We investigate the strict-exogeneity assumption, a necessary condition for estimator consistency in many finance panel-data applications. We outline tests for strict exogeneity in both traditional (non–instrumental variable (IV)) and IV settings. When we apply these tests in common traditional finance panel regressions, we find that the strict-exogeneity assumption is often strongly rejected, suggesting large inference errors. We test for strict exogeneity in specific finance panel-data IV settings and illustrate the potential for these tests to help confirm, or rule out, the validity of common panel-data IV estimators. We offer recommendations to address the strict-exogeneity issue in finance research.

This study examines how frequently firms restate when they materially misstate their financial statements using stock option backdating as the setting. Stock option backdating provides a unique opportunity to study this issue because it is possible to estimate misstatements with publicly available information to a high level of confidence, and the extensive media coverage of backdating notified boards of directors of the significant risk of misstatement. After identifying firms that materially misstated earnings due to stock option backdating with 95 percent (99 percent) probability, we find that only 11.5 percent (16.1 percent) of these firms subsequently restated. Restating firms are larger, have greater board independence, higher litigation risk and ROA, a lower market‐to‐book ratio, less discretionary accruals, and are more likely to have a CFO that was not involved in backdating. Restating firms are also more likely to disclose other adverse news, face securities litigation, and turn over the CFO than firms that appear to materially backdate but do not restate. Since nearly 9 of 10 firms failed to restate, our results give pause to researchers who use restatements as an indicator of misreporting, and to regulators who levy penalties on those who do self‐report.

We show that borrowing firms benefit substantially from important enforcement actions issued on U.S. banks for safety and soundness reasons. Using hand-collected data on such actions from the main three U.S. regulators and syndicated loan deals over the years 1997–2014, we find that enforcement actions decrease the total cost of borrowing by approximately 22 basis points (or $4.6 million interest for the average loan). We attribute our finding to a competition-reputation effect that works over and above the lower risk of punished banks post-enforcement and survives in a number of sensitivity tests. We also find that this effect persists for approximately four years post-enforcement.

We examine how firms' accounting quality affects their reaction to monetary policy. The balance sheet channel of monetary policy predicts that the quality of firms' accounting reports plays a role in transmitting monetary policy by affecting information asymmetries between firms and capital providers. Consistent with this prediction, we find that accounting quality moderates firms' equity market response and future investment sensitivity to unexpected changes in monetary policy. Moreover, the former relation is amplified for firms with more growth opportunities and more financial constraints, further consistent with accounting quality moderating the transmission of monetary policy.

We find that firms’ tax planning exhibits strategic reactions: firms respond to changes in their industry-competitors’ tax planning by changing their own tax planning in the same direction. We document evidence of these strategic reactions in two distinct research settings that entail an exogenous increase and decrease in competitors’ tax planning. We also find evidence that strategic reactions stem from concerns about appearing more tax aggressive than industry competitors, some evidence that they stem from firms learning from the tax planning of their industry competitors, and no consistent evidence that they stem from leader-follower dynamics.

While prior research focuses on the audit team made up of auditors, we focus on the collective audit team made up of auditors and specialists—in our context, information technology (IT) specialists. Complex systems in today's audits and researcher and regulator concerns regarding ineffective coordination and communication between the two specializations motivate better understanding of this collective audit team. We investigate how auditors and IT specialists perceive their relationship and how the audit process unfolds when these relationships are good and when they are difficult. Results of interviews conducted with Big 4 audit and IT practitioners provide evidence that they perceive their relationship quality to depend on the level of mutual value and respect. Auditors assert a one‐team view of the collective audit team that includes IT specialists, but IT specialists feel auditors see them as a separate team and a “necessary evil.” The audit process vastly differs between relationships perceived as difficult and good. In difficult relationships, the two specializations often struggle for status, with limited communication or effort to understand how their work fits together. Our findings imply difficult relationships are at risk for poor integration and unsupported reliance on IT functions, shedding light on recurring threats to audit quality identified by PCAOB inspections. In good relationships, auditors and IT specialists appear motivated to engage in frequent and open communication to help understand, coordinate, and complete the audit. Inferences gleaned from good relationships let us highlight prescriptions for audit firms to improve effectiveness of collective audit teams.

We examine the effect of stakeholder orientation on firms' cost management as proxied by selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) cost stickiness. Using a sample of 19,783 firm‐years, we find that customer and employee orientation are associated with greater SG&A cost stickiness. Furthermore, the effect of customer orientation on SG&A cost stickiness is more prominent in firms where SG&A costs create high future value, growth firms, and firms with strong corporate governance. In contrast, the effect of employee orientation on SG&A cost stickiness is stronger in firms where SG&A costs create low future value, mature firms, and firms with weak corporate governance. Overall, the association between customer orientation and SG&A cost stickiness is consistent with efficiency considerations (i.e., adjustment costs). In contrast, the association between employee orientation and SG&A cost stickiness is consistent with agency motives such as empire building or “a preference for a quiet life.” In sum, we provide evidence that corporate orientation toward different stakeholders can have different efficiency implications in the context of SG&A resource adjustments and cost management.

Motivated by recent changes to corporate governance standards around the world, we use a regulatory shock that substantially altered the governance structure for some firms to shed light on the long-term impact of mandates that are of global interest. Firms affected by this shock had lower values and non-mandated governance practices that were less shareholder friendly before the mandates were in effect when compared to unaffected matched peers. In the post-mandate period, we document a 48% tightening of the relative value gap, and show that this gap relates to the continued use of less shareholder friendly non-mandated governance practices. Our results suggest that governance mandates can tighten, but not eliminate, the value gap between poorly and well governed firms, and that firms affected by the shock continue to have less shareholder friendly governance cultures long after regulatory intervention.