This study examines the association between abnormal returns and five alternative proxies for the market's assessment of unexpected quarterly earnings. We examine the role that measurement error potentially has in multiple regression tests of abnormal returns (occuring around the time of earnings announcements) on an unexpected earnings proxy and other non-earnings variables. The results indicate a potential measurement error interpretation of such multiple regression tests. We examine three procedures which reduce, to an unknown degree, the measurement error problem. Our procedures appear to be more (less) effective at reducing measurement error for small (large) firms and recent (non-recent) forecasts.

The study and evaluation of internal control requires an auditor to analyze all key controls and control relationships included in each major transaction cycle. Gaining the requisite level of understanding can become a formidable task where complex systems with intricate control relationships, computer‐based accounting systems, or systems with suspected collusion, are involved. This study describes an audit simulation model which is designed to assist auditors in evaluating and documenting the reliability of complex internal control systems. The proposed simulation extends previous ones in two primary respects. First, dependencies between error and control processes can be modeled, which allows an auditor to investigate the effects of collusion on system reliability and final balance error amounts. Second, the simulation is an interactive computer model which can be tailored to different client applications without the need for programming knowledge. An application of the simulation approach in a typical payroll cycle is described. Résumé. L'étude et l'évaluation du contrôle interne nécessitent de la part du vérificateur d'analyser l'ensemble des contrôles‐clé et les liens entre les contrôles compris dans chaque cycle d'opération important. L'obtention du niveau de compréhension requis peut s'avérer une tâche énorme lorsque le praticien étudie des systèmes à interrelations complexes, des systèmes comptables informatisés ou des systèmes où la collusion est soupçonnée. Cette étude décrit un modèle de simulation en vérification destiné à aider les vérificateurs dans l'évaluation et la documentation de la fiabilité de systèmes de contrôle interne complexes. La simulation proposée constitue un prolongement de simulations précédentes sous deux aspects primordiaux. En premier lieu, les dépendances entre les processus d'erreur et de contrôle peuvent être modelées, ce qui permet au vérificateur d'examiner les effets de la collusion sur la fiabilité des systèmes et les montants des erreurs dans les soldes finals. En deuxième lieu, la simulation est un modèle informatisé interactif qui peut être adapté aux diverses applications d'une entreprise sans avoir à posséder des connaissances en programmation. Un exemple d'application de cette approche de simulation, dans le contexte d'un cycle de paye, est présenté.

In this Review (1983), Mark McBride reconsiders the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) enforcement policy toward vertical mergers between cement and ready-mix concrete firms. In response to a significant increase in acquisitions of ready-mix concrete firms by cement manufacturers during the 1960's, the FTC undertook a series of legal actions to block or dissolve the mergers. The actions of the FTC constituted one of the most intensive efforts undertaken to date to challenge vertical mergers in a single industry.' McBride (p. 1012) notes that the actions of the FTC provoked considerable debate concerning the motivation for the mergers both in the industry and in academe. A significant number of articles were published advancing various reasons for the mergers. In addition to the FTC's main contention that the mergers were motivated by a desire for captive markets, it has been suggested that there were economies of integration or that the mergers were the outcome of an erroneous view of the potential benefits to foreclosure held by executives in the beleaguered cement industry.2 McBride's 1983 paper offers another explanation for the mergers. His argument is that vertical integration was undertaken to avoid rigid oligopolistic pricing in the cement industry.3 The empirical results presented by McBride suggest that vertical integration was a significant factor in the decline of cement prices in the 1960's. The purpose of this comment is to point out some of the problems with McBride's analysis. In particular, we show that the experimental design of his testing equation is faulty and does not offer a test of his hypothesis. As a result, McBride's analysis does not provide convincing evidence on whether cement firms vertically integrated to avoid rigid oligopolistic pricing, or if cement firms were merely reacting to prices that had already begun to decline. Our intent, however, is not to challenge McBride's contention that vertical integration can provide lower prices to consumers. Rather, we would argue that the evidence presented at the FTC hearings involving cement and ready-mix concrete firms as well as McBride's and others' analyses illustrate the problems in discerning the motives for mergers.4

