This paper explains that value relevance research assesses how well accounting amounts reflect information used by equity investors, and provides insights into questions of interest to standard setters. A primary focus of financial statements is equity investment. Other uses of financial statement information, such as contracting, do not diminish the importance of value relevance research. Value relevance questions can be addressed using extant valuation models. Value relevance studies address econometric issues that otherwise could limit inferences, and can accommodate and be used to study the implications of accounting conservatism.

In this paper, we propose that affective reactions are integral to accounting decision contexts like capital budgeting, and that researchers must jointly consider affect and cognition to better understand accounting decision makers' behavior. We argue that interpersonal relationships are characteristic of many capital-budgeting contexts, and that these relationships can lead to emotional affective reactions. For example, reactions such as frustration and anger may result if a manager is treated unfairly by another individual involved in a capital project. Drawing on relevant work in neurobiology and psychology, we then predict that these affective reactions can influence managers' capital-budgeting decisions. We report on four experimental scenarios that demonstrate the impact of affective reactions on capital-budgeting decisions. Consistent with our predictions, the results indicate that managers consider both financial data and affective reactions when evaluating the utility of an investment alternative. Our results suggest that researchers should consider both affect and cognition to more fully understand decision making in accounting contexts.

We investigate the trade-off between the benefits from bank monitoring when a banker is represented on a firm's board and the costs from two sources: conflicts of interests between lenders and shareholders, and U.S. legal doctrines that generate lender liability for bankers on boards of firms in financial distress. Consistent with high costs of active involvement, bankers are on boards of large, stable firms with high proportions of collateralizable assets and low reliance on short-term financing. While permitting banks to own equity could mitigate conflicts, the protection of shareholder versus creditor rights could continue to reduce the role of U.S. banks in corporate governance.

This paper introduces a model in which the firm's returns depend on trading volume when the firm defers disclosure, because market makers use volume to draw inferences about better-informed investors' private information on firm value. In addition, we show that a firm's commitment to a policy of timely disclosure of a broader range of outcomes dampens the slope coefficient on volume in a Taylor expansion of the log of the absolute value of returns on volume. The reason for this is that when a firm commits to a policy of timely disclosure of a broader range of outcomes, the deferral of a report indicates that the outcome is extreme. This heightens adverse selection. In turn, this makes informed trade more costly and hence less likely, thereby rendering returns less dependent on trading volume as a source of information about firm value. This result predicts that firms committing to more disclosure should experience a smaller slope coefficient on trading volume. Thus, the slope coefficient offers a potential tool for measuring the economic consequences of shifts in disclosure regimes.

This paper examines the often stated idea that the poor do not support high levels of redistribution because of the hope that they, or their offspring, may make it up the income ladder. This "prospect of upward mobility" (POUM) hypothesis is shown to be fully compatible with rational expectations, and fundamentally linked to concavity in the mobility process. A steady-state majority could even be simultaneously poorer than average in terms of current income, and richer than average in terms of expected future incomes. A first empirical assessment suggests, on the other hand, that in recent U. S. data the POUM effect is probably dominated by the demand for social insurance.<br> "In the future, everyone will be world-famous for fifteen minutes"<br> [Andy Warhol 1968].

Over half of money fund managers voluntarily waive fees they have a contractual right to claim. Moreover, as a consequence of fee waivers, funds on average collect one half of reported expense ratios. Variation in fee waivers is significant and relates to differences in relative performance. Both low‐performing retail and institutional funds waive fees to improve their net performance. More interestingly, high‐performing retail, but not institutional, funds use fee waivers to strategically adjust net performance to increase expected fund flows. Despite fund flow incentives, high‐performing institutional funds do not waive more because they cannot significantly improve their relative performance.

This study examines the relation between analysts' incentives to cover firms and the extent of their intangible assets. Because intangible assets typically are unrecognized and estimates of their fair values are not disclosed, absent analyst coverage firms with more intangible assets likely have less informative prices. Accordingly, we expect analysts have greater incentives to cover firms with more intangible assets and, thus, predict they have higher analyst coverage. As predicted, we find that analyst coverage is significantly greater for firms with larger research and development and advertising expenses relative to their industry, and for firms in industries with larger research and development expense. We also predict and find that analyst coverage is increasing in firm size, growth, trading volume, equity issuance, and perceived mispricing, and is decreasing in the size of the firm's analysts' brokerage houses and the effort analysts expend to follow the firm. These findings indicate that analyst coverage depends on private benefits and costs of covering a firm. We also test hypotheses related to analyst effort. We predict and find that analysts expend greater effort to follow firms with more intangible assets, after controlling for other factors associated with analyst effort. Our evidence indicates that intangible assets, most of which are not recognized in firms' financial statements, are associated with greater incentives for analysts to cover such firms, and greater costs of coverage. An open question is whether financial statement recognition of intangible assets could more efficiently provide information about such assets to investors.

This paper develops an asymptotic theory of inference for an unrestricted two-regime threshold autoregressive (TAR) model with an autoregressive unit root. We find that the asymptotic null distribution of Wald tests for a threshold are nonstandard and different from the stationary case, and suggest basing inference on a bootstrap approximation. We also study the asymptotic null distributions of tests for an autoregressive unit root, and find that they are nonstandard and dependent on the presence of a threshold effect. We propose both asymptotic and bootstrap-based tests. These tests and distribution theory allow for the joint consideration of nonlinearity (thresholds) and nonstationary (unit roots). Our limit theory is based on a new set of tools that combine unit root asymptotics with empirical process methods. We work with a particular two-parameter empirical process that converges weakly to a two-parameter Brownian motion. Our limit distributions involve stochastic integrals with respect to this two-parameter process. This theory is entirely new and may find applications in other contexts. We illustrate the methods with an application to the U.S. monthly unemployment rate. We find strong evidence of a threshold effect. The point estimates suggest that the threshold effect is in the short-run dynamics, rather than in the dominate root. While the conventional ADF test for a unit root is insignificant, our TAR unit root tests are arguably significant. The evidence is quite strong that the unemployment rate is not a unit root process, and there is considerable evidence that the series is a stationary TAR process.

We use event-time methodology to study legal insider trading associated with mergers circa 1900. For mergers with “prospective” disclosures similar to today's, we find substantial value gains at announcement, implying participation by “out-side” shareholders despite the absence of insider constraints. Furthermore, preannouncement stock-price runups, relative to total value gain, are no more than those observed for modern mergers. Insider regulation apparently has produced little benefit for outsiders, with the inside information-pricing function and related gains shifting to external “information specialists.” Other results suggest market penalties for nondisclosure; i.e., insider trading is less successful in a restricted information environment.

This paper investigates long-term interdependencies and short-term dynamics in currency futures utilizing intraday data for six major foreign currencies: the British Pound, Deutsche Mark, Swiss Franc, Australian Dollar, Canadian Dollar, and Japanese Yen. Lack of cointegration (CI) among the foreign exchange futures is found to be the prevailing mode of behavior, but some temporary deviations from the no-CI condition are detected. There is a notable overlap between detected CI relationships and the timing of policy changes, world events, and regime shifts, indicating that the observed CIs are event-driven. The robustness of the CI results is checked with respect to variations in the model, lag structure, data period, sample horizon, and currency basket grouping. Impulse–response functions (IRFs) reveal that currency markets are in general efficient and absorb new information within the day. The interdependence among currencies is found to be asymmetric.