This paper formalizes a widely discussed peer effect titled “acting White.” “Acting White” is modeled as a two-audience signaling quandary: signals that induce high wages can be signals that induce peer group rejection. Without peer effects, equilibria involve all ability types choosing different levels of education. “Acting White” alters the equilibrium dramatically: the (possibly empty) set of lowest ability individuals and the set of highest ability individuals continue to reveal their type through investments in education; ability types in the middle interval pool on a common education level. Only those in the lower intervals are accepted by the group. The model's predictions fit many stylized facts in the anthropology and sociology literatures regarding social interactions among minority group members.

It is often claimed that well-capitalized banks are less inclined to increase asset risk, because the option value of deposit insurance decreases with capitalization. However, bankers, regulators and some academics challenge this view. Since the traditional view relies on studies that neglect the managerial agency problem and do not consider “higher-risk, higher-return” assets, we revisit the issue assuming that three agents – deposit insurers, shareholders, and managers – all influence banks' risk levels. We examine four distinct assumptions on the characteristics of risk–return profiles and derive conditions under which banks' risk decreases or increases with capitalization.

We introduce imperfect creditor protection in a multicountry Schumpeterian growth model. The theory predicts that any country with more than some critical level of financial development will converge to the growth rate of the world technology frontier, and that all other countries will have a strictly lower long-run growth rate. We present evidence supporting these and other implications, in the form of a cross-country growth regression with a significant and sizable negative coefficient on initial per-capita GDP (relative to the United States) interacted with financial intermediation. In addition, we find that other variables representing schooling, geography, health, policy, politics, and institutions do not affect the significance of the interaction between financial intermediation and initial per capita GDP, and do not show any independent effect on convergence in the regressions. Our findings are robust to removal of outliers and to alternative conditioning sets, estimation procedures, and measures of financial development.

We examine interactions between flexible financing and investment decisions in a model with stockholder–bondholder conflicts over investment policy. We find that financial flexibility encourages the choice of short-term debt thereby dramatically reducing the agency costs of under- and overinvestment. However, the reduction in agency costs may not encourage the firm to increase leverage, since the firm's initial debt level choice depends on the type of growth options in its investment opportunity set. The model has a number of testable predictions for the joint choice of leverage and maturity, and how these choices interact with a firm's growth opportunities.

We analyze a general equilibrium model in which there is both adverse selection of, and moral hazard by, banks. The regulator can screen banks prior to giving them a licence, audit them ex post to learn the success probability of their projects, and impose capital adequacy requirements. Capital requirements combat moral hazard when the regulator has a strong screening reputation, and they otherwise substitute for screening ability. Crises of confidence can occur only in the latter case, and contrary to conventional wisdom, the appropriate policy response may be to tighten capital requirements to improve the quality of surviving banks.

This paper demonstrates that mall store contracts are written to internalize externalities through both an efficient allocation and pricing of space, and an efficient allocation of incentives across stores. Certain stores generate externalities by drawing customers to other stores, whereas many stores primarily benefit from external mall traffic. Therefore, to varying degrees, the success of each store depends upon the presence and effort of other stores, and the effort of the developer to attract customers to the mall. Using a unique data set of mall tenant contracts, we show that rental contracts are written to (i) efficiently price the net externality of each store and (ii) align the incentives to induce optimal effort by the developer and each mall store according to the externality of each store's effort.

We consider how fund managers respond to the conflicting preferences of their investors. We focus on the conflict between the taxable and retirement accounts of international funds, which face different tradeoffs between dividends and capital gains. In principle, managers could resolve this conflict through dividend arbitrage, but a proprietary database of dividend-arbitrage transactions shows that in practice they cannot. Thus, managers must resolve it through their investment policies. We find robust evidence that managers with more retirement money favor the preferences of retirement investors and further evidence for this view in the difference between U.S. and Canadian funds’ portfolio weights.

Using microdata from the 1994–1998 International Adult Literacy Survey for nine countries, we examine the role of cognitive skills in explaining higher wage inequality in the United States. We find that while the greater dispersion of cognitive test scores in the United States plays a part in explaining higher U.S. wage inequality, higher labor market prices (i.e., higher returns to measured human capital and cognitive performance) and greater residual inequality still play important roles, and are, on average, quantitatively considerably more important than differences in the distribution of test scores in explaining higher U.S. wage inequality.

From a macroeconomic perspective, the shortterm interest rate is a policy instrument under the direct control of the central bank, which adjusts the rate to achieve its economic stabilization goals. From a finance perspective, the short rate is a fundamental building block for yields of other maturities, which are just riskadjusted averages of expected future short rates. Thus, as illustrated by much recent research, a joint macro-finance modeling strategy will provide the most comprehensive understanding of the term structure of interest rates. In this paper, we discuss some salient questions that arise in this research, and we also present a new examination of the relationship between two prominent dynamic, latent factor models in this literature: the Nelson-Siegel and affine no-arbitrage term-structure models. I. Questions about Modeling Yields 1. Why Use Factor Models for Bond Yields?—The first problem faced in term-structure modeling is how to summarize the price information at any point in time for the large number of nominal bonds that are traded. In fact, since only a small number of sources of systematic risk appear to underlie the pricing of the myriad of tradable financial assets, nearly all bond price information can be summarized with just a few constructed variables or factors. Therefore, yield-curve models almost invariably employ a structure that consists of a small set of factors and the associated factor loadings