Intellectual collaboration in science includes formal coauthorship as well as presentation of papers at workshops, seminars, and professional meetings and informal commentary from colleagues, journal referees, and editors. While the incidence and extent of formal coauthorship are greater in biology than in economics, the extent of intellectual collaboration is greater in economics than in biology. Intellectual property rights to coauthored papers in economics tend to be assigned alphabetically, whereas biology is characterized by a strong merit‐based (nonalphabetical) assignment of intellectual property rights. These patterns do not result from differences in the relative importance of funding/physical capital.

Differences in test scores of white and black students have narrowed substantially over time, falling by one‐half since 1970s. Some have speculated that this convergence is due to changes in family background or convergence in school quality. In this article we decompose the convergence in test scores into that portion due to changes in parental education, changes in school quality, and a narrowing of the within‐school gap in test scores. Only about 25% of the overall convergence is attributable to changing family and school characteristics. We find that nearly 75% of the convergence is attributable to changes within schools.

We view debt and outside equity as serving to elicit credible information from different specialists about the value of an enterprise in its various uses. The equity valuation specialist provides a price forecast for equity that reveals information about the value of the enterprise in its primary use. The debt valuation specialist provides a price forecast for debt that reveals information about the value of the enterprise in its alternative use. The prices forecast by the valuation specialists credibly reveal their private information because they are required to buy the associated claims at the forecast prices, thereby bonding their valuations.

During the nineteenth century most Western societies extended voting rights, a decision that led to unprecedented redistributive programs. We argue that these political reforms can be viewed as strategic decisions by the political elite to prevent widespread social unrest and revolution. Political transition, rather than redistribution under existing political institutions, occurs because current transfers do not ensure future transfers, while the extension of the franchise changes future political equilibria and acts as a commitment to redistribution. Our theory also offers a novel explanation for the Kuznets curve in many Western economies during this period, with the fall in inequality following redistribution due to democratization.

The national income and product accounts (NIPA) are the most important measures of overall economic activity for a nation. Much as a satellite in space can survey the weather across an entire continent, so can the GDP give an overall picture of the state of the economy. Nevertheless, since their inception, there have been concerms that the accounts are incomplete and misleading because they omit vast continents of nonmarket activity such as unpaid work, the value of leisure time, investment in human capital, and most recently, the environment. The threshold question is: why should we devote scarce intellectual resources to studying nonmarket sectors? The basic insight behind nonmarket accounts is that economic and social welfare does not stop at the market's border, but extends to many nonmarket activities. Three particular areas are worth emphasizing. One important reason why we need better measures of nonmarket activity is because we spend increasingly fewer of our lifetime hours in market activities. A second and more speculative reason concems the growing importance (or at least the great importance) of nonmarket assets or mispriced market assets such as the environment and technology. A third point is that current measures of national saving and investment are highly defective. The examples later in this paper address each of these issues. Many of these issues were reviewed in a recent report on augmented accounting

Requiem for the Representative Consumer? Aggregate Implications of Microeconomic Consumption Behavior by Christopher D. Carroll. Published in volume 90, issue 2, pages 110-115 of American Economic Review, May 2000

The stock price effects for the domestic competitors of foreign acquisition targets in the US are found to be significantly positive. These results imply that signals of favorable industry conditions conveyed through cross-border acquisitions dominate any perceived changes in competitive balance. Consistent with the information-signaling hypothesis, the stock price effects are more favorable for relatively small competitors, for rivals with stock returns that are highly correlated with the target’s stock returns, when the targets experience favorable stock price effects, in technologically-intense industries, for rivals with poor prior performance, and with related acquisitions. Consistent with the competitive hypothesis, the stock price effects are less favorable with high degrees of financial leverage and when the acquirers already have a presence in the US.

We study the consequences of hospital competition for Medicare beneficiaries' heart attack care from 1985 to 1994. We examine how relatively exogenous determinants of hospital choice such as travel distances influence the competitiveness of hospital markets, and how hospital competition interacts with the influence of managed-care organizations to affect the key determinants of social welfare—expenditures on treatment and patient health outcomes. In the 1980s the welfare effects of competition were ambiguous; but in the 1990s competition unambiguously improves social welfare. Increasing HMO enrollment over the sample period partially explains the dramatic change in the impact of hospital competition.

We analyse the decision of an agent with time-inconsistent preferences to consume a good that exerts an externality on future welfare. The extent of the externality is initially unknown, but may be learned via a costless sampling procedure. We show that when the agent cannot commit to future consumption and learning decisions, incomplete learning may occur on a Markov perfect equilibrium path of the resulting intra-personal game. In such a case, each agent's incarnation stops learning for some values of the posterior distribution of beliefs and acts under self-restricted information. This conduct is interpreted as strategic ignorance. All equilibria featuring this property strictly Pareto dominate the complete learning equilibrium for any posterior distribution of beliefs.