We investigate the valuation consequences of voluntary proposals to sell part or all of a corporation's assets. For partial sell-offs, successful sellers and buyers reap statistically significant abnormal returns of 1.66% and 0.83%, respectively. Unsuccessful sellers realize gains at the bid announcement of 1.41% that are lost at the offer termination. In contrast, proposals to liquidate the firm are associated with significant average abnormal returns of 12.24%. We interpret these findings as evidence that asset sales are associated with the movement of resources to higher-valued uses rather than as evidence of market mispricing before the divestiture announcements.

Empirically estimated flexible functional forms frequently fail to satisfy the appropriate theoretical curvature conditions. Lau and Gallant and Golub have worked out methods for imposing the appropriate curvature conditions locally, but those local techniques frequently fail to yield satisfactory results. We develop two methods for imposing curvature conditions globally in the context of cost function estimation. The first method adopts Lau's technique to a generalization of a functional form first proposed by McFadden. Using this Generalized McFadden functional form, it turns out that imposing the appropriate curvature conditions at one data point imposes the conditions globally. The second method adopts a technique used by McFadden and Barnett, which is based on the fact that a non-negative sum of concave functions will be concave. Our various suggested techniques are illustrated using the U.S. Manufacturing data utilized by Berndt and Khaled

In this paper we analyze an aggregative general equilibriiri model in which the use of money is motivated by a cash-in-advance constraint, applied to purchases of a subset of consumption goods. The system is subject to both real and nxnetary shocks, which are economy-wide and observed by all. We develop methods for verifying the existence of, characterizing, and explicitly calculating equilibria. A main result of the analysis is that current money growth affects the current real allocation only insofar as it affects expectations about future money growth, i.e., only through its value as a signal.

It has long been recognized that financial reporting influences the decisions of external parties interesting in gauging organizational performance. More recently, it has been argued that it may also influence managerial decisions made within the reporting entity. This article examines the relationship between external financial reporting and three levels of decisions made within organizations: operating control, management control, and strategic planning decisions. A review of the accounting literature dealing with stewardship, accountability and information inductance, and selected studies in organizational theory and sociology leads us to hypothesize that financial reporting exerts its strongest influence on strategic planning across four phases of the decision process. Evidence gathered from a case study mode of analysis that entailed distributing a description of a fictitious electronics company operating in a dynamic and complex industry to corporate managers and independent auditors, supports this primary hypothesis. Various implications for managerial decision making, the promulgation of external financial reporting policies, and further research are examined. Résumé. Il est admis depuis longtemps que la publication de l'information financière influence les décisions des tiers intéressés à mesurer la performance d'une organisation. Plus récemment, certains ont affirmé qu'elle peut également influencer les décisions de gestion prises à l'intérieur même de l'entreprise. Cet article étudie la relation entre la publication de l'information financière et trois niveaux de décisions de la firme: des décisions de contrôle d'exploitation, de contrôle de gestion, et de planification stratégique. Un examen de la documentation comptable portant sur l'aspect fiduciaire, sur l'obligation redditionnelle et sur l'information incitative, ainsi que diverses études en théorie organisationnelle et en sociologie, nous amènent à poser l'hypothèse que la publication de l'information financière exerce sa plus forte influence sur la planification stratégique à travers quatre phases du processus décisionnel. Les informations probantes recueillies au moyen d'une étude de cas qui a nécessité la distribution, à des gestionnaires de sociétés ainsi qu'à des vérificateurs, d'une description d'une société d'électronique fictive œuvrant dans un secteur industriel dynamique et complexe, appuient l'hypothèse fondamentale. Sont examinées également diverses conséquences sur les décisions de gestion, la promulgation de politiques relatives à la publication de l'information financière et les possibilités de recherche future.