equity offerings. We test this suggestion for 172 industrial firms that made an initial public offering during 1987–1991 and made a subsequent seasoned equity offering within three years of their IPO. We examine two measures of the impact of the hypothesized underpricing signal net of the cost of employing that signal. Inconsistent with the underpricing signal hypothesis, we find no evidence that firms recover the cost of an underpriced IPO in either higher issue proceeds or in greater wealth for the firm's initial owners.

This paper argues that the typical household's saving is better described by a “buffer-stock” version than by the traditional version of the Life Cycle/Permanent Income Hypothesis (LC/PIH) model. Buffer-stock behavior emerges if consumers with important income uncertainty are sufficiently impatient. In the traditional model, consumption growth is determined solely by tastes. In contrast, buffer-stock consumers set average consumption growth equal to average labor income growth, regardless of tastes. The model can explain three empirical puzzles: the “consumption/income parallel” documented by Carroll and Summers; the “consumption/income divergence” first documented in the 1930s; and the stability of the household age/wealth profile over time despite the unpredictability of idiosyncratic wealth changes.

The paper considers the estimation of welfare measures when the functional form of demand is unknown. An adaptation of an argument of Gallant (1987) is used to show that welfare estimators based on a Fourier functional form for demand will be consistent under weak assumptions. Simulation evidence is presented for equivalent variation. True demand is a generalized Box–Cox function, estimated demand is a Fourier form, and equivalent variation is estimated by applying Vartia's (1983) algorithm to the estimated demand function. The estimator of equivalent variation has small asymptotic bias in the case of the assumed family of data generating processes.

The decision to disclose information concerning a firm's environmental liabilities is modeled as a sequential game involving the firm, a capital market, and outside stakeholders who can impose proprietary (political) costs on the firm. A partial disclosure equilibrium is derived in which firms reveal information strategically, maximizing the share‐value net of expected political costs. Inherent uncertainty regarding the existence and size of the liabilities creates a setting where outsiders are uncertain if management is informed about these liabilities, so firms can plausibly withhold “bad news”, that is, they do not disclose liabilities that exceed a threshold level. Three novel hypotheses are that a firm is more likely to disclose as (1) its pollution propensity increases, (2) outsiders' knowledge of its environmental liabilities increases, and (3) the risk of incurring proprietary costs decreases. Empirical support is found for the hypotheses, based on the accounting disclosures made by sample firms selected from the records of the Ontario Ministry of the Environment and Energy. Improved accounting and auditing standards for environmental disclosure would build on at least three implications of the study: To the extent that inherent uncertainty leaves managers with discretion as to what to disclose, the partial disclosure equilibrium result suggests that not all firms will comply with disclosure standards. Publishing broad environmental performance indicators for companies in nonaccounting outlets would increase public awareness of a manager's private information endowment, making voluntary accounting disclosures of the liabilities more likely. If a significant decline in stakeholder tolerance of pollution occurs, the expected proprietary costs of disclosing increase, and companies become less likely to disclose